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THE STRUGGLE FOR THE VALTELINE, 1621-1639:
THE ALPINE CAMPAIGNS OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

by

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A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE STRUGGLE FOR THE VALTELINE, 1621-1639: THE ALPINE CAMPAIGNS OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, submitted by David C. Norwood in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

The Thirty Years's War, which dominated the second quarter of the seventeenth century, turned on a great many issues and involved most of Europe's great powers, but in broadest terms it quickly evolved into another phase of the long struggle between France and the Habsburgs. Most general accounts of the war suggest that until 1635 France limited her efforts to subsidizing the enemies of Habsburg interests and that only after the crushing defeat of Swedish and Protestant German forces at Nördlingen did France make direct commitments. For over a decade before entering directly into the war in Germany, however, the French were involved deeply in a direct and rather large-scale opposition to Habsburg forces in the Alps, in the area called the Grisons and the Valteline. This thesis examines that French effort, investigates the problems it encountered and attempts to evaluate its successes and its failures.

After a brief introduction, Chapter I relates French efforts to close the important Alpine passes to the transit of Spanish troops in the early 1620's, efforts which commenced with the Treaty of Madrid (1621), which was favourable to French interests, and which culminated in the Treaty of Monçon (1626), favourable to Spanish interests. Chapter II considers the long-drawn skirmishing between the French and the Habsburgs, partly military but mostly diplomatic, during

the late 1620's and early 1630's, and attempts to relate the shifting positions of the major powers to the religious civil war in France and to the emergence of a succession dispute concerning the strategic north Italian territories of Mantua and Montferrat. Chapter III describes the preparations for and the execution of the military campaigns of the Duke of Rohan in the Valteline during the mid-1630's, when France made heavy commitments in an effort to check the resurgent power of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire. Finally, the conclusion analyzes the results of the French efforts and attempts to suggest some perspectives meaningful for the whole study. Two appendices follow, one a detailed description of the topography of the area in question and of the routes through it, the other a presentation of the Franco-Spanish treaties and other diplomatic instruments upon which the study turns.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- Avenel, Lettres. Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de. Lettres, instructions diplomatiques et papiers du Cardinal de Richelieu, ed. M. Avenel. 8 vols., Paris, 1853-1877.
- Bassompierre, Mémoires. Bassompierre, François, maréchal de. Journal de ma vie: Mémoires de Bassompierre. 4 vols., Paris, 1870-1877.
- Le Vassor. Le Vassor, Michel. Histoire du règne de Louis XIII, roi de France et de Navarre. 10 vols., in 15, Amsterdam, 1701-1711.
- M.F. Mercure François, ou, Suite de l'Histoire de nostre temps sous le Regne du Tres-Chrestien Roy de France & de Navarre. Vols. VI-XXI, Paris, 1621-1639.
- Rohan, Valteline. Rohan, Henri, duc de. Mémoires du duc de Rohan sur la guerre de la Valteline. Vol. 19 of Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France, ed. Michaud et Poujoulat, Paris, 1854.
- Rott. Rott, Edouard. Histoire de la représentation diplomatique de la France, auprès des Cantons Suisses, de leurs alliés et de leurs confédérés. 10 vols., in 11, Berne and Bümpliz, 1900-1935.

GRISONS (Graubünden)

TOPOGRAPHY


Adapted from "Tourist Map of Switzerland" (Swiss Bank Corporation Bern) and the
Landeskarte der Schweiz 1:50,000 Eidgenössische Landestopographie Wabern-Bern.

MILES



Drawn and Compiled by David C. Notwood 1970.

MAP 1



LEGEND

- ROUTE
- Spilgen P. PASSmajor
- Casana P. PASSminor
- CHUR Capital
- ADD River stream

INTRODUCTION

During the series of conflicts known generally as the Thirty Years' War, which dominated international affairs in Europe during most of the first half of the seventeenth century, a relatively small area called the pays du Grisons, or Grisons, and especially its southern region, the Valteline,¹ assumed an importance out of all proportion to its size.

The foundation of the strength of the Habsburgs at this time was the power of Spain. The Grisons was of tremendous strategic importance to the Spanish Habsburgs, and consequently to the Austrian Habsburgs, because the Valteline, its major valley, constituted a direct route from Spain's northern Italian possessions (specifically, Genoa and the Milanese) to both the Austrian Tyrol and the upper Rhine. The Spanish had need of the Valteline for two main reasons: first, to supply troops to the Austrian Habsburgs for the war in Germany; second, and more important, to move troops into the Holy Roman Empire and down the Rhine to the region of the Spanish Netherlands, in order to protect their interests there. The naval strength of the Dutch, with whom Spain was at war, prevented the latter from moving soldiers to the north by the sea route, around the coast of Spain and France, then through the Channel.

France also evinced a considerable interest in the

Grisons and the Valteline, because Spain's successful movement of soldiers through the Grisons and down the Rhine would threaten its security. So long as internal Huguenot rebellions prevented commitment to a general conflict with Spain, it was in the Valteline mainly, and in the Grisons generally, that France chose to obstruct Habsburg war efforts.

The Grisons, in German Graubünden, is the largest and most easterly of the Swiss cantons. Its entire terrain is composed of mountains and valleys, and it is the source of three important rivers: the Rhine, the Inn and the Adda.² The Rhine flows generally north through the Grisons and into Lake Constance; the Inn flows northeastward into the Tyrol and joins the Danube; and the Adda flows through the Valteline into Lake Como, then south from the lake to join the Po.

The Valteline is a long valley that runs directly eastward from Lake Como for almost forty miles, then turns northeastward for another thirty-five miles, culminating in the steep Stelvio pass, beyond which lies the Tyrol. The Valteline itself was important as a direct route from the Spanish Milanese to the Austrian Tyrol, and it also was important in that it afforded connections to other valleys which could cut many days from the time required to travel from northern Italy to the Holy Roman Empire.

Several of the passes of the Grisons and Valteline are important. The Splügen and Maloja passes, the southern access to which was controlled by the town of Chiavenna,³

lead to the Rhine river and the Inn river respectively. The Bernina pass joins the Valteline to the Inn somewhat further northeast. The Julier pass made possible transit between the high valley of the Inn, the Upper Engadine, and the important center of Chur, on the Rhine. The Albula and Flüela passes permitted travel between the Lower Engadine, further down the Inn, and the important Prättigau valley, which opens on the Rhine just south of the Luziensteig (Steig) pass. The Luziensteig controlled access to the Grisons from the north.

In the area of Bormio, at the northeastern end of the Valteline, there are other passes of importance. Of these, the Stelvio was paramount, for it constituted a direct route from the Valteline into the Tyrol. Close to the Stelvio is the Umbrail pass, which controlled access from the Valteline to the Münsterthal (Val Müstair), a U-shaped valley running from the Adige river in the Tyrol to the Lower Engadine. South of Bormio and east of the Valteline is the Gavia pass, which controlled the route from the northeastern end of the Valteline south towards the city of Trent.

The Valteline is joined by seven valleys, including its opening on Lake Como, which combine to form a complex network of routes. The significant number of openings to the Valteline was both an advantage and a disadvantage to any forces attempting to pass through it. If one entrance or exit was blocked by enemy troops, the traversing force could move easily to the next opening. The situation

could be reversed with equal facility however, for complete, simultaneous defense of all openings was impossible and greatly increased chances of successful ambush. The fact that the entire area was mountainous was not always an advantage to the defender, as the Duke of Rohan was to discover in 1635. Instead of strengthening his position, he found that:

where one believed oneself to be assured of mountains as so many fortresses, it was found that they were open on all sides, and for every opening that was blocked ten more were discovered, so that it was necessary to have not just one good army, but several, to guard this territory.⁴

Yet regardless of its drawbacks, the Valteline was a necessary route for Spanish troop movements north. More than geography, the factors that made this area an insecure portion of the total route and that offered France an opportunity to contest the Spanish passage of the Alps were the religious divisions of the Grisons and the political sympathies of the neighbouring states, notably the Swiss cantons and the Republic of Venice.

At this time the Grisons was a federation allied with the Swiss Confederation. (It was not to become a canton until 1803.) The Grisons was composed of three small republics, each known as a league; collectively they were known as the Three Grey Leagues (les Trois Ligues Grises or die drey Grauen Bündt)⁵ or simply the Grey Leagues (Grisons or Graubünden).⁶

The Upper League (Ligue Haute) was the most southern and western of the three. Its area included the

sources of the Rhine, and its capital was Thusis. Its inhabitants spoke (and speak) the Romansh (Romansch) language,⁷ and approximately half of them were Catholic, the largest percentage in the three leagues.

The Younger League (Ligue Cadée) or League of God's House (Maison-Dieu or Gottehausbünd) was the largest of the three leagues. It encompassed the area surrounding the Oberhalbstein and Upper Engadine valleys, and its capital was at Chur, on the Rhine. Its inhabitants spoke mainly German, but there were strong Romansh and Italian minorities. Calvinism was the dominant religion, but there was a sizeable Catholic group.

The League of Ten Jurisdictions (Ligue des Dix-Juridictions or der Zehen Gerichten Bund) formed the northeastern portion of the federation and was the smallest league. It included the area of the Lower Engadine and Prättigau valleys, extending as far east as the upper reaches of the Adige river and as far north as Maienfeld and the Luziensteig pass. Its capital was Davos. Its people spoke mainly Romansh, but a large minority spoke German; and most were Protestant.

The leagues began to form independently of each other in the early fifteenth century; and in 1471 they established the Federation of the Grey Leagues through a treaty of perpetual alliance.⁸ The government of the federation was democratic; elected members sat annually in the general diet, which was revolved yearly among the three capitals. Each league also elected its own president,

or chief, who was empowered to deal with matters pertaining only to his own league. Late in the fifteenth century, the Upper League and God's House allied themselves with the Swiss Confederation; the League of Ten Jurisdictions joined the alliance in 1590.⁹ When the religious divisions that developed within the Swiss Confederation in the sixteenth century brought about the de facto existence of two unions within the confederation, the Grisons, along with the cities of Geneva and Neuchâtel, became the outer circle of the Protestant formation.

Of all the territory of the Grisons, only the Valteline (including Chiavenna) was overwhelmingly Catholic and therefore sympathetic to the Habsburg cause. As the effects of the Reformation spread through the Alpine regions, the Grisons, who had ruled the Valteline since the early sixteenth century, did not force the Valtelins to abjure their Catholic faith; they were content to settle Protestants beside Catholics in the Valteline, much to the consternation of the Valtelins. Yet the value of the Valteline as a route to strategic passes, which soon made it the center of international attention, also intensified religious issues, and religion became an important focus of the struggles between the Habsburgs and their enemies for control of the valley.

Aside from the opposition of the Protestant Grisons and their Swiss and French allies, the factor that most seriously threatened the Habsburgs' transit of the Valteline was the hostility of the Republic of Venice.

During the Italian Renaissance the wealthy commercial city had grown into a powerful state controlling mainland territories that reached far to the west, north and northeast. Staunchly independent, it opposed vigourously Habsburg expansion in northern Italy, and it guarded its independence of the papacy just as jealously. As a Catholic state opposed politically to both the Habsburgs and the papacy, the republic usually maintained cordial relations with France, which followed similar policies.

During this period the border of the Venetian republic extended northeastward, enclosing the entire northern end of the Adriatic, and north to the Austrian Tyrol. It then dipped south around Bolzano and Trent, swinging north again through the northern tip of Lake Garda up to the range of mountains which forms the southern side of the Valteline. It ran west along this range almost to Lake Como, then turned south, coming within a few miles of the city of Milan. In the southwest its border ran alongside the Duchy of Mantua to the Papal States, where it turned and ran to the Adriatic.¹⁰ This territory enclosed several important valleys or portions thereof, including the Val Camonica, the Val di Sole (western portion) and the Valfurva. The lower reaches of the Adige river also lay within Venetian borders, so that access to the Brenner pass via either the Adige river or the Val di Sole was impossible for the Spanish.

In the confused mixture of religious and political motivation of the early seventeenth century, the Catholic

Valtelins favoured closer ties with the Habsburgs, while the Protestant Grisons favoured ties with France and Venice. During the second decade of the seventeenth century these conflicting orientations led to violence when Spain attempted to secure the use of the Grisons and its subject territories, specifically the Valteline, for passage.

In 1603 the Spanish governor of the Milanese, the Duke of Fuentes, constructed a fort immediately east of Lake Como, on the delta of the Adda, which blocked, or was capable of blocking, access to any of the passes of the Grisons from the south and west. However, the fortress was not employed in a restrictive manner until 1616, when the Venetians, believing themselves deserted by France following an expedition into Italy headed by the Marshal of Lesdiguières, resolved to secure the Valteline for themselves. They formed an unofficial alliance with the Grisons which gave them equal rights of passage with either the French or the Spanish, both of which had used the Valteline when the need arose.¹¹ The alliance was of little benefit to either Venice or the Grisons, but it did serve to irritate the Spanish, who now began to realize the strategic importance of the Valteline. As a result, they ignored the traditional French influence in the territory and used the Fort of Fuentes to cut all communication between the Grisons and Italy. The blockade, which resulted in economic strangulation for the Grisons and starvation for its people, brought about the signing of a treaty between Milan and the Grisons on 9 and 19 March 1617 (which

never was ratified).¹² The treaty provided for Spanish rights of passage through the Valteline and Grisons to the Tyrol and Rhine and allowed Spain the right to recruit soldiers in the territory, a right traditionally French. In retaliation, the mountaineers established a criminal court in Thusis, the capital of the Upper League, which was the most Catholic of the three leagues, to deal with the "Spanish traitors".¹³ They outlawed the leaders of the Catholic-Habsburg party in the Valteline and set a reward upon their capture. In return, the Spanish faction attempted to retaliate by inciting a Catholic uprising and establishing its own criminal court in Chur, the capital of the largely Protestant League of God's House. The Protestant force proved to be the stronger, and both Spanish measures failed.

Encouraged by their success, the Protestants established a large Protestant church at Sondrio, the capital of the Valteline. The symbolic nature of the church produced an explosion that eventually would involve French, imperial and Spanish armies. Under the leadership of Robustelli de Grosotto, one of the leaders of the Catholic-Habsburg party, and supported by Don Gomez de Figueroa y Cordova, Duke of Feria, who was the Spanish governor of the Milanese, the Catholics of the Valteline planned to rid the valley of the Protestants. In the early morning of 20 July 1620, a large band of Catholics fell upon the Protestants of Tirano in the Valteline. Spurred on by the priests, the

attackers slaughtered Protestant men, women and children. Any Catholics who attempted to protest the massacre shared the same fate. From Tirano the killing spread westward toward Lake Como and Chiavenna. When it was over, between 350 and 600 people were dead.¹⁴ Sporadic killings also occurred in the Poschiavo valley and in Bormio.

It quickly became apparent to the shocked Grisons that the Spanish and Austrians were involved in the plan, for no sooner had the massacre ended than Austrian troops poured into the Valteline over the Stelvio pass and Spanish troops into the western end through Lake Como. International involvement in the Valteline and Grisons had become reality; it was not to end for two decades.

FOOTNOTES FOR INTRODUCTION

¹There are several spellings of "Valteline." C.V. Wedgwood, in The Thirty Years War (New York, 1961), refers to it as the Val Telline, which is an approximation of the German rendition. S.H. Steinberg, in The Thirty Years War and the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600-1660 (London, 1966), calls it the Valtellina, which is the Italian name. D.P. O'Connell, in Richelieu (London, 1968), renders it as Valtelline. As is the case with so many geographical locations, there is no consensus regarding a "proper" English form; and because of the large majority of French works cited in this thesis, this writer has decided to use the French spelling, that is, "Valteline".

²For a detailed geographical description of the Valteline, Grisons and surrounding area, see Appendix I, p. 149. For additional clarification, see also Map I: "Grisons: Topography", facing p. 1.

³Chiavenna is located north of Lake Como, on the Mera River. At this time, it was regarded as a separate administrative unit from the Valteline, as was the area surrounding Bormio, at the northeastern end of the Valteline. All three were subject territories of the Grisons, and usually were referred to as "the Valteline, Counties of Bormio and Chiavenna". For example, see M.F., X (Paris, 1625), 123-29: and Rohan, Valteline, pp. 611-12. In the following thesis, the term "Valteline" shall be used to denote all three areas, that is, the Valteline, Counties of Bormio and Chiavenna.

⁴Rohan, Valteline, p. 638.

⁵"die drey Grauen Bündt" is an archaic form of reference to the Grisons. It is cited in the Baron of Zur-Lauben's introduction to Rohan, Valteline, p. 611.

⁶Both "Grisons" and "Graubünden" are official names of the Canton. In this work the term "Grisons" shall be used to refer both to the territory and its people.

⁷Romansh is a Romance language based not on Latin but on Italian. It developed as a separate language because of the Grisons' isolation from the rest of Europe and today is spoken nowhere else.

⁸Rohan, Valteline, p. 612.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰See Map 2, "Political", facing p. 52. It should be noted that these boundaries are approximate.

¹¹See O'Connell, pp. 79-80; also Rott, III, 160-77; and M.F., VI, Part II, 174-247, for over-views and background of this situation.

¹²Rott, III, 172-74; and M.F., VI, Part II, 176-82. The M.F. lists the articles of the treaties. The Grisons delegates also promised not to renew their alliance with the Republic of Venice, and the Spanish promised to demolish the fort of Fuentes.

¹³Wilhelm Oechsli, History of Switzerland, 1499-1914 (Cambridge, 1922), p. 188.

¹⁴The number killed varies with the source, as do precise accounts of what occurred. Oechsli states that the number was 600 (p. 180); O'Connell estimates 400. Rott, whose work is by far the most voluminous and comprehensive secondary work on the Valteline war in any language, does not give a number, stating that ". . . a troop of bandits, Milanese, Venetians and Trentines for the most part, directed by Robustelli in person, slaughtered [them] to the last one." (III, 325). The major primary source, M.F., VI, Part II, 174-175, like Rott, does not give a number, and states, "In the month of July of this year [1620] the Catholic Valtelins, having taken arms by secret plot, put to death in their valley all of the Calvinist Protestants, as many natives of the territory as foreigners, and being supported by the Duke of Ferra, Governor of Milan for the King of Spain, [they] rendered themselves masters of all the Valteline, the safest and most direct passage from Italy into Germany." Rott states that the massacre carried on until 4 August; this is supported generally by M.F., which however does not stop its account with that date but goes on throughout the month of August. See also Le Vassor, III, 693-95.

LEGEND

MILAN	Important political unit
CHIAVENNA	Important centre
VALAIS	Other political unit
Tirano	Other centre
	Border
	River lake

Adapted from MUIR S
HISTORICAL ATLAS
(New York 1963) "Eur-
ope 1555-1648" Drawn
by David C Norwood 1970
MAP 2



CHAPTER I

FIRST CLASHES, 1621-1626

In 1620-1621 clouds of war were gathering in Germany once again, and because of the strategic importance of the Valteline to the Forces of the Habsburgs, the valley--and the Grisons as well--quickly was drawn into the struggle and became the focus of important military operations which often are overlooked in the larger clash. A revolt against Habsburg authority in Bohemia, begun in 1618, spread into Germany in 1620 for a variety of reasons: the young Frederick V, Count of the Palatinate, a German Rhineland prince, supported the Bohemian rebels and soon emerged as the titular leader of the opposition to the Habsburgs; the Habsburg Emperor Ferdinand II rallied the German princes of the Catholic League to his support and obtained promises of aid from his Spanish cousins, from the pope and from the Grand Duke of Tuscany. If the imperial cause in Germany were to be supported from Spain and Italy, it was essential that the Valteline be open to the passage of Habsburg forces; thus the valley became the pivot of the momentous developments beyond the Alps. Moreover, the Twelve Years Truce between the Spanish and the Dutch was to expire in 1621, and the imminence of the resumption of hostilities in the Netherlands made the Valteline as vital to the Spanish as to imperial interests. But the Habsburgs were not the only foreign powers interested in the Valteline.

In 1602¹ Henry IV had renewed an alliance with the Grisons which had been established by Francis I (1515-1547) when he ruled the Milanese and declared the Valteline a protectorate of the Grisons. In the next year, Venice signed an alliance with the Grisons,² which brought the three governments together in pursuit of common goals. The major provisions of the treaty were a guarantee of French and Venetian rights of passage, a denial of such a right to Spain, and a confirmation of traditional French recruiting privileges in the Grisons.³ It was the completion of these alliances which prompted the Duke of Fuentes, then governor of the Milanese, to construct, at the mouth of the Adda on Lake Como, the fortress bearing his name.⁴ At the end of 1620, however, the Habsburgs were in actual control of the Valteline,⁵ having occupied the valley during that year, under pretext of protecting its Catholic inhabitants from the Protestants.⁶

During the early stages of the Bohemian revolt, Ferdinand II had requested aid from France, and it appeared that he might receive it. However, the French Council was unstable; two years earlier, Louis XIII had overthrown the authority of his mother, Marie de Médicis, and her minister, Concini, and he still was floundering in his first years of personal rule, depending chiefly upon the mediocre Duke of Luynes. On the one hand, Louis' confessor, the Jesuit father Arnoux, and the President of the King's Council, Jeannin, who were supported by an extreme Catholic faction, advocated full support of Ferdinand. On the other hand,

the Secretary of State, Puisieux, advocated neutrality. The pro-Habsburg faction won out, persuading Louis XIII to inform the imperial ambassador at the end of 1619 that France would send an army to the emperor's assistance the following spring.⁷ However, French policy changed before the army was dispatched, for in July of 1620 representatives of the Spanish Netherlands informed the French government that the Marquis of Spinola was preparing to occupy the Palatinate in order to punish Count Palatine for his support of the rebels.

This development forced a drastic reappraisal of French priorities, for the movement of Spanish troops on the Rhine was a very different matter from imperial operations in Bohemia and could pose a real threat to French security, particularly when considered in conjunction with the Habsburg seizure of the Valteline. This opened the possibility of Spanish troops receiving heavy reinforcements whenever they were needed.

In an attempt to counteract this Spanish move, Louis XIII and Luynes sought to support the Grisons' claim to the Valteline and close it to the Spanish, but because of Huguenot unrest within France they felt they could not commit troops. Luynes resorted to diplomacy. At the beginning of 1621 he sent his brother, the Marshal of Cadanet (later the Duke of Chaulnes), to England to negotiate with James I.⁸ The English monarch was desirous of securing the return of the Palatinate to the Elector (who was his son-in-law);⁹ however, he did not wish to accomplish this by waging war with Spain, but rather by allying with her.¹⁰ With this in

mind, the Marshal of Cadanet proposed to James I that England and France bring joint pressure on Spain to return the Palatinate to Frederick (Spinola had occupied it in September of 1620), and to return the Valteline to the Grisons. He also requested that the English king not give support to the Huguenots.

Only the first proposal, to restore the Palatinate to Frederick V, was important to the English government. It already had opened negotiations for a marriage alliance between Charles, the Prince of Wales, and a Spanish princess, and did not want to jeopardize them; moreover, English merchants had substantial business ties to the large Huguenot port of La Rochelle on the French coast and envoys from that city persistently were asking for aid from England.¹¹ Consequently, the Valteline question was set aside, and James avoided comment upon the Huguenot situation, confining himself to vague assurances.¹²

In the meantime, the Bohemian struggle had ended badly for Frederick and his subjects, and the situation for France and the United Provinces was precarious. In France M. Fançan, one of the self-styled "bons Français",¹³ described the situation in Les sentinelles au roi:

The passage of the Rhine is now in control of and at the disposal of the Marquis of Spinola. . . . In one night he could be at the gates of Strasbourg. . . . On the other side, Spain has seized the passages of the Valteline for herself. . . . Chiavenna is in danger, . . . the Kingdom of France will be blocked entirely.¹⁴

Having failed with England in his attempt to have

the situation in the southern Alps restored to France's favour, Luynes turned to applying direct pressure on Spain. In February of 1621 he sent the prominent diplomat and general Bassompierre to Madrid, with instructions to exert strong pressure on Philip III to return the Valteline to the Grisons. Bassompierre himself described the mission:

The preceding year, 1620, the Emperor, assisted [by] the arms of Spain, had won the famous battle of Prague. . . . At this time the Duke of Feria was governor of the duchy of Milan, an ambitious and vain man, who for any price was willing to shuffle the maps. . . . He saw that without great obstacle he could arrange for the Grisons to give him some pretext to intrude in the Valteline. . . . He reasoned that the Protestants were restrained, the the King of France occupied in his civil war, the King of England occupied in his hopes of a marriage between the Infanta of Spain and his son, the Prince; he then undertook and executed the conquest [in July 1620]; . . . this alarmed the princes of Italy, offended the Swiss, and interested the [French] king, [the Grisons'] ally, in procuring and undertaking the restitution for them . . . as legitimate governors of [the Valteline]; and for this reason [he] sent me to Spain as his special ambassador. . . .¹⁵

The decision of Luynes to send Bassompierre to Spain, against the advice of the other ministers,¹⁶ appears to have been made simultaneously with his decision to declare war on the Huguenots. The crisis of the Valteline had appeared just as the religious problem in France reached its climax, although the latter had been building up since 1617. The issue that provoked civil war was the crown's decision to enforce the re-establishment of the Catholic Church in Navarre and Béarn as provided for in the Edict of Nantes, for these areas (the patrimonial lands of Henry IV) were solidly Calvinist.

In 1620 Louis XIII gathered an army and marched south to force the obedience of the Huguenots of Béarn. He halted

at Bordeaux and gave the Protestants one further chance; when they still refused to do his bidding he marched into Pau, in Béarn, arriving on 13 October. His troops took the fortress of Navarrenx, and he forced the Estates to register his orders; then, on 18 October Louis declared Navarre and Béarn joined to the Throne of France.

The power of the royal army greatly worried the remainder of Protestant France, and the Duke of Rohan, the acknowledged military leader of the Huguenots, quickly reinforced the fortified town of St. Jean d'Angély, near La Rochelle. In November and December, 1620, a Huguenot assembly met at La Rochelle to decide upon a course of action. "His Majesty initially forbade the holding of the said assembly," wrote Rohan, "then commanded it to separate, then finally transferred it to criminal proceedings."¹⁷ Many notable Protestants stayed away from the meeting because of its illegal nature,¹⁸ but those who attended ordered the levying of men in preparation for a general uprising. Informed of the decision, Rohan was unhappy but agreed to support it.

On 27 April 1621 Louis, at the head of his army, marched south to combat the Huguenots, and initially the march resembled a triumphal procession. The gates of the castle of Saumur were opened to the army, and it was occupied. Then St. Jean d'Angély surrendered after a month's siege.¹⁹ After a hurried march further south, the royal army invested the massively-fortified city of Montauban. Yet Rohan managed to reinforce the place, while bad weather, disease

and lack of supplies worked against the besiegers, and on 18 November 1621 Louis XIII ordered the siege lifted. On the return journey to Paris, Luynes fell ill and died.

During the first year of the renewed religious wars, the situation in the Valteline continued to develop threateningly. From the middle of December 1620 the French and Venetian governments had worked together²⁰ to create a current of opinion favourable to the prompt restitution of the Valteline to the Grisons, but the Venetian ambassador could see that the "abatement of Spanish influence in the region of the Alps could not be obtained so long as the internal peace of France could not be assured."²¹ The urgency for action, upon which the Venetians insisted, could not be ignored, however, and the Venetian ambassador to France was told that "his Majesty had decided to dispatch special ambassadors to Spain and to the [Grisons]".²²

Early in 1621 the Grisons, with the knowledge and approval of Venice, but not of France, had seized the Stelvio and Umbrail passes near Bormio, re-establishing communication with Venice and severing those between Milan and Innsbruck.²³ The success was only temporary; although Feria then "officially" returned the Valteline to the Grisons, he demanded that all fortresses in the valley be left in Spanish hands for a period of eight years, and he backed his demand with a show of force. The Grisons had to agree, with the result that nothing changed, and the Habsburgs retained military control of the passes.

When news of the secret agreement between the Grisons

and Venice reached Luynes, he had been angered, and he rejected a proposal made by the Venetians that France, Venice and Savoy form a coalition to take the Valteline from the Spanish by force.²⁴ It is likely that Luynes used the incident as a pretext for non-involvement. He had entrusted French hopes for success to Bassompierre's diplomacy; and because the army was committed to an internal campaign, he had no other choice. His comments to the Venetian ambassadors in Paris were vague:

"We hide in ourselves some items of importance; the king is resolved and generous," then he stopped himself. The ambassadors having pressed the Duke of Luynes to explain himself more clearly and to state what he concealed in himself in relation to the present affairs, he answered: "The things which we hide in ourselves deal less with Italy than with this kingdom; I would like to tell you, but, for heaven's sake, keep this to yourselves: Let us finish clearing up domestic affairs and appease the Huguenots, and we can apply ourselves with more heart to the affairs which are in progress."²⁵

At this time Luynes had few thoughts other than the Huguenot problem, and he was quite willing to allow Bassompierre to negotiate foreign affairs.

In Madrid, Bassompierre set about the accomplishment of his task.²⁶ The Spanish preferred to avoid a confrontation with France, and towards the middle of March 1621, they proposed to the special ambassador that they would return the Valteline to the Grisons, provided that the Swiss cantons would agree to act as peace-keepers. Bassompierre accepted, and the Treaty of Madrid was signed on 25 April 1621.²⁷

The treaty was negotiated for the Spanish by Don Gaspar de Guzmán, Count of Olivares, who was to play a role

in the history of Spain similar in stature to, but different in results from, that of Cardinal Richelieu of France.²⁸

Although the first article of the treaty provided that the Valteline would be restored to the control of the Grisons at once, it is doubtful whether Olivares had any intention of evacuating his troops from the valley. The signing of the treaty likely would decide the French to move against the Huguenots, and once the campaign had begun, the French army would be in no position to enforce the treaty. Nor was Olivares worried about legal complications; he or Feria could find a pretext to remain in the Valteline without great difficulty.

The Treaty of Madrid contained three important provisions,²⁹ which were found in Articles 1, 3 and 4:

1. First, that all things shall be replaced in their original state, by both sides, each withdrawing the forces from the garrisons that have been placed [there] anew, and consequently that his Catholic Majesty withdraw the troops which he has, to the frontiers of the State of Milan, adjoining the Valteline, and the Valley of Chiavenna, in such a manner that there will be no troops other than those who were accustomed to being there before the afore-said last movements, and that on the other side, the Grisons Gentlemen will do the same in the Valteline, [and] counties of Chiavenna and Bormio.

3. It is decided and agreed, that in the matter of Religion in the Valteline, Counties of Chiavenna and Bormio, all novelties prejudicial to the Catholic Religion which may have been introduced from the beginning of the year 1617 until the present will be abolished.

4. It is decided that the Grey League make the requisite oath and promises, conforming to that which is accustomed upon similar occasions, for the maintenance of that which is agreed above, and will give the said oaths and promises in authentic form to the three persons declared in the following chapter [the President of the Parlement of Burgundy, the Nuncio of the Pope, and the

French ambassador]. And the Most-Christian King will promise to maintain the same thing, as likewise will the thirteen Cantons and the Valaisans, or most of them.³⁰

The articles are a credit to the ingenuity of Olivares, who prepared their text. They were explicit enough to be acceptable, but ambiguous enough to be interpreted broadly. Bassompierre also saw the ambiguities, especially with regard to the fourth article, which made acceptance of the treaty contingent upon the agreement of most of the Swiss cantons. Yet he could do nothing about them.

. . . [Bassompierre] well knew that this clause [Article 4] rendered the convention illusory; he wrote to Luynes, a few days before the signing: "I will make a treaty, and I will make it advantageous for the service of the King. . . . Finally, Sire, I will make them bound by writing. . . ." And, immediately after the signing of the treaty he wrote again: "If the execution of this treaty is delayed, [if] our affairs change and [if] the Spanish can find some subject for delay, assuredly they will not restore the Valteline; for to them it is³¹ the greatest consequence" [Italics in original].

Bassompierre also added a suggestion in an urgent tone, which demonstrated his lack of faith in both the Spanish and the treaty:

This obligates me to advise you to delay for some months your plan for a Huguenot war, until the Grisons are in possession [of the Valteline], and then, having won our case in the Valteline, we shall, at our leisure make our case to the Huguenot rebels, whose insolence it is necessary to punish.³²

The ambassador's advice was solid and perceptive and, could it have been put into practice, both goals likely would have been achieved. But by this time the Huguenots had begun their rebellion and the French army was committed to this campaign.

The ambiguities of the Treaty of Madrid, as well as

several existing realities, rendered its execution impossible from the beginning. The fifth article of the treaty provided that representatives of Philip IV, Louis XIII and the pope must meet in Lucerne, at the very latest on 31 May 1621,³³ with representatives of the thirteen Cantons, Valais, and the Grisons, to ratify the treaty and execute its provisions. In this respect, the religious divisions of the Swiss Confederation prevented the agreement stipulated in Article 4.³⁴

It was natural that the Swiss Catholics had no desire to see their fellow Catholics in the Valteline again subjected to rule by the Protestant Grisons, and the ties between Spain and the Catholic cantons by no means were hidden. The Protestant cantons, on the other hand, while numerically superior to their Catholic counterparts and perhaps wishing to support the execution of the Treaty of Madrid, had to consider that Louis XIII had declared war on the Huguenots in France. This gave them some cause to worry for the eventual safety of their own religion; moreover, the deployment of the French army within France negated the chance that if the Swiss Protestants decided to support the treaty's execution they would be assisted by the French. A final factor was that neither the Spanish army nor the Austrian army was involved as totally as the French. France could not support her interpretation of the treaty; the Habsburgs could. The end result was that at the May meeting in Lucerne the deputies could not come to agreement, and the execution of the Treaty of Madrid was delayed indefinitely.³⁵

In the meantime, Feria received an order from Madrid

in the middle of May to evacuate Spanish troops from the Valteline, in accordance with the treaty. Not wishing to be relieved of his duties in the Milanese, but hesitant to put the order in effect, Feria compromised and halted his arming of the valley, which had been proceeding since the previous winter. There is some question as to why Olivares bothered to send such an order, because although it was a stipulation of the treaty (Article 1), France had committed its army to the Huguenot war. However, it also should be remembered that the French internal campaign had commenced very recently and Olivares had no way of knowing how long the war would last. If the Protestants were subdued by mid-June or July, the French army would be freed to travel to the Grisons and oversee the execution of the treaty. In addition, there was no point to Spain's disobeying the treaty flagrantly; there still was a good possibility of a violation of the treaty by the people of the Grisons. In this respect the order was sent as a matter of form, to deny France the opportunity of showing Madrid devoid of "honour" in her agreements.

As soon as it became clear that the French army would be held up in front of St. Jean d'Angély for some time, and the meeting at Lucerne on 31 May produced no agreement among the Swiss cantons, Feria wasted no time in altering his evacuation plans. He looked for a pretext which he could use to prove violation of the treaty by the Grisons, and the Catholic Valtelins soon provided him with one.

When his entente with the Archduke Leopold [the brother of Ferdinand II and ruler of the Tyrol] had been cemented . . . and his intrigues, as much in Spain as in Switzerland, Germany and Italy, had procured some serious support for him, [Feria] openly resumed his recent attitude. Armaments, fortifications, provisions, interrupted briefly, were pushed ahead with furious activity, in the Milanese, from Colico [at the mouth of the Adda on Lake Como] to Bormio. From the very start the Valtelins, disillusioned [by the Treaty of Madrid], had appealed to his counsel. Rather than fall under the Grisons yoke again, these subjects of the Three Leagues threatened to request annexation to the Tyrol, and, in case of refusal there, to resort to worse extremities, all the more so, they affirmed, because their priests were on the verge of leaving the area.³⁶

Feria interpreted the Valtelins' appeal to him as an indirect threat to them by the Protestants of the Grisons, and he secretly promised them that even if they were abandoned by the pope himself, he would defend them.³⁷ This arrangement soon became known to the Grisons, and they loudly demanded the execution of the Treaty of Madrid, but throughout the summer Feria delayed effecting the treaty, using small incidents, some of them real, others invented, to justify his procrastination.

By the time the siege of Montauban was lifted in November of 1621, the situation in the Valteline had become very disturbing to France. In September Feria had erected new fortresses close to Sondrio to cut the connection between the Grisons and the Republic of Venice. Then, in October, the desperate Grisons had gathered together a force of 6,500 men and had attempted to re-take the town of Bormio. The clash ended as quickly as it had begun, the numerically smaller but vastly better-equipped garrison repelling the Grisons with little trouble. In reprisal, Feria seized the Poschiavo

valley and Chiavenna, and from the latter the Spanish began to make forays up the Val Bregaglia. By previous arrangement with Feria, at the end of October a large Austrian army led by Archduke Leopold invaded the Lower Engadine through Maienfeld and a few days later joined forces with the Spanish in the Maloja pass. On 18 November 1621 the Austrians occupied Chur. Suddenly not only the Valteline but most of the Grisons as well were in the hands of the Habsburgs.

Early in January of 1622 Feria ordered the people of the Grisons and the Valtelins to send deputies to Milan to negotiate a treaty of perpetual alliance. There, on 29 January, the governor dictated to them the so-called Articles of Milan.³⁸ The articles included the following points:

That the true Apostolic and Roman Catholic Religion shall be re-established by all the Grey Leagues and their dependencies. That the Bishop of Chur and the Abbot of Disentis/Muster shall be re-established in their Bishopric and Abbey. That the lands usurped from the Churches and Catholics shall be returned to them. That the Valteline shall come to be a particular Canton, which shall have only Catholics [living] there. As to the forts which are there, the King of Spain shall retain there a garrison of Spanish maintained as Protectors of the Valtelins. That the Upper and Lower Engadine, and Prättigau [become] connected to the Archduke Leopold, [treating] him as lord of them. That the Archduke Leopold shall place and maintain a garrison in Chur and Molphepo. That the Leagues of the Grisons shall have a perpetual alliance with and fidelity to the King of Spain, and promise to allow him all free passage and commerce through the Alps. That the County of Chiavenna shall be re-established in the state in which it was before [its] taking, so that nothing contrary to the Catholic Religion can remain there. That the King of Spain [and] the Duke of Milan shall pay to the Grey Leagues thirty thousand florins per year: and that the Grisons shall furnish him with three thousand men of war when he shall have need of them. All without prejudice to the Alliances of France and of the House of Austria.³⁹

The Articles openly contradicted the Treaty of Madrid and,

contrary to their last declaration, they completely prejudiced all treaties between France and the Grisons. Spain usurped France's traditional rights of recruitment in the Grisons; she took all rights of passage through the territories. All of the League of the Ten Jurisdictions was annexed to the Tyrol by the Articles (this league consisted of the area of the Lower Engadine and the Prättigau); and Austria occupied most of the League of God's House, including its capital, Chur.

However, Feria could claim that the Articles were the result of the insurrection in the autumn of 1621 and merely were safeguards. He gave the deputies no choice but to accept the Articles, and they realized their plight. Their lands were occupied almost totally by the Spanish or Austrian troops and the deep January snows rendered French assistance impossible. France exerted her influence on the Spanish to put the Treaty of Madrid into force, but to no avail.

The provisions of the first article then were instituted, and reconversion of the Protestants of the Grisons commenced. Capuchin monks and Austrian soldiers worked together to re-Catholicize the Calvinists. All Protestant pastors were expelled from the Grisons, and "the inhabitants were driven to mass at the point of the pike".⁴⁰

With the death of Luynes in December of 1621, Louis XIII could find no one to whom he could entrust the responsibility of chief minister. Pressed by Condé, the first Prince of the Blood, and by Richelieu, his mother's adviser, Louis decided to open negotiations with the Duke of Rohan and appointed Lesdiguières to initiate the proceedings. But before

Lesdiguières could reach an agreement with the Huguenot leaders, Louis regathered his army (early in March of 1622) and began to march south from Orléans.⁴¹ By the end of April there was no doubt, within France or outside, that the Huguenot war was being renewed and that there would be no significant French military aid to the Grisons.

On 24 April 1622 the Grisons inhabitants of the Prattigau, starved and desperate after a terrible winter of oppression, attacked and killed several hundred Austrian soldiers and officials.⁴² The revolt spread, and several more towns fell to the Grisons in a matter of days. More and more of the mountain people joined the rising, and support soon came from Zürich.⁴³ By the middle of June the two strong Austrian garrisons at Maienfeld and Chur had fallen, and all of the Valteline from Sondrio to Bormio, the Poschiavo valley, the Stelvio, Umbrail, Bernina, and Tonale passes were in the hands of the Grisons.

The Spanish and remaining Austrian forces managed to retain their hold on Chiavenna and the western portion of the Valteline. They expected an attack upon Chiavenna, but it never came. By a decision which proved fatal to their newly-regained liberty, the Grisons halted their activities at the end of June.

Considering their task finished, and because of the approach of the harvest season, which evinced in the farmers a desire not to sacrifice their particular interests to those of the public, a great portion of them returned to their farms at the beginning of July.⁴⁴

At the same time, delegates of the Three Leagues assembled at Chur on 27 June. Their first act was the

confirmation of the ancient charter of the Three Leagues, and the annulment of the Articles of Milan. Then, in a move which demonstrated their motives for having rebelled in the first place, the Grisons proclaimed general amnesty to all sides, including the Valteline, Chiavenna and the Habsburgs. The rebellion had not been initiated so much for reasons of politics as for those of survival, both physical and spiritual. As a result, they felt that their mission was accomplished when their lands were free, thus their proclamation. The deputies then awaited a response from either Feria or Leopold. As the wait became prolonged and no answer was forthcoming, the Grisons realized that the Habsburgs were not of similar mind, and reluctantly they decided to renew the offensive. It was too late; in the meantime Feria had marched with his best soldiers to reinforce Chiavenna.⁴⁵

As the summer of 1622 progressed, the situation of the Grisons deteriorated rapidly. The departure of many of the Zürich soldiers for home in the late summer greatly reduced the size of the Protestant force,⁴⁶ while that of the Habsburgs increased greatly. Soon the overwhelming numerical superiority of the latter gave the Grisons little choice but to accept an offer made by Archduke Leopold to convoke a meeting at Lindau, an Austrian island fortress in the Lake of Constance, in the autumn.

The conference at Lindau confronted several demands from Leopold, of which the most important was that the League of the Ten Jurisdictions⁴⁷ be re-united with the Tyrol. The final list of demands, put forward by Austria and agreed to

by the Catholics of the Grisons and the five Catholic Swiss cantons, included:

1. That the League of Jurisdictions, one of the three Leagues of the Grisons, shall be separated from them, and relinquished entirely to the House of Austria, as [is] its proper heritage. . . .
2. That the Grisons shall sever all of their alliances, except those of France and of the House of Austria.
3. That there shall be maintained by the House of Austria two garrisons, one in Chur, and the other in Maienfeld, for six years only.
4. That the House of Austria shall not construct any forts in the territory of the two Leagues of the Grisons.
5. That there shall be published a general amnesty for all that has happened.
6. With regard to the passage of troops, that the treaty of Milan [that is, the Articles] shall be observed and maintained, and all passages open for commerce: and
7. That the troops who have no established garrison shall disband on one part and the other, and leave the territory of the Leagues.⁴⁸

The Protestant deputies who attended the negotiations declared that they could not sign the articles, as they did not have the power to do so. "As such, this was a Treaty which agreed upon peace, without according peace."⁴⁹ The winter then intervened, and all sides concerned retired to their garrisons to await spring. The Habsburgs, after a summer which had seen them dislodged from their occupation temporarily, once again were in full control of the Valteline and Grisons, though the Protestants of the Grisons had not signed the Treaty of Lindau.

The Duke of Alba, a high-ranking Spanish noble who had been appointed Viceroy of Naples at this time, stopped in Rome and delivered to Pope Gregory XV a verbose "Discourse on the Valteline".⁵⁰ The main point of his discourse was that it was the responsibility of the pope and the princes of Italy, as well as of the King of Spain, to persuade the French to accept the situation in the Valteline. Alba gave

as his reason for this belief that the French had no cares for the preservation of the Catholic faith in the valley.⁵¹

In early December 1622 Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, visited the French court, where he opened negotiations with Louis XIII and the Venetian ambassador. Charles Emmanuel, a duke notorious for his ability to play one side against another to the advantage of Savoy, was a traditional ally of Spain, but he saw little chance of Savoyard gain from the Spaniards in the Grisons situation. Thus he appeared in Paris to discuss a solution to the problem in the Alps with the French monarch and the Venetian representative. Louis XIII informed his visitors that he had placed his army into various camps in southern France during the winter, mainly in the Dauphiné, so as "to pass into Italy . . . if the affairs of the Valteline were not accommodating".⁵²

The royal campaign against the Huguenots during 1622 had met with more success than the one the previous year. The French army had laid siege to the Protestant fortress of Montpellier in early July. Although the siege lasted until mid-October, the Huguenots finally surrendered, and the Duke of Rohan made peace with Louis. The peace freed the royal army, commanded by Lesdiguières, to maneuver externally. This was the basis of the king's statement to Charles Emmanuel and the Venetian ambassador.

In Rome, meanwhile, the French and Venetian ambassadors, as well as representatives of Savoy, had made representation to Gregory XV protesting Spanish control of the Valteline. Spain held it, they said, "on the pretext of

religion",⁵³ when in fact the real motive was political. They asserted that it was becoming ever more obvious that Spain's true interests were strategic, that the safety of the Catholic Valtelins was secondary; she could not afford to lose the passages in the Alps.

During the winter of 1622-1623 both French and Spanish ministers met with papal representatives in Rome. The French demanded the execution of the Treaty of Madrid and the official retraction of the Articles of Milan. Then, on 7 February 1623, France, Venice and Savoy announced the formation of a coalition to enforce the Treaty of Madrid.⁵⁴ Word of this agreement had reached Spanish authorities even before the actual alliance was signed, and it moved them to action. On 4 February the Spanish government announced that it had placed the Valteline in the hands of the pope.⁵⁵

This decision on the part of Spain was well-timed, and its actual implementation would drag out over one year. While in theory it deposited the Valteline in the hands of a neutral authority, in fact it did no such thing. Both Spain and the papacy supported Catholicism, though sometimes for different reasons, and in any case, given Spanish strength flanking the papal states in Milan and Naples, it was unlikely that the pope would attempt to deny passage of the valley to Spanish troops. The transfer was a simple expedient designed to render execution of the Treaty of Madrid impossible and at the same time to retain Spanish rights of passage.

For the remainder of 1623, while French representa-

tives in Rome and Madrid demanded the execution of the Treaty of Madrid, the Spanish went through the formalities of transferring the fortresses of the Valteline to the papacy. Yet when the Spanish announced their intention to place the valley in the hands of the pope, the French ambassador in Rome, Sillery, reluctantly had agreed to the proposal without consulting Paris, accepting the announcement as a fait accompli.⁵⁶ He hoped to have the transfer based upon the principles set forth in the Treaty of Madrid but was in no position to insist upon this.⁵⁷ There was no principle upon which France could oppose papal control of the Valteline without endangering relations with Gregory XV, who already was pro-Spanish.

Spain had excused herself from putting the 1621 treaty into effect on the basis of the helplessness of the Catholic Valtelins and the Protestant Grisons insurrection of 1622. What better agency could oversee the protection of the Catholics than the papacy itself? In addition, France was not yet prepared to offend the pope and the Spanish by ignoring the transfer and marching to the Grisons; probably she was not strong enough, and the bold Richelieu was not yet in control of foreign policy.⁵⁸ But with the death of Gregory XV on 8 June 1623 and the election of Urban VIII as his successor, France found itself in a more favourable position in Rome, for the new pope was inclined more favourably towards Paris.

In November, 1623, a first official attempt at transferring the Valteline to the papacy was made, but the treaty was not ratified by Philip IV.⁵⁹ This agreement, negotiated by Urban VIII, did not include a provision granting Spain

rights of passage through the Valteline, and Olivares refused to allow its ratification. Spain threatened not to proceed with the transfer unless rights of passage were included in the treaty. Consequently, in February of 1624 another treaty was drawn up. This agreement, longer and more formal than the one of the previous November, was divided into two parts (of twenty-two and twenty-one articles respectively), one for the "accommodation of differences", the other "touching the fact of Religion".⁶⁰ The Valteline nominally was returned to the control of the Grisons, but the pope retained all rights with regard to religion and administration.⁶¹ The ninth article of the first portion stipulated that the Spanish be allowed the right of passage through the valley.⁶²

In spite of the ninth article, Sillery agreed to the treaty, again without orders from Paris.⁶³ While the religious and administrative aspects of the agreement were not disputed by France, Spain's right to use the passes and the papal occupation of the fortresses were. On this basis, Louis XIII refused to ratify this treaty.⁶⁴ But already the pope had sent troops to the Valteline, and the provisions of the agreement were being executed. In May of 1624 Feria finally handed the fortresses over to the papacy except for the two at Chiavenna and Riva, which were situated north of the western (Lake Como) entrance to the Valteline. The fact that these two garrisons guaranteed passage from the Milanese into the Valteline and Grisons rendered the surrender of the remainder an empty formality.

In October of 1624 the Swiss Cantons called together

a General Diet to deliberate the new situation. The French government sent Hannibal d'Estrées, Marquis of Coeuvres (later Marshal d'Estrées) as special ambassador to this meeting.⁶⁵

The assembly, which consisted mainly of Protestants, was addressed by d'Estrées who said that Louis XIII:

has sent me especially to confirm in this general assembly [his] assurances. . . . [By] the care which his Majesty takes in the general conduct of his affairs, he has reached the point where his people rejoice in a sweet and assured peace . . . [and] his Majesty, by the rank which he holds in Christianity, has immediately thrown his eyes and his thoughts outside [France], with the same intentions and desires which he always has had . . . to remove or stop all sorts of usurpations. . . . It therefore is the principle care of the King my Master, whose spirit is troubled by the miserable state to which the Grisons, your common friends, allies and confederates, have been reduced. . . . You know well enough, Magnificent Lords, with how much care and solicitation his Majesty has embraced their re-establishment in the Valteline. . . . The greatest difficulty which has stopped his Majesty has been the demand made by the Spanish for their passage in the Valteline. . . . His Majesty, on this subject, has commanded Monsieur de Béthune his Ambassador in Rome [who replaced Sillery] to represent to the Pope the interest which he has in not giving his consent to the said passages. . . .⁶⁶

D'Estrées then asked the delegates to oppose the Spanish-papal agreement, and the diet carried a resolution to this effect.⁶⁷

Rome was not encouraging. Pope Urban VIII had made a conciliatory offer, which included rights to passage of the Valteline for France, Venice, and Spain, but only from Milan directly to the Tyrol for the latter. The French government replied that any rights involving Spain in the Valteline were unacceptable, and again it demanded the execution of the Treaty of Madrid with complete Spanish withdrawal from the valley. With equal obstinacy the Spanish refused, upon the pretext that the Catholics of the Valteline needed protection.

This excuse was becoming less and less tenable; the articles drawn up for the papal occupation of the valley were extremely detailed with regard to the safety of the Roman Catholic faith, and there were papal troops in the Valteline to enforce them. Still, Spain clung to the excuse. Diplomacy had failed, and there was little doubt that a conflict involving French arms was imminent.

Immediately following his speech to the Swiss diet, d'Estrées began recruiting four regiments of Swiss soldiers, and he received an army of 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry from France; these were reinforced by substantial numbers of soldiers from the Grisons, Venice and Savoy, and d'Estrées launched an unexpected and daring winter campaign. In early November he and his army crossed the Luziensteig pass near the Rhine, took Maienfeld, then travelled through the Prättigau. When he first entered the Grisons, he was received with great enthusiasm and honour; immediately the League of the Ten Jurisdictions renounced its annexation to the Tyrol and joined the invading army.⁶⁸ By 1 December the army was in Chur, having routed the Austrian garrison there, as well as in the Valteline itself, and its strength was given as almost 11,000.⁶⁹ On 8 December d'Estrées took Tirano, where he was joined by a Venetian contingent which was equipped with cannon.⁷⁰ A treaty was signed with the papal commander, Bagni, and the fortress at Tirano was vacated by papal forces on the 10th.⁷¹ Possession of Tirano assured communications between the Republic of Venice and the Grisons once again and denied Habsburg forces the transit of the Valteline.

In early January of 1625 a large portion of the coalition army moved eastward towards Bormio and placed it under siege, but several requests for the besieged to surrender were ignored. When the Venetian artillery arrived on 14 January, considerable damage to the fortress was done, but the papal garrison still refused to capitulate until the 18th, when a surrender was obtained. In the meantime, another portion of the army had worked its way westward from Tirano and took Morbengo. By 20 January 1625 all of the Valteline from the Stelvio pass to a point just east of Lake Como was in the hands of the French and their allies.⁷² As a reward for his prudent and successful conduct of operations in the Valteline and Grisons, Louis XIII promoted d'Estrées to the rank of Marshal of France and left him in command of the occupation forces to see to the continued security of the valley.

Towards the end of February of 1625 d'Estrées sent another French army, led by the sieur de Haraucourt, through the Val Bregaglia from the Grisons to lay siege to Chiavenna.⁷³ On 9 March the fortress surrendered, and articles were signed that were similar to those drawn up by d'Estrées concerning the evacuation of papal troops from the Valteline.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, the Spanish hurriedly had reinforced their one remaining fortress in the area, that of Riva, which lay on the east shore of Lake Como north of the mouth of the Valteline. By the end of the month the French had invested that garrison.

Despite minor skirmishes which took place during the

summer of 1625, the Valteline remained solidly in the hands of the French and their allies, and the Grisons regained their former possessions. The planning and execution of the winter campaign ordered by Richelieu had been brilliant. D'Estrées had timed the operation perfectly; he and his army had entered the Grisons and the Valteline just at the time when heavy snows were beginning to fall, and the attack had achieved total surprise. The Austrians in the Grisons and the papal and Spanish troops in the Valteline were isolated, and by the time a call for help had gone out to Spain and Austria, the winter snows were too heavy for reinforcements to fight their way in. In June the Spanish managed to reinforce the fortress at Riva, and shortly after, d'Estrées ordered the siege raised.⁷⁵ With this one exception, the coalition army remained entrenched solidly.

Astuteness and the willingness to take risks, for which Richelieu was to become famous, were demonstrated in this decision to strike quickly in the Valteline. Demands to have the Treaty of Madrid observed had proved useless; and the fact that the Valteline was open to Spanish troops who were reinforcing the Spanish army in the Palatinate and Spanish Netherlands no longer was tolerable. D'Estrées' diplomatic approaches to the Swiss Protestants at their diet had won the French not only their troops but passage through their territory, and this contributed greatly to the element of surprise the following November, while other diplomatic moves had achieved pledges of assistance from Venice and Savoy. In addition, there was one other action which served

to catch the Habsburgs off their guard. Simultaneously with d'Estrées' invasion of the Valteline, Lesdiguières crossed the southwestern Alps through Savoy and, with the help of that duchy, laid siege to Genoa as a diversion to the events in the Grisons.⁷⁶ Yet Richelieu took a serious chance of jeopardizing his own position and isolating France in invading the Valteline, because he--a Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church--was sending the armies of Catholic France against the pope. In addition, he faced a steadily increasing restlessness amongst the Huguenots within France. As the siege of Riva dragged on and proved more costly than anticipated, Richelieu was forced to reconsider his position.

Urban VIII, naturally, was greatly angered over the French usurpation in the Valteline, and in Vienna early in 1625 a statement by Urban was published to the effect that he intended to recover the Valteline with arms.⁷⁷ In addition, in April of 1625 he sent his nephew, Cardinal Barberini, to complain about the events in the Valteline and demand the restitution of the valley to the pope.⁷⁸ Barberini arrived in Paris on 21 May.

The first proposition of the said legate was a suspension of arms. His Majesty neither could nor had to accept it, because this suspension could produce no other effect than to give the adversaries time to assemble their forces and to gather themselves against those of His Majesty and his allies. . . . The second proposition was on the subject of the satisfaction of the Pope for that which had occurred in the Valteline. He [Barberini] was told that the King never had consented to the deposition of the forts except on condition of a limited time, in which His Holiness must execute the Treaty of Madrid. . . .⁷⁹

Richelieu went on to say that Béthune, in Rome, had requested

constantly that the pope have Spain enforce the Treaty of Madrid; and the fact that this was not done "could justify sufficiently in front of all the world the action which has been taken. . . ." ⁸⁰ The third proposal made by Barberini dealt with the safety of the Catholics in the Valteline, which he connected with its sovereignty. In this regard, he hinted that the Grisons should not be given control over the valley again. Louis XIII and the legate agreed on the religious proposals and the suspension of arms, but both were equally obstinate regarding the restoration of the Valteline and its fortresses to the Grisons and the pope respectively. Louis demanded that the forts be demolished; Barberini demanded that they be returned to the papacy. ⁸¹

The discussions continued through the summer without agreement. Richelieu realized that the talks with the legate would have to be broken off, ⁸² because agreement to his demands would sacrifice the gains of the entire campaign of the previous winter. After having been received in a final, private audience with Louis XIII, the papal legate left Fontainebleau on 24 September. Nothing had been resolved during the course of discussions, and the king sent a letter to Urban VIII telling him that France desired peace in the Valteline, but on French terms. ⁸³

Both within and outside France the situation was becoming less favourable. During the summer of 1625 Feria had solicited help from various Spanish allies and claimed to have pledges for over 100,000 men to help the pope regain the Valteline. ⁸⁴ Then, in October, Spanish and papal forces

began making forays into the valley, and although victories were small, the harassment was great. Within France, the Duke of Soubise, the brother of Rohan, had precipitated a new Huguenot rebellion, and the need again had arisen for royal intervention. As a result, the French armies deployed in the Valteline and Genoa were required at home. Immediately after the departure of Barberini from Fontainebleau, Richelieu and Louis XIII called a special assembly of notables, which opened on 29 September. Its purpose was the discussion of the Huguenot revolt, the Italian question (Genoa), and the Valteline.⁸⁵

One outcome of the assembly was the decision of Louis XIII to send the Marshal of Bassompierre as special ambassador to the Protestant Swiss cantons, to seek their support for the French viewpoint. Bassompierre was to persuade them to join France, the Republic of Venice, and Savoy in procuring the complete restitution of the Valteline to the Grisons, or to continue to make representation to the pope and Philip IV to have them return the valley to its rightful rulers, or to make an agreement by which France, Venice and they would contribute to maintaining the fortresses held at this time by France for the Grisons.⁸⁶ Bassompierre's other instructions were intended mainly to persuade the Swiss that France had only their best interests in mind.⁸⁷

During this same period, the Spanish ambassador to France, Mirabel, opened negotiations for peace. As much as France, Spain needed peace; she was occupied in Genoa and the Valteline by the French, Venetians, and Savoyards, and in the north by the Dutch and the English. To Mirabel's enquiries,

Louis XIII answered that his honour and reputation had been disturbed by Spain's actions in the Valteline and Grisons, and that the only means of making peace would be that Philip IV, "of good faith, depart from the pretension to the passages, which [is] the whole cause of this difference."⁸⁸

In Spain, the French ambassador, du Fargis, was approached by Olivares for similar reasons, and he wrote to Paris for instructions. On 25 and 29 October Louis responded to the ambassador, warning him that the Spanish were changing their minds daily with regard to the Valteline, and to be very careful to preserve his honour.⁸⁹ As any basis of negotiation, the French king demanded two things: the exclusion of the Spanish from the passages and the restoration of the sovereignty of the Grisons.

The negotiations were carried on in strict secrecy and were independent of Bassompierre's activity in Switzerland. A peace settlement at this particular time was undesirable to either Venice or the Grisons, because their interests were not satisfied yet. The negotiations continued throughout the winter of 1625-1626. Then, on 5 March 1626, the Spanish and French concluded the Treaty of Monçon,⁹⁰ which contained several major points concerning religion and the custody of the Valteline. The preamble to the treaty stated that all previous treaties, from 1617 to 1626, were null and void; this appeared to satisfy one of the two French demands, that Spain could not use the Valteline to move troops.⁹¹ All military installations in the Valteline were to be restored to the pope, with the exception of any

forts constructed since 1620, which were to be demolished. The Grisons were given nominal control of administration, but strict limitations were placed upon them in this respect. Catholicism was to be the sole religion of the Valteline, including its prolongations in Chiavenna and Bormio; and all judicial and administrative officials representing them were to be Catholic. The actual choice of officials was left to the Grisons and Valtelins.

The Treaty of Monçon, like the Treaty of Madrid, is a credit to the diplomacy of the period. It agreed upon peace as a necessity, but it went no further. The general tone of the agreement was unsatisfactory to the French, and according to Richelieu, du Fargis disobeyed instructions.⁹² But the fact that the French ambassador was quite aware of his king's demands well before the treaty was signed, and that he remained in regular communication with Paris throughout the negotiations places some doubt upon Richelieu's assertion. It seems probable that du Fargis was following instructions when he signed the treaty, and that he knew he would be the scapegoat when France confronted her angry allies with news of the treaty.

In late March of 1626 the anticipated uproar from Venice and Savoy became a fact. On 20 March the French Secretary of State, Herbault, wrote to one of his ambassadors, Césy, that two days earlier word had reached Paris that du Fargis had signed a treaty with the King of Spain without the knowledge, and to the great surprise, of Louis XIII. The king, continued Herbault, was angry and indignant that his

ambassador would do such a thing; and he had declared this to the upset Venetians and the Duke of Savoy, with whom he had decided to discuss the treaty in detail.⁹³

Richelieu hoped that the pretense that an ambassador had exceeded his instructions would salvage France's relations with her allies; the provisions concerning religion preserved France's credibility as a Catholic power despite her use of force against papal troops; and superficially the treaty appeared to close the Valteline to the passage of Spanish troops while allowing France to withdraw forces needed to confront the Huguenots at home. Outwardly angry, inwardly likely relieved, Richelieu and Louis XIII hoped that the mediocre treaty would bring about cessation of hostilities and provide the basis for future negotiations. The interim period was to be far shorter than they hoped.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

¹M.F., VI (1621), Part II, 237-38.

²Ibid., p. 238. The alliance between Venice and the Grisons initially was protested by France, but after further negotiations Henry IV agreed to it.

³Ibid.

⁴See above, pp. 8-9.

⁵There is some question as to the actual date of the Habsburg occupation of the Valteline. A.D. Lublinskaya, in French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-1629 (Cambridge, 1968), p. 176, says that the Spanish invaded the valley in 1619. She is supported remotely by J.H. Mariéjol, Henri IV et Louis XIII, vol. VI, Part II, of Histoire de France, ed. Ernest Lavisse (Paris, 1905), pp. 210-11, who writes that "the Valtelins, encouraged by the presence of Spanish troops, exterminated the Protestants of the valley. . . ." However, this can be interpreted to mean that the Spanish were close to the valley, which is true. Primary sources contradict Miss Lublinskaya's claim. Rohan, Valteline, p. 652, states, "Immediately after the uprising of the Valtelins, which occurred in 1620, the Grisons took up arms to enter the Valteline, . . . but this was of little effect, for the Duke of Feria . . . entered soldiers into the Valteline." M.F., VI, 175 ff., states that the Spanish invaded the valley after the massacre. Rott, III, 329, writes, "The Spanish had not yet deployed their troops into the subject counties of the Three Leagues [when the massacre occurred]." See also V. L. Tapié, La politique étrangère de la France et la début de la guerre de trente ans (Paris, 1934), p. 590.

⁶See the "Manifesto of the Valtelins" reprinted in M.F., 218-24, in which they explain their insurrection.

⁷Mariéjol, p. 211. See also Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: The Reformation (New York, 1959), p. 311.

⁸For a detailed account of the mission, see B. Zeller, Le Connétable de Luynes: Montauban et la Valteline (Paris, 1879, pp. 21-26, 171-72).

⁹Frederick V (Count Palatine) married Elizabeth, the only daughter of James I.

¹⁰H. Hauser, La prépondérance espagnole, 1559-1660, vol. IX of Peuples et Civilisations, histoire générale (Paris, 1933), p. 590.

¹¹Lublinskaya, p. 177.

¹²Zeller, pp. 24-25.

¹³For an explanation of the "bons Français," see Gabriel Hanotaux, Histoire du Cardinal de Richelieu (Paris, n.d.), III, 459.

¹⁴Hauser, p. 297.

¹⁵Bassompierre, Mémoires, II, 231. See also P.M. Bondoïs, Le maréchal de Bassompierre (1579-1646) (Paris, 1925), pp. 210-23.

¹⁶Zeller, p. 175.

¹⁷Henri, duc de Rohan, Mémoires du duc de Rohan, sur les choses advenues en France depuis la mort de Henri-le-Grand jusques à la paix faite avec les réformés au mois de juin 1629, vol. 19 of Nouvelle collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France, ed. Michaud et Poujoulat (Paris, 1854), p. 523.

¹⁸Such prominent nobles as the dukes of Sully, Bouillon, Lesdiguières, as well as Rohan and his brother, Soubise, were absent, although Rohan and Soubise sent delegations in their names. Bouillon remarked that "nothing but evil would come from this flagrant act of disobedience." J. A. Clarke, Huguenot Warrior: The Life and Times of Henri de Rohan, 1579-1638 (The Hague, 1966), p. 75.

¹⁹Louis XIII penalized no one. The entire garrison was allowed to go free.

²⁰Zeller, p. 168, raises some doubts about the harmony of Franco-Venetian relations, saying, "The French ministers had to deal not only with Spain, a declared enemy, but [also] with Venice, allied less scrupulously." He says that the Venice-Grisons alliance of 1618, signed without the consultation of France, made many French ministers wary. Similar moves on the part of France were to generate mutual distrust during this entire period, but circumstances usually forced the two governments to work together.

²¹Rott, III, 381.

²²Ibid., p. 382.

²³Zeller, p. 180. The Swiss also were involved in these and earlier negotiations. For a full account of Swiss participation in the Grisons and the Valteline, see Rémy Pithon, "La Suisse, théâtre de la guerre froide entre la France et l'Espagne pendant la crise de la Valteline, 1621-1626," Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte, XIII (1963), 33-53.

²⁴Zeller, p. 184. The text of the Venetian proposal is reprinted here.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 184-85.

²⁶See Luynes' instructions to Bassompierre, dated 21 January 1621, reprinted in Zeller, pp. 177-79.

²⁷Although this date has been questioned by Lublinskaya, p. 180 n., who attempts to develop an elaborate theory based on the 15 April date she employs, the 25 April date is verified in M.F., X (1625), 123-29; Bassompierre, Mémoires, II, 274-75; Le Vassor, IV, 118; Rott, III, 409; Tapié, p. 159; and Hanotaux, II, 442.

²⁸See O'Connell, pp. 98-99, for a general description of Olivares. See also the detailed biography by Gregorio Marañón, Olivares: Der Niedergang Spaniens als Weltmacht, trans. by Ludwig Pfandl (Munich, 1939).

²⁹See Appendix II, p. 162, for the original French version of the Treaty of Madrid.

³⁰M.F., X, 126-28. At this time, Valais, like Geneva and the Grisons, was independent of the Swiss Confederation.

³¹Hanotaux, II, 434, italics his.

³²Zeller, p. 203.

³³M.F., X, 127.

³⁴Pithon, pp. 36-38.

³⁵Rott, III, 447-55.

³⁶Ibid., p. 433.

³⁷Ibid., p. 434.

³⁸The articles originally were presented to the deputies on 15 January; the final version appeared on 29 January. See M.F., VIII, 331-32; and Rott, III, 500.

³⁹Reprinted in M.F., VIII (1623), 331-32. See M.F., X (1625), 130-48, for the entire text of the Articles of Milan.

⁴⁰Oechsli, p. 190.

⁴¹Rohan and Lesdiguières had reached preliminary agreement, but the murder of two royal officials by Protestants in the spring ruined all chances of peace. Clarke, pp. 95-97.

⁴²M.F., VIII, 352, places the number at 500. See also Rott, III, 536.

⁴³Rott, III, 536.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 538-39.

⁴⁵M.F., VIII, 353. The force numbered 2,000 foot and 300 cavalry.

⁴⁶M.F., IX (1624), 53, mentions this departure, as does Rott, III, 460, but neither gives a reason for their leaving. The probable reasons are winter's approach and a shortage of supplies.

⁴⁷See above, p. 5.

⁴⁸M.F., IX, 58-60.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 60.

⁵⁰This is reprinted in full in M.F., IX, 62-64.

⁵¹M.F. IX, does not give papal reaction to the discourse. Gregory XV was inclined to favour Spain in a dispute, but he was not greatly active in the conflict. His successor, Urban VIII, who leaned toward France, played a much larger role in the Valteline struggle.

⁵²M.F., IX, 66.

⁵³Ibid., p. 67.

⁵⁴Lublinskaya, p. 247. See also Clarke, p. 117; and Rott, III, 650-53.

⁵⁵M.F., X (1625), 153. See also Pithon, p. 39; and Le Vassor, IV, 590-92.

⁵⁶There is some confusion as to the date that these proposals were initiated. M.F., X, 153, states that the agreement between French, Spanish and papal representatives took place on 4 February 1623. Rott, however, in a comprehensive list of all treaties affecting the Grisons or the Valteline (Rott, III, 1043-1046), does not mention this as a formal agreement. It can be assumed that the agreement was the basis of the formal treaty signed a year later.

⁵⁷When Sillery heard of the plan he protested strongly, but in fact there was little he could do. Habsburg troops occupied the Grisons and the Valteline, while French forces were far from the area. The fact remains, though, that he eventually gave his consent. See M.F., X, 153.

⁵⁸It often seems that from the minute he assumed the position of First Minister, Richelieu was known internationally. In fact it was not so. In all of its volumes before 1625, M.F. mentions him only once, in a list of cardinals created in 1622.

⁵⁹Rott, III, 1046, 673-78, and 689-92.

⁶⁰The treaty is reprinted in M.F., X, 155-68. See Appendix II, p.166, for the original French version.

⁶¹M.F., X, 155-68.

⁶²Ibid., p. 156.

⁶³Sillery became the French scapegoat because of the provision in the treaty which allowed Spain rights of passage. When the pope presented him with a fait accompli, saying that his troops already were in the Valtelline, Sillery hesitantly approved without consulting Paris. Venice and Savoy were angry with France, for to them papal occupation of the Valteline was little better than the Spanish. France was able to absolve herself only by dismissing and disgracing Sillery and refusing to ratify the treaty.

⁶⁴Rott, III, 689, 693-96.

⁶⁵The marquis of Coeuvres was promoted to Marshal early in 1625 (see below, p.37). To avoid confusion he is referred to as Marshal d'Estrées throughout this thesis.

⁶⁶M.F., X, 170-78.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 178-79.

⁶⁸Letter from d'Estrées in Solothurn, 27 November 1624, reprinted in M.F., X, 822.

⁶⁹Letter from Chur, 1 December 1624, reprinted in Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 821.

⁷¹See Appendix II, p. 177, for original French version of this treaty.

⁷²M.F., X, 839.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Reprinted in M.F., XI (1626), 17-25.

⁷⁵See also Richelieu's account of this campaign in his Mémoires du Cardinal de Richelieu, Société d l'histoire de France edition, IV (Paris, 1920), 241-43, and V (Paris, 1921), 82-83. Hereafter these shall be called Richelieu, Mémoires.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 60-69. See also O'Connell, p. 87.

⁷⁷M.F., XII (1627), Part II, 139.

⁷⁸Richelieu, Mémoires, V, 85.

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 102-103.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 103.

⁸¹Ibid., pp. 104-105.

⁸²See Letter to the King, Avenel, Lettres, II, 119 n. Richelieu wished Louis XIII to sever negotiations with Barberini but did not want responsibility for the rupture to fall upon himself. This letter was the result. Also see M.F., XI, 850 ff., for another account of the Legate's mission. According to Avenel, the account likely was supplied to the editor by the Cardinal-Minister. As well, see Paul Ardier, Mémoires sur l'affaire des Grisons et de la Valteline, contenant ce qui s'est passé en ces derniers guerres . . . depuis l'année mil six cent vingt quatre jusqu'en 1631. Bibliothèque nationale, Collection Dupuy 529, fols. 125-129, for another account of the mission.

⁸³See Richelieu, Mémoires, V, 119 n., for this letter.

⁸⁴M.F., XI, 52. This is a great exaggeration. Most of Feria's support came from the five Catholic cantons (Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, and Zug), according to Richelieu, Mémoires, V, 120-24, and numbered 7,000, in addition to his own forces.

⁸⁵Richelieu, Mémoires, V, 120-24.

⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 123-24. For a detailed account of the assembly, see Jeanne Petit, L'Assemblée des Notables, 1626-1627 (Paris, 1936).

⁸⁷Richelieu, Mémoires, V, 124-30. See also Bondoïs, pp. 297-307; and Le Vassor, V, 306-40.

⁸⁸Richelieu, Mémoires, V, 133-34.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 135.

⁹⁰See M.F., XII (1627), Part II, 1-8, for a reprint of the treaty. See also Appendix II, p. 180, for the original French version. As well, see Ardier, fols. 152-154; and Le Vassor, V, 386-87. Monçon also can be spelled Monzon.

⁹¹The treaty makes no mention of passage rights for any state.

⁹²Richelieu, Mémoires, V, 209-12.

⁹³Lublinskaya, p. 280.

LEGEND

MILAN	Important political unit
CHIAVENNA	Important centre
VALAIS	Other political unit
Tirano	Other centre
	Border
	River lake

Adapted from MUIR S
HISTORICAL ATLAS
(New York, 1963) "Europe
1555-1648" Drawn
by David C Norwood 1970
MAP 3



CHAPTER II

INTERIM: THE VALTELINE AND NORTHERN ITALY, 1626-1631

The Treaty of Monçon, although intended to achieve largely the same ends as that of Madrid, was balanced much less in France's favour. There were several causes for the difference in tone, but two stand out. The first was the experience of Olivares, who in the five year interval had established his influence over Philip IV and who, therefore, was able to direct the peace terms with a firmer hand. The second was the anxiety of du Fargis. Although he was advised that France might repudiate the treaty if its terms were unacceptable,¹ in which case he would become the scapegoat, he had received disquieting information from his wife² to the effect that official sources felt he should sign a treaty with Spain at any price.³

When an initial draft of the Treaty of Monçon was made in January of 1626, Richelieu disagreed with many of its provisions.⁴ He sent word to du Fargis telling him that the terms must be modified. If Olivares would not agree, the ambassador was to sever relations and return to Paris.⁵ As it turned out, Olivares was faced with unrest in Catalonia and agreed to the modifications. These were embodied in the treaty of 5 March.⁶

The Treaty of Monçon was worded vaguely, leaving it open to interpretation by each side according to expedients.

It left unsolved the major problems confronting the French: it contained no provision denying Spain passage of the Valteline; the technicalities involved in giving the Grisons sovereignty over the Valteline rendered that sovereignty useless; it made no specification of French rights in the Valteline and the Grisons; France's traditional rights of recruitment in the territories were ignored, and French rights of passage were unmentioned. France could enjoy privileges in the Grisons and the Valteline only with the consent of the Grisons, who were bound by so many restrictions that their permission meant little.

When France handed back the fortresses of the Valteline to the pope, French control would end. The Catholic government of the Valteline then could give Spain permission to use the passes, and tradition made this likely. France had no basis of protest; an invasion of the Valteline to prevent Spanish passage would violate the treaty.

After the treaty was signed and ratified, Louis XIII sent the Marquis of Châteauneuf to the Grisons to explain the treaty to the inhabitants and have them accept it.⁷ Upon his arrival Châteauneuf met with Marshal d'Estrées who had remained there in charge of the French army. Together the two convoked an assembly of the Grisons, on 12 September 1626, and presented the articles of Monçon to the delegates. The deputies listened to the provisions, conferred, and replied that they would debate the treaty in Chur in the near future.⁸

In Chur the Grisons informed the French that the

treaty displeased them greatly. They had decided to send special ambassadors to Paris to make representation to Louis XIII, and "inform him of the prejudice which was made to their liberty and sovereignty by the said Treaty."⁹

The deputies told M. Châteauneuf that, because the consent of the Archduke Leopold does not appear on the peace articles, there can be no safety in this respect. . . . Châteauneuf [answered], that it is necessary that the said Archduke Leopold give his consent and ratification; and to this end his Most-Christian Majesty has sent a Special Ambassador to the King of Spain, to ask him to have the Archduke give his ratification, or that he shall promise to ratify for the Archduke. . . .¹⁰

This was a matter which would remain contentious for the next few years, and attempts to have Austria ratify the treaty remained unsuccessful.

Reluctantly the Grisons agreed to the other articles of the treaty but stipulated that they would agree to the sole practice of Catholicism in the Valteline only if Protestants could travel through and live there. They were willing to sacrifice the right to exercise their religion there, in this respect. They also wished to place emphasis on their sovereignty and stated that "other princes have no domination or power over them."¹¹ The Grisons viewed the Valtelins as rebellious subjects who had been forgiven and placated in the Treaty of Monçon while they themselves had been denied their traditional rights. Through Châteauneuf they implored Louis XIII not to remove his forces from the Grisons and Valteline until the provisions of the treaty were fulfilled. But the French could not do this; their troops were required in France. However, Richelieu decided in favour of further negotiations,

in accordance with the secret articles of the treaty.¹²

So that the execution of the Treaty of Monçon would be facilitated, it was decided that the fortresses occupied by both the French and Spanish would be remitted formally to Urban VIII but that the task of demolition would be the responsibility of the occupying armies. Papal forces would not take possession of the valley until all forts were demolished, for the pope would not hear of his troops being responsible for the task.¹³

When they heard of the pope's refusal, Richelieu and Olivares gave their representatives in Rome responsibility for settling the dispute. After protracted negotiations which eventually required the mediation of Urban VIII, the French representative, Béthune, and the Spanish representative, Oñate, signed a convention which would regulate in all details the orderly evacuation of the Valteline. The agreement, signed on 11 November 1626, stated that papal troops would take possession of the forts, including those which never before had been occupied by such forces. The old forts were to be demolished by the Valtelins, under the supervision of French and Spanish representatives; the new forts were to be razed by soldiers.¹⁴

On 22 November d'Estrées received a communication from Torquato Conti, the papal commander, telling him of the agreement. The news surprised the Marshal, who had been ordered to delay the evacuation of French troops so as to win time for the French. He replied with a proposal that the convention be delayed six months, but this was rejected by

Conti. At the same time, the Spanish began to provision the fortress of Riva on Lake Como, which hinted that Spain was preparing to evict the French with force.

D'Estrées knew that he could not defend the Valteline without reinforcements, and he appealed to both Paris and Venice for troops. In order to combat the Huguenot insurrection, Richelieu needed not only troops already in France but also those in the Valteline, and he could not send aid. Venice, angry with France's abandoning of Venetian interests at Monçon, announced that it would not support further French activity in the southern Alps.¹⁵

When d'Estrées appealed for help among the Grisons, he found them less than enthusiastic. To them the Marshal was the representative of a kingdom which had placed its own interests before theirs, and he was becoming less popular with each passing day. He had helped his cause very little when, during the previous September, he had settled on the figure of 60,000 écus as the sum of money to be paid annually by the Valtelins to the Grisons.¹⁶ Both French and Spanish authorities rejected this amount as far too high and told d'Estrées to mind his own affairs. Du Fargis and Olivares already had reached verbal agreement on the amount, which was to be 25,000 écus annually;¹⁷ and on 22 December 1626 Louis XIII signed an agreement with Mirabel, the Spanish ambassador, which set this amount as final.¹⁸ When d'Estrées was over-ruled his popularity decreased further.

With the agreement of 22 December, the course was

set. D'Estrées received instructions to implement the French portion of the Treaty of Monçon; the governor of the Milanese received instructions to halt military preparations at Riva and Milan. D'Estrées made another attempt to have the Grisons accept the treaty but failed. He resolved to make a final effort, in Chur, when he left the Grisons. By 15 February 1627 papal troops had occupied all the area specified by the treaty, though the Grisons commissioner in Chiavenna refused to leave until he had formulated an official protest regarding violations of sovereignty. The task of demolition then commenced.¹⁹

Marshal d'Estrées arrived in Chur on 8 March 1627, and soon he had no doubts about the disfavour into which France had fallen during the past year. Received as a liberator in November of 1624, twenty-eight months later d'Estrées was treated as an enemy. In these circumstances, he decided that a lengthy stay in Chur would do him more harm than good, and he proceeded with the two tasks which Richelieu had entrusted to him. He installed the secretary-general of his army, Jacques Mesmin, as regular French Ambassador to the Grisons, and he collected his troops and began conducting them to Zürich and back to France.

With the departure of the French troops, the first active phase of the Valteline war was ended; and there was some hope, if not belief, that it was ended permanently. But the Treaty of Monçon, negotiated without the participation of the Grisons or Valtelins was a political expedient ambiguous beyond interpretation, and it merely

suspended hostilities. Now other events in different parts of Europe demanded attention, and the problems of the southern Alps were replaced by new priorities.

In France, Richelieu was faced with several problems, the most serious of which was the Huguenot rebellion. Externally he faced a situation equally formidable. A long-anticipated rupture with England became reality, and the English fleet was preparing to aid the French Protestants. Imperial forces were intriguing with several French nobles, including Gaston d'Orléans, the only brother of Louis XIII, and the Count of Soissons; and the government of the Spanish Netherlands was fomenting trouble in Lorraine. The Republic of Venice had drawn away from French influence, calling the Treaty of Monçon "the treason of 5 March".²⁰ These circumstances forced Richelieu to ignore the de facto Spanish victory in the Valteline and Grisons.

In the Grisons itself, the governor of Milan had forced subservience and within a short time Spanish and imperial forces were using the passes, oblivious to the protests of the Grisons. More important, France had lost the old, traditional diplomatic privileges it had enjoyed in the Grisons and most of Switzerland.²¹ Repeated violations of the Monçon agreement appeared to be ignored by France--simply because Richelieu had neither the time nor the resources to concern himself with the matter. But he would not forget.

A Huguenot rebellion had recommenced in France shortly after d'Estrées conquered the Valteline late in

1624. England was sympathetic to the citizens of La Rochelle, which was the centre of the rebellion, and the Duke of Buckingham, the "favourite" of Charles I, urged his king to prepare for war with France.²² Buckingham himself wasted no time and soon was investigating the possibilities of an English-Spanish alliance. In Madrid, du Fargis heard rumours of an impending treaty between England and the Spanish Netherlands, which also would bind Spain. In panic, and without instructions from Paris, he signed a treaty of alliance between France and Spain on 20 March 1627,²³ but from its inception the treaty proved worthless.

Meanwhile, Buckingham continued his preparations and now hoped to enlist the support of Lorraine and Savoy.²⁴ Duke Charles of Lorraine was not on good terms with Louis XIII, because the king disputed his succession to the duchy, and because France held the three bishoprics which lay within the Duchy of Lorraine: Toul, Metz, and Verdun. Hence, Charles of Lorraine easily was brought to agreement with Buckingham. Montagu, Buckingham's representative, then travelled to Turin, where he had no trouble obtaining the support of Charles Emmanuel,²⁵ and also found another ally, the Count of Soissons, who earlier had sought asylum in Savoy. Buckingham then tried without success to relieve the siege of La Rochelle, which had commenced in August of 1627.

In the meantime, French agents had captured Montagu,²⁶ and he was found to be carrying papers which linked several rulers in various plots against France. The documents disclosed that Charles of Lorraine had offered to raise 15,000 troops and had asked Ferdinand II to supply

a further 7,000 to occupy Vic and Moyenvic.²⁷ In addition, Soissons was to command an army of 16,000 men,²⁸ and Venice had offered money to raise 10,000 troops, which would be commanded by Soissons and Rohan.²⁹ The Emperor's part in the plan and the fact that Spain had not sent aid in accordance with the treaty of 20 March 1627³⁰ made Richelieu suspect the added participation of the Spanish, but his suspicions were unfounded.³¹ The Spanish Council of State had discussed the possibility of allowing France to be consumed by the Huguenot war, but Philip IV felt obliged morally to aid a fellow Catholic and ordered Don Frederico of Toledo to sail to La Rochelle. He arrived there with twenty-six ships and 6,000 men on 28 November 1627, two weeks after the departure of Buckingham;³² but "apart from providing an excuse for elaborate festivities, [he] proved useless."³³

La Rochelle was confident of the arrival of English reinforcements the following spring. Richelieu also expected such an expedition, and on 1 December he began construction of a huge, fortified dike across the mouth of the harbour of La Rochelle.³⁴ The dike, almost 4,500 feet in length,³⁵ was completed in the spring of 1628, and by that time the French army in front of La Rochelle, now commanded personally by Richelieu, had increased in size to 25,000.³⁶ Despite heroic resistance by its starving citizenry and further English attempts at relief, La Rochelle capitulated to Richelieu and Louis XIII on 28 October 1628.³⁷ Of an original population of between 18,000 and

25,000 only 5,000 remained. Louis was generous with the survivors; he pardoned all and gave some of them commissions in his army and navy.

Almost a year before La Rochelle surrendered, external circumstances had forced Richelieu to divide his attention. On 26 December 1627, Vincent II, Duke of Mantua, died without direct heirs.³⁸ His territories, Mantua and Montferrat, lay on the eastern and western frontiers of the Milanese respectively and were extremely important, especially Montferrat, the tiny territory which separated the Duchy of Savoy from the Milanese. Its capital, Casale, was the site of a redoubtable fortress that controlled the upper valley of the Po, and it lay on the major Spanish route from Genoa to Milan. France was offered an opportunity to obtain control of this strategic point, since the foremost claimant to the territory was Charles of Gonzaga, the French Duke of Nevers, who was a cousin of the deceased Vincent II. A more remote cousin, the Spanish Duke of Gustalla, also claimed the duchies, however, and as Spanish interests were involved deeply a Franco-Spanish confrontation developed rapidly. The situation was complicated yet further when Urban VIII lent his support to the French, and the Duke of Savoy, asserting claims to Montferrat,³⁹ began to cooperate with the Spanish.⁴⁰ Then Emperor Ferdinand, in an effort to protect his suzerainty and avoid new hostilities, issued a decree sequestering the Duchy of Mantua until all claims could be heard. In his will Vincent II had named Nevers as his heir, and the Frenchman had taken possession

of Mantua and Montferrat immediately upon the duke's death. But in the early spring of 1628 Casale was besieged by Spanish and Savoyard troops.⁴¹

In consequence, if France was to gain this Italian stronghold, Richelieu had no choice but to support Nevers with force; however, the continuation of the siege of La Rochelle made immediate aid infeasible. It became a question of which would last longer, La Rochelle or Casale.

Duke Charles Emmanuel of Savoy had little confidence in his alliance with the Habsburgs, however, and he began sounding out Richelieu. A Savoyard emissary was sent to La Rochelle to inform Richelieu that Savoy would abandon its Spanish alliance if France would allow it to retain some of its conquests in Montferrat. Simultaneously the Savoyard ambassador in Madrid inquired whether Spain could send reinforcements to Italy if French troops crossed the Alps to relieve Casale. He received a negative reply, and Charles Emmanuel decided that an alliance with France might prove more profitable.

As the siege of La Rochelle continued into the autumn of 1628 it became obvious to Richelieu that an expedition to relieve Casale would have to be undertaken in the winter, and he began formulating plans accordingly. The French army would march immediately after the surrender of La Rochelle and would relieve Casale in March.⁴² It would lift the siege in May, then march through Provence to Languedoc to deal with rebellious Protestants in southern France.⁴³

On 15 January 1629 Louis XIII left Paris for Grenoble to join his army. In spite of false rumours that the Count of Bautru, Richelieu's special envoy in Madrid, had signed a treaty handing over Casale to Spain, the army continued its march over the Alps. In February it entered Savoy and proceeded to the fortress-city of Susa without anyone knowing the position of Charles Emmanuel. Although allied nominally with Spain, the Duke appeared to be neutral at the time. Then his son, Victor Amadeus, arrived at Susa and tried to negotiate with the French; but from past experience Richelieu knew that Charles Emmanuel could not be trusted, and he decided to attack and take the citadel.⁴⁵ The French had little difficulty in routing the Savoyards from Susa, and on 11 March 1629 Charles Emmanuel came to terms.

Earlier, in February, Richelieu had negotiated a treaty between France, Venice, Mantua and the papacy which called for a coalition army to settle the Mantuan problem. A similar treaty, drawn up in March and ratified in April,⁴⁶ was embodied as a secret article in the 11 March agreement between Charles Emmanuel and France.⁴⁷ This treaty gave France the right to cross Savoy at any time and bound Charles Emmanuel to supply Casale immediately upon its relief. In return, Savoy was to be allowed to retain Trino in Montferrat, and Mantua would pay Savoy an annual sum in exchange for its renunciation of all claims to any portion of Mantua or Montferrat.⁴⁸ In the meantime, the French would retain possession of Susa for the sake of security.

Richelieu knew Charles Emmanuel too well to rely upon his word alone.

French forces had no need of moving beyond Susa. The Spanish army, deserted by Savoy and with no further reinforcements, had no choice but to abandon the siege of Casale.⁴⁹ The siege was lifted, and soon Richelieu was able to lead the army back to France to deal with the southern Protestants. England, more and more concerned with events in Germany, had abandoned the Huguenots and had signed a treaty with France on 24 April.⁵⁰ Two months later, on 28 June 1629, Louis XIII proclaimed the Edict of Grace, which offered pardon and religious tolerance to all who surrendered. Almost immediately, most of the remaining insurrectionists accepted the peace. The Duke of Rohan, humiliated and under pressure from the crown, chose exile in Venice, where he soon became chief of the Republic's army.

By the end of August, 1629, Richelieu was back in Paris, faced with new and serious aspects of the Mantuan problem. Spain and Austria, disturbed by the events of the preceding spring, had taken action. It was Philip IV who initially had given vent to his feelings, when he wrote:

The King of France has had in mind to disturb me ever since he has been on the throne. Everywhere I am blocked by the French, Frenchmen in Brazil, Frenchmen in Genoa, Frenchmen in the Valteline, Frenchmen in Breda, Frenchmen on the sea!⁵¹

The Spanish Council of State then decided on a show of force in Italy, and the Marquis of Spinola was appointed Governor of the Milanese and commander-in-chief of Spanish

forces in Italy. However, it was Emperor Ferdinand II who reacted to the developments with more than words. In an atmosphere of secrecy, he set about making his plans.

In the Valteline and Grisons, little other than domestic conflicts had disturbed the valleys since the departure of d'Estrées in 1627. The most serious problems concerned the rights of the Protestant Grisons in the Valteline and the fact that Spain had begun using the passes shortly after the French evacuation. The Grisons had attempted to secure Spanish enforcement of the Treaty of Monçon, but to no avail; comparably, Spain's promise that she would have Austria sign the treaty was ignored.⁵²

The events of the Mantuan succession had a direct bearing on affairs in the Grisons and Valteline. If the French could retain possession of Montferrat, an additional hardship would be imposed on the Spanish, who would have to find another, and consequently less direct, route from Genoa to Milan. But if Spain or Austria took possession, the Grisons would find themselves at a great disadvantage, for the Treaty of Monçon had nullified French passage and recruiting rights in the mountain territories; if Mantua-Montferrat were lost, France would have no base in Italy or the southern Alps at all, the Habsburgs would strengthen their already solid position in Italy, and the Grisons would be isolated completely.

Increasingly, the Grisons were worried about an invasion by imperial troops. Earlier, when they heard that French soldiers were en route to Grenoble (December

of 1628-January of 1629), they had been panic-stricken;⁵³ they imagined France seizing Mantua-Montferrat, in alliance with themselves, Switzerland, and Venice, then withdrawing, as Richelieu was wont to do, leaving the Grisons completely open to a retaliatory imperial invasion. The course of events approximated these predictions,⁵⁴ and with the evacuation of French troops from Susa, the people of the Grisons commenced military preparations for their own defence. The Austrian threat silently covered the area and resulted in a defensive alliance among the three leagues; soon this alliance had spread to most of Switzerland.

During this period Spanish envoys had been attempting to persuade Ferdinand II to take overt action in Mantua-Montferrat. They told him that Nevers had requested that Bassompierre organize an army in the Grisons and Valteline, so as to prevent the passage of imperial troops through the valleys.⁵⁵ They also told him that Spinola had embarked for the Milanese to prepare a new assault in Mantua-Montferrat. Finally he was persuaded.

In 1629 Ferdinand II had three armies. One was marching to Poland to aid that kingdom against the advancing Swedish army of Gustavus Adolphus; another was lending support to Spain in the Spanish Netherlands; and the third, comprising about 35,000 men,⁵⁶ was uncommitted in any strategic sense but was in a position to strike quickly in the south, particularly in Switzerland and northern Italy.

Towards the middle of May, 1629, there was little

doubt that the Grisons and much of Switzerland would be the first victims of an invading imperial army which was gathering on the middle Rhine.⁵⁷ Quickly the Grisons attempted to erect fortifications at Maienfeld and in the Luziensteig pass, but it was too late. The advance units of the Austrian army reached the northern Grisons on 25 May.⁵⁸ The following evening a messenger appeared in Chur with a formal note from Ferdinand demanding that the Grisons open their passes to his troops. The Grisons delegates sought out Mesmin, the French ambassador, to ask his advice.

"According to him, peace in Italy had never been more assured, and never had the emperor been less interested in breaking with the Most-Christian King. . . ."⁵⁹ Mesmin had failed to analyze the gravity of the situation.

On the morning of the 27th, the columns of the main imperial army, commanded by the Count of Collalto, entered the Grisons, imprisoned Mesmin, and demanded the surrender of the territory.⁶⁰ On Monday, the 28th, the army was at Chur; simultaneously a Spanish army from the Milanese secured the Valteline. Ferdinand II immediately made known his purposes, by letter, to the Grisons. He had no intention of incorporating the Valteline and the Grisons into the Empire; his actions were a necessary expedient in his campaign to enforce the sequestration of Mantua-Montferrat. When presented with the letter from Ferdinand, "the Grisons . . . agreed that they could not refuse, [and] permitted the passage which already had taken place. . . ."⁶¹

News of the invasion reached Richelieu at Alais on

3 June. Totally unexpected, "this audacious act . . . produced a considerable reaction in the entourage of the French monarch."⁶² Richelieu saw in the move the defeat of French ambitions in Mantua-Montferrat, the re-establishment of Habsburg influence in the Grisons, the Valteline, and northern Italy, the immediate defection of Charles Emmanuel from the French camp and the ruin of the Treaty of Susa.⁶³

It is possible that this news was in part responsible for Louis' proclamation of the Edict of Grace so shortly thereafter. Until this time there existed in Paris the opinion that external problems could be solved at any time and that the principal item was to subdue the Huguenots.⁶⁴ The imperial invasion of the Grisons quickly dissipated that illusion. Richelieu then set about preparing France for any subsequent events. He sent agents to Madrid and Vienna to discover if a reputed entente between Spain and Austria was as formal as it appeared, and he began consolidating affairs within France.

Créqui, in charge of the French garrison at Susa, soon received orders from Richelieu to strengthen his forces and to obtain from Charles Emmanuel assurances that he would honour the treaty of 11 March. This would determine whether or not the Savoyard duke was collaborating with the Spanish once more. In Rome, Béthune was ordered to sound out the disposition of Urban VIII, with the goal of undertaking a joint action against the Habsburgs.⁶⁵ The Marshal of Toiras, who now was at Casale, was directed by Richelieu to move within the walls of the citadel and

join his forces with those of the Venetian commander, Avaux.⁶⁶

Richelieu's envoys to the two Habsburg capitals met with little success.⁶⁷ In Madrid, Olivares was firm and close-mouthed; he flatly refused to enter into negotiations with France. In Vienna the French envoy was treated with more courtesy but found Ferdinand II equally firm. The emperor refused to invest Nevers in the duchy without a formal arbitration. The situation moved Richelieu to prepare a new show of arms in Italy.

During this period, Venice and France had been coming to agreement over common interests, and bitterness over the Treaty of Monçon was forgotten. The imperial invasion of the Grisons had isolated the Republic completely. She already had lent assistance to the French cause in Mantua-Montferrat, and now she was urging France to settle her internal problems so as to free an army for use in the south.⁶⁸ On 23 September 1629, France and Venice concluded a treaty uniting them against the Habsburgs and upholding their earlier Treaty of Susa.⁶⁹

Initially, the Venetians proposed a diversion in the Valteline with French help, while Richelieu preferred to concentrate any French movements in the Italian peninsula itself. While formulating his plans, the Cardinal named Marshal d'Estrées as special ambassador to the Grisons. D'Estrées was to join the new regular ambassador there, Brûlart de Léon; and both were to work to obtain the support of the Grisons in the potential establishment of a "voluntary army." D'Estrées would oversee the organization of the

force; when and if it was ready, he was to command it and conduct a diversionary campaign either in the Grisons and Valteline or in the Tyrol.⁷⁰

In the autumn of 1629, the French government was not prepared to mount a major offensive in Italy, and Richelieu was stalling for time. New negotiations with the Venetians revealed that they would prefer a campaign in northern Italy to one in the Valteline, and Richelieu informed d'Estrées that if the Venetians hesitated to send forces to the Grisons, he was to abandon the plan and return to France. At a diet held in Solothurn on 27 August 1629, the Swiss, especially the Catholics, became less enthusiastic about the levy, to which they had agreed for purposes of security from Austrian invasion. Also, it became increasingly likely that any Swiss Catholic participation in a French-organized army would provoke Austrian retaliation. Then, on 26 September, the French envoy to Poland and Sweden, Charnacé, announced that he had arranged an armistice between Sweden and Poland which ended hostilities.⁷² The armistice freed the Swedish army, caught Ferdinand II off guard and created a diversion in the north, so that Richelieu had no need of another one in the Valteline and Grisons. He wrote d'Estrées and instructed him to halt his plans,⁷³ and on 22 October Louis issued orders to Brûlart de Léon to "suspend the 'levy'".⁷⁴

On 11 November Richelieu again communicated with Léon, informing him that the King had decided to take 6,000 Swiss soldiers into the French army, for use outside Switzerland, and that he had delegated Bassompierre to

organize, recruit and command this army.⁷⁵ He had two reasons for this change of plan. A month earlier when Louis had ordered the levy suspended, Richelieu did not know the intentions of Spain and Austria, and he still hoped for a rapid peace in Italy. But within three weeks his envoys had reported that such hopes were futile, "for the attitude of the Austrians and Spanish allowed the survival of no doubt as to their belligerent plans."⁷⁶ The second reason was equally important. For six months the Venetians had been requesting that Bassompierre be placed in command of a Swiss regiment; he was respected and liked in both the Grisons and Venice, and possibly he could unite them into an effective force. Richelieu appointed him special ambassador to the Swiss and gave him a threefold task:

. . . the first to see what means there would be of placing the Grisons in liberty and of chasing from them the imperial army; the next to prevent the imperials in Italy from being able to increase their army with forces from Switzerland; and the third to make strong levies if they were needed. . . .⁷⁷

Bassompierre left Paris on 16 January 1630. His arrival in Switzerland was impressive; at Solothurn on 12 February he was "given a superb entry".⁷⁸ There he requested the convocation of general diet, which was accorded him for 3 March. While he awaited its opening, he met with representatives of almost every Swiss canton and found that French influence was increasing again.

The business portion of the diet commenced on 4 March. and the debate went smoothly for Bassompierre, who found the majority of the delegates inclined to support France. Swiss representatives, apparently weary of the prolonged Austrian

occupation of the Grisons and the subsequent threat to their security, told the ambassador:

For the regard of the Recuperation of the Valteline, and the re-establishment of our allies of the three Grey Leagues in their traditional liberty, we shall have occasion to follow the inspired advice of his said Excellency [Bassompierre], and to re-establish our said allies in their initial state. Being notified meanwhile, that between the interested powerful Princes there should be concluded a peace treaty, we wish to hope that this affair will be concluded to a good end, and that our said allies of the three Grey Leagues, together with the Valteline, will be included there. . . .

On 27 March Bassompierre was informed that a French army commanded by Richelieu and a former Huguenot leader, La Force, had besieged and taken the Savoyard fortress of Pinerolo.⁸⁰ Pinerolo was an important strategic citadel which overlooked and controlled access to the upper Po valley; it now would be used as an advanced base of operations and as a supply depot for the French. The messenger who delivered the news to Bassompierre "exhorted [him] to place six thousand Swiss on foot promptly."⁸¹ The marshal obeyed the request, and on 20 April he left Solothurn in command of 6,000 troops.⁸²

On 24 April Bassompierre's army was split in two. One half journeyed to the Lorraine frontier to reinforce troops under Marshal Marillac, who were facing Duke Charles of Lorraine. The other half, commanded by Bassompierre, travelled through the Dauphiné and Savoy, and a few months later it joined the force headed by Marshal Schomberg, which was marching to reinforce Casale.

Spinola laid siege to Casale on 13 May 1630,⁸³ and in mid-July his forces were joined by an imperial army com-

manded by Collalto and Piccolomini; further east, on 18 July Mantua fell to the Austrians,⁸⁴ and Nevers and his son were captured. On the battlefield the summer heat had begun to take effect, however. The plague struck⁸⁵ and soon spread across all of northern Italy. Marshals La Force and Marillac (the latter having moved his army into Italy from the Lorraine frontier) were relatively close to Casale, but there was so much sickness within their forces that they could not move to relieve the siege. Richelieu noted that Susa was free of the plague but that Pinerolo "is in the worst state it can be, the plague having made a desert of it."⁸⁶ Despite the epidemic, Casale refused to surrender, and Richelieu maintained his attempts to seek a peace. While the French position in northern Italy was not weak, Richelieu wished to have the succession affair done with. France was not at war officially with the Habsburgs, and the Cardinal had no desire to see the dispute escalated into a major conflict at this point. In addition, the situation in the north was potentially far more dangerous. His efforts found new support, for during the summer Charles Emmanuel died and was succeeded by his son, Victor Amadeus, who had married a sister of Louis XIII. She began exerting pressure on her husband to support Richelieu and Giulio Mazarini, the agent of the papal nuncio, in peace talks with Spanish and imperial officials.

Early in September, Mazarini managed to secure a truce between the French and the Habsburgs, to last until the 30th of the month.⁸⁷ The most important aspect of the

truce was that it represented a deadline for French efforts to have Nevers invested formally in Mantua-Montferrat.

Ferdinand II had called a meeting of his Electors at Regensburg for 3 June, hoping to have his son elected King of the Romans. To this meeting Richelieu sent Brûlart de Léon, whom he detached from his diplomatic mission in Switzerland, and Père Joseph, his trusted Capuchin agent. When Richelieu initially informed them of their task at Regensburg, they were instructed to persuade the Electors not to vote for Ferdinand's son. They also were to secure the Emperor's formal investiture of Nevers in Mantua-Montferrat, and for this purpose Léon was given full powers to conclude a peace in northern Italy.⁸⁹ But by the time the French delegates arrived in Regensburg, Mantua had fallen, Nevers and his son were prisoners, and Casale was in danger. The north Italian issue became the most important one.

The first formal negotiations between the French delegates and the Emperor commenced on 11 August 1630, when Brûlart de Léon and Père Joseph met with imperial plenipotentiaries.⁹⁰ They requested that the Emperor formally invest the Duke of Nevers in Mantua and Montferrat and that he withdraw his troops from northern Italy and the Grisons. They were told that a settlement of this nature was impossible unless France agreed to withdraw all support from imperial enemies in Germany. Any treaty between France and Austria must include French abandonment of Sweden, the United Provinces, the German Protestants and Denmark. In effect, what the imperial representatives demanded was a

general peace, something which Léon did not have the power to negotiate. He told the imperials this and wrote again to Richelieu asking for full powers, but the Cardinal-Minister would not give him such authorization.⁹¹

When Richelieu's new instructions telling Léon to make a peace only for Italy reached Regensburg in mid-September they no longer were valid. France was in a more favourable situation in the north, for the army of Gustavus Adolphus had invaded Pomerania. The dismissal of the imperial general Wallenstein at the demand of the Electors had weakened Ferdinand's forces in the north, and the Emperor required the army deployed in Mantua-Montferrat and the Grisons to secure his defences in Germany. In Italy, Marshal Schomberg had arrived early in September with considerable reinforcements,⁹² and on 25 September Spinola died, weakening Spanish influence in the area. Richelieu felt that the issue could be forced to a conclusion favourable to France, and though he had debated extending the truce, he decided against it.⁹³ But while he communicated the news of Schomberg's arrival to Léon and Père Joseph, the Cardinal-Minister did not inform them that he had instructed the army to march to the relief of Casale and that there was less demand for a general Italian peace. The two delegates at Regensburg continued to assume there was great pressure on them to conclude a peace in Italy.⁹⁴

Ferdinand told Léon and Père Joseph that he planned to invest Nevers in Mantua and Montferrat; he never had thought otherwise, but he had wished that Nevers submit to

his sequestration order.⁹⁵ Upon this basis, for it seemed important, the delegates signed their names to the Treaty of Regensburg on 13 October 1630.⁹⁶ The treaty provided for Spanish withdrawal from Casale and imperial evacuation of Mantua-Montferrat, the Valteline and the Grisons. The French were to withdraw at once from all positions in Italy except Pinerolo and Susa, the evacuation of which would be negotiated with Duke Victor Amadeus. The Mantuan succession problem would be adjudicated, Nevers would be invested and compensation made to other claimants. Savoy would retain Trino in Montferrat and pay the Duke of Mantua an annual rental of 18,000 crowns. Nevers would retain the citadel at Casale but would erect no further fortifications. With restrictions, the treaty had settled the Italian problem in favour of the French.⁹⁷ But there were other aspects of the treaty which made the Mantuan settlement less comforting. France agreed not to support any imperial enemies, which included Sweden, the German Protestants, the Dutch, and Venice. Nor was there any settlement of the Lorraine problem, which was causing Richelieu much trouble.

Almost immediately, copies of the Treaty of Regensburg were sent to Spanish, imperial and French camps. Schomberg read it before he had heard from Richelieu; after glancing at its terms he judged that the first minister would repudiate it, and he continued his march to Casale, where he and the army of Marillac arrived on 26 October.⁹⁸ Hostilities no sooner had begun than Mazarini appeared with the news that he had negotiated a new agreement with the

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Spanish commander, the Treaty of Casale.⁹⁹ It provided that Spain would return Casale to Nevers and evacuate Montferrat so long as the French army did likewise.

When Richelieu saw the text of the Treaty of Regensburg, he was angered,¹⁰⁰ and he wrote to his generals in Italy immediately, instructing them to ignore the treaty.¹⁰¹ He then received news of the Treaty of Casale; its terms strengthened his conviction to repudiate that of Regensburg. But repudiation of the Treaty of Regensburg was not to be easy, and for the next few years it would be the pivot around which every discussion involving France and a Habsburg power would revolve.

Then, in the process of his negotiations, Mazarini discovered that Spain had no intention of adhering to the Treaty of Casale, and Richelieu ordered Schomberg and Marillac to break the Spanish siege of Casale and relieve the fortress.¹⁰² Other French holdings in northern Italy, including Susa and Pinerolo, were strengthened, and Richelieu, having established a situation more favourable to France, awaited new developments.

At Regensburg the signing of the treaty was followed by more detailed discussions of particular topics. One of the most important of these was the question of the Grisons and the Valteline, which still were held by imperial forces. The French made two proposals: first, that the Austrians should leave the territories simultaneously with the French evacuation of northern Italy; and second, if the Emperor did not wish to relin-

quish the passages until "Collalto's last soldier was over the mountains safely", Louis XIII would retain the right to arbitrate the French evacuation of Pinerolo and Susa until the Valteline and Grisons had been restored to the Grisons.¹⁰³ Ferdinand rejected both proposals, telling the French that he intended to restore the Grisons' liberty, not because "of the request of the Very Christian King, but in virtue of an earlier promise made to the Council of Chur."¹⁰⁴

With regard to the Treaty of Monçon, Ferdinand dismissed French demands that he respect its provisions, saying that it was a matter for France and Spain, since he had taken no part in it. He would not demand that Spain fulfill its commitments; this was a problem for France. Thus the Treaty of Regensburg failed to guarantee another area with which Richelieu was concerned. The Spanish remained as much masters of the Valteline as before.

In the late spring of 1631 a new set of agreements was negotiated. These were accepted by Spain for several reasons. She had no reserves; she was almost bankrupt and was supporting a major conflict on the lower Rhine and in the Spanish Netherlands; and France held three extremely strategic points in northern Italy, Susa, Pinerolo and Casale, and she had a very large number of troops with which to retain them. Austria accepted peace because of the northern threat, which during the winter of 1630-1631 had become much more serious.

The agreements, known collectively as the Treaty of Cherasco,¹⁰⁵ were dated 31 March, 6 April, and 30 May. The

treaty of 6 April, ratified on 26 April by the Duke of Savoy, contained thirty articles, and provided that the Duke of Nevers be invested in Mantua-Montferrat; all armies, imperial, Spanish, and French, were to be withdrawn from the duchies; and France was to withdraw from Susa and Pinerolo. Article 21 provided for Austrian withdrawal from the Grisons and Valteline,¹⁰⁶ while a secret article between France and Austria stated that the Swiss army raised by Bassompierre would garrison the fortresses of Susa and Avigliana in Savoy until the imperial troops had restored all fortresses of the Valteline and Grisons to the Grisons.¹⁰⁷ However, Ferdinand II wrote to Victor Amadeus stating that this last provision violated article thirteen of the Treaty of Regensburg (upon which he based the Treaty of Cherasco) and that it would have to be deleted from the Treaty of Cherasco in order to gain his approval.¹⁰⁸ As a result an amended treaty was drawn up between French, Savoyard, and imperial representatives (Spain was represented by the Austrian delegates)¹⁰⁹ and signed on 30 May.¹¹⁰

Throughout the summer of 1631 agents of the Emperor, Spain, France, and Savoy supervised the execution of the Treaty of Cherasco. The final matter was the French restitution of Pinerolo to Savoy. On 20 September Victor Amadeus made a solemn declaration that France had fulfilled its obligations by the treaties and that the fortress of Pinerolo had been evacuated.

Insofar as the Habsburgs were concerned, there had been two treaties of Cherasco, on 6 April and 30 May. But a

third had been negotiated secretly between Savoy and France a week before the first open treaty, on 31 March, in which Victor Amadeus agreed to cede Pinerolo to France in perpetuity. This treaty was engineered by Mazarini, who although still in the service of the papacy was working for the French as well, and who was demonstrating the skill with which he would rule France as Richelieu's successor. Richelieu had regarded this secret agreement with some doubt. He feared Habsburg reactions, though he realized that the control of Pinerolo would establish France as master of northern Italy and that its loss would deny France that role. Ultimately, he was convinced that the secret treaty was a necessity.

Thus when imperial and Spanish inspectors toured Pinerolo on 20 September and detected nothing violating the Treaty of Cherasco, they expressed satisfaction and left. Victor Amadeus then proclaimed that Pinerolo was to remain with the French. It did not take long for the news of the trickery to leak out. When Feria, again governor of the Milanese, learned of it, he threatened that Nevers would not be allowed to retain his investiture unless France honoured the treaties of Regensburg and Cherasco to the letter.¹¹¹ Richelieu replied that Spain had done no better with regard to the Treaty of Monçon, having violated it constantly since its inception, most recently when over 6,000 troops released from Casale had been moved through the Valteline to Flanders. The last imperial troops had left the Valteline and the Grisons on 15 September,¹¹² but the Spanish still remained in the Valteline, violating both the agreement of

Monçon and that of Cherasco. After the quarreling had ceased, the Spanish remained in the Valteline and the French in Pinerolo.

To win time and to placate the angry Spanish, Mazarini, Richelieu, and Victor Amadeus signed an agreement on 19 October which stated that France would evacuate Pinerolo and return it to Savoy after a period of six months.¹¹³ This agreement was a sham; its purpose was to allow the French to consolidate their hold on Pinerolo and prepare themselves for further hostilities. When the agreed date was reached, Victor Amadeus would give his permission for the French to remain.

The Habsburgs were faced with a critical situation in 1631. The imperial army had been defeated soundly at Breitenfeld by Gustavus Adolphus in September; Spain was suffering reverses in the Spanish Netherlands, and her treasury was almost empty, while Savoy under its new ruler, Victor Amadeus, had moved from the Spanish to the French sphere of influence. Urban VIII and the Republic of Venice were decidedly pro-French, the latter having appointed the Duke of Rohan as its military Commander-in-Chief in July of 1630. The road through Casale, the most direct route from Genoa to Milan and thence to the Valteline and the north, had been blocked. In the north a French army had invaded Lorraine and in effect had negated the value of that duchy to the Habsburgs. In a situation of considerable complexity the French had emerged victorious and the Habsburgs had lost. The events of the Mantuan succession had

demonstrated the importance of the Grisons, and the indispensability of the Valteline as a route for supply and passage. In the near future, this valley would play a role of even greater importance in the increasing hostilities between France and the Habsburgs.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

¹Letter from the King to M. du Fargis, 4 February 1626, in Avenel, Lettres, II, 187-89.

²Richelieu to the Keeper of the Seals, 4 November 1626, in Avenel, Lettres, II, 283-84.

³O'Connell, p. 94.

⁴See Avenel, Lettres, II, 16, n. 2.

⁵Georges Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue (Paris, 1884-1895), II, 283-84.

⁶See the French version of the Treaty of Monçon in Appendix II, p. 180.

⁷Richelieu, Mémoires, VII (Paris, 1926), 2-4.

⁸M.F., XIII (1629), 258.

⁹Ibid., p. 260.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 261.

¹¹Ibid., p. 262.

¹²See these articles, reprinted in Appendix II, p. See also Pithon, pp. 51-53.

¹³Rott, IV, Part I, 121.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 123-24.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 126.

¹⁷M.F., XIII, 280.

¹⁸Rott, IV, Part I, 127.

¹⁹M.F., XIII, 280.

²⁰Rott, IV, Part I, 160.

²¹Ibid., pp. 160-61.

²²O'Connell, pp. 112-13. In an effort to heal the breach between England and France, Richelieu sent Bassompierre to the English court, but the mission was unsuccessful.

²³Richelieu, Mémoires, VII, 55-58. The main importance of the treaty to France was Spain's obligation thereunder to send ships against the Protestants at La Rochelle. On a copy of the document Richelieu wrote: "Treaty signed by M. du Fargis with the Count Olivares on the subject of England, [a] treaty made and signed by Fargis without order, . . ."

²⁴Ibid., pp. 50-51.

²⁵Whose interests also had been ignored by France in the Treaty of Monçon.

²⁶Montagu had been travelling from London to Nancy, in the Spanish Netherlands, and due to standing orders from Richelieu for his arrest, he remained off French soil. When he was travelling through Bar, a part of the Duchy of Lorraine, a dozen Frenchmen from Langres crossed the border and abducted him. See Richelieu, Mémoires, VII, 226-32.

²⁷Vic and Moyenvic were fortified dependencies of the bishopric of Metz.

²⁸Richelieu, Mémoires, VII, 233.

²⁹"Instruction from Cardinal Richelieu to the sieur of Guron", 19 April 1628, in Avenel, Lettres, III, 70-72. For an account of the last religious war in France, see A.D. Cazenove, "Campagnes de Rohan en Languedoc (1621-1624)", Annales du Midi, XIV (1902), 329-49, 492-522, XV (1903), 5-27, 168-204.

³⁰See the letter from Richelieu to Olivares and the commander of the Spanish army, 23 September 1627, in Avenel, Lettres, II, 619. Richelieu also knew that Olivares was negotiating with Rohan with a view to prolonging the rebellion.

³¹O'Connell, pp. 168-169.

³²Richelieu, Mémoires, VII, 233.

³³O'Connell, p. 169.

³⁴See Richelieu's notes on this project in his Mémoires, VII, 215-85.

³⁵G.A. Rothrock, "The Siege of La Rochelle", History Today, XIX (1969), 759.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷See Avenel, Lettres, III, 139-40, 144. "To M. the Count-Duke of Olivares, 9 November 1628: Sir, I have no doubt that you will be very happy to learn the news of the taking of La Rochelle, of which the sieur de Bautru shall give you the details. I have implored him to assure you also of the esteem in which I hold your person, and of the desire that I have to serve you. I hope that you will do me the favour of believing it. . . . Sir, your very affectionate servant, Richelieu."

³⁸Richelieu, Mémoires, VIII (Paris, 1927), 58. For a detailed account of the succession, see Emile Baudson, Charles de Gonzague, Duc de Nevers, de Rethel et de Mantoue, 1580-1637 (Paris, 1947).

³⁹In the name of his grand-daughter, Marguerite, who married Nevers' son, The Duke of Rethel, on 25 December 1627.

⁴⁰Richelieu, Mémoires, VIII, 61-64.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 112-13.

⁴²Ibid., IX (Paris, 1929), 4-12.

⁴³Avenel, Lettres, III, 150-52. Richelieu wrote Louis, "Returning with your army into Languedoc, you shall reduce all to your obedience, and there give peace in the month of July. With the result that Your Majesty shall be able, as I hope, to return victorious to Paris in the month of August."

⁴⁴Richelieu, Mémoires, IX, 62.

⁴⁵O'Connell, p. 194.

⁴⁶Avenel, Lettres, III, 238-46. Both treaties of Susa are listed in footnotes here. Their provisions are similar, except that the first obligated Urban VIII to force Milan's acceptance of the treaty (for which reason he refused to sign it), whereas the second did not. The treaty allied France, Savoy, Venice, and the papacy, and projected a 48,000 man army.

⁴⁷Letter to the Queen from Richelieu, 14 March 1629, in Avenel, Lettres, III, 253-55. See also M.F., XV (1631), for a reprint of the treaty.

⁴⁸M.F., XV, 132.

⁴⁹Richelieu, Mémoires, X, 280-83.

⁵⁰Ibid., IX, 243-44. This treaty also was known as the Treaty of Susa.

⁵¹Georges Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue, III, 73.

⁵²Rott, IV, Part I, 208-209.

⁵³Ibid., p. 329.

⁵⁴There was, however, no alliance between France and the Grisons and Switzerland.

⁵⁵Rott, IV, Part I, 343.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷North of Basel or west of it.

⁵⁸Rott, IV, Part I, 344.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 345

⁶⁰Richelieu, Mémoires, X, 284, gives a concise account of this invasion.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 285.

⁶²Rott, IV, Part I, 362.

⁶³"Andrèa Cioli a Sacchetti, a Vienna", Florence, 16 June 1629; quoted in Rott, IV, Part I, 362. This line of thinking is not mentioned by Richelieu in his Mémoires, although there is no doubt that he was concerned for all of these matters.

⁶⁴Rott, IV, Part I, 362-63.

⁶⁵See letter from Richelieu to Bèthune in Rome, 20 July 1629, in Avenel, Lettres. Spain refused to accept the Treaty of Susa, and with the imperial invasion of the Grisons, Richelieu wished Bèthune to sound out the pope regarding further action on the part of the latter. Most of all, Richelieu wanted Urban VIII to pressure Ferdinand into investing Nevers in Mantua-Montferrat without delay.

⁶⁶Letter to Toiras from Richelieu, in Avenel, Lettres, III, 426. Letter is dated 7 September 1629.

⁶⁷Richelieu's instructions to Sabran, his envoy to Vienna, in Avenel, Lettres, III, 343-49.

⁶⁸Rott, IV, Part I, 374.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 376. This treaty was ratified on 19 April 1629.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 378.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 377-78.

⁷²Ibid., p. 384.

⁷³See Richelieu, Mémoires, X, 345-58.

⁷⁴Rott, IV, Part I, 385.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 387.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Bassompierre, Mémoires, IV, 70.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 79. See also Rott, IV, Part I, 398.

⁷⁹M.F., XVI (1632), Part II, 36.

⁸⁰Bassompierre, Mémoires, IV, 89.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²M.F., XVI, Part II, 40.

⁸³Casale was provisioned just before the siege commenced. Richelieu, Mémoires, vol. 79 of Collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France, ed. M. Petitot (Paris, 1823), Liv. XXI, 120. (All references to Richelieu's memoirs henceforth shall be from the Petitot collection (vols. 74-83). The collection published by the Société de l'histoire de France ends with vol. X, for the year 1629, whereas the Petitot series continues. References to this work shall take this form: Richelieu, Mémoires (Petitot ed., vol. __), Liv. __, p. __.)

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 188-94.

⁸⁵Richelieu refers to it as "la peste", (Avenel, Lettres III, 785-86). O'Connell, p. 107, says that Spinola died of this disease while besieging Casale.

⁸⁶"State of the King's Affairs in Italy", in Avenel, Lettres, III, 790.

⁸⁷Richelieu, Mémoires (Petitot ed., vol. 79), Liv. XXI, 267.

⁸⁸See Ibid., pp. 263-68, and Avenel, Lettres, III, 772-74, for details of the truce.

⁸⁹Instructions from Richelieu to Brûlart de Léon, in Avenel, Lettres, III, 879-83.

⁹⁰O'Connell, p. 209.

⁹¹See "Dispatch made to M. de Léon", 5 September 1630, in Avenel, Lettres, III, 896-902, for Richelieu's instructions.

⁹³See "Reasons of M. the Keeper of the Seals [Marillac] inclining toward a continuation of the truce", and "Reasons against the continuation of the truce" (by Richelieu) at the beginning of October, 1630, in Avenel, Lettres, III, 914-17.

⁹⁴Richelieu did not communicate with Léon and Père Joseph after his instructions of September reached them in mid-month. See Avenel, Lettres, III, 94-145, for a note regarding Richelieu's lack of communication and the Treaty of Regensburg.

⁹⁵O'Connell, p. 215.

⁹⁶Avenel, Lettres, III, 940-45.

⁹⁷Rott, IV, Part 1, 476-78; and O'Connell, p. 215.

⁹⁸Richelieu, Mémoires, Livre XXI, 350.

⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 350-51; and letter from the King to the Lieutenant-Generals, 16 November 1630, in Avenel, Lettres, IV, 17-19.

¹⁰⁰See his comments in his Mémoires, Livre XXI, 374.

¹⁰¹Avenel, Lettres, III, 947-48. "The treaty is void, Léon exceeded the ends of his power, which was to negotiate only for a peace in Italy. . . ."

¹⁰²Letter from the King to the Lieutenant-Generals, 16 November 1630, in Avenel, Lettres, IV, 17-19.

¹⁰³Rott, IV, Part I, 479.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 480.

¹⁰⁵For details of the signing of the treaty, see Richelieu's letter to the Duke of Savoy, editor's footnote 2, Avenel, Lettres, IV, 144-45. See also Le Vassor, III, 775-87.

¹⁰⁶M.F. XVII (1633), 14.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 17. See also Rott, IV, Part I, 506.

¹⁰⁸Letter from Ferdinand to Victor Amadeus, reprinted in M.F., XVII, 25-28.

¹⁰⁹The Baron of Gallas signed for the Emperor, who was "strongly representing the interests of Spain. . . ." Avenel, Lettres, IV, 145.

¹¹⁰See the original French version of this treaty in Appendix II, p. 191.

¹¹¹O'Connell, p. 261.

¹¹²Rott, IV, Part I, 527.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 550.


GRISONS (Graubünden)

Adapted from 'Tourist Map of Switzerland' (Swiss Bank Corporation Bern) and the
Landeskarte der Schweiz 1:50,000 Eidgenössische Landestopographie Wabern-Bern.
Rohan's Campaigns of 1635.

MILES

10 7.5 5 2.5 0 10 15 20

Drawn and Compiled by David C. Neilson 1970 MAP 4



LEGEND

- | | |
|-------------|--------------|
| ROUTE | ROUTE |
| Splügen P X | PASS-major |
| Casene P x | PASS-minor |
| CHUR | Capital |
| add | River stream |
| | Battles |
| | Centres: |
| Rohan | Habsburgs |

CHAPTER III

THE DUKE OF ROHAN AND THE VALTELINE, 1631-1637

On 20 July 1629 Henry, Duke of Rohan, left France for exile in the Republic of Venice. His arrival there on 3 August disturbed the Spanish, for his aggressiveness and military skill were known throughout Europe, and they had no desire to see him enter service with the Venetians.¹ Rohan applied for a military commission upon his arrival, but pro-Spanish elements in Venice prevented his immediate appointment, in spite of support from Richelieu and Louis XIII. Then, with the changes in the situation in Italy brought about by the Mantuan succession, the Republic saw itself the potential victim of an invasion by the Austrians. On 11 June 1630 Rohan signed a contract with the Venetian government by which he became Commander-in-Chief of the Venetian army.

Rohan worked with the Venetian army throughout 1630 and into 1631 and found his task most frustrating because of the inefficiency of the army. In letters he wrote to France and in the dedication of his work Parfait Capitaine, he emphasized his desire to serve Louis XIII again.

The Treaties of Cherasco (6 April and 30 May 1631) ended the Italian conflict and provided for the evacuation of the Grisons and Valteline by Habsburg forces.² Yet all

interested governments knew that neither the Austrians nor the Spanish would encounter difficulty in finding a pretext to re-enter the valley if the need arose. Cardinal Richelieu realized this fact; and although he wished to avoid at almost any cost an open confrontation with the Habsburgs, he decided that it would be in the best interests of France to take precautions.

Richelieu's first move was to attempt to enlist the support of the Republic of Venice for a joint plan of action in the Grisons. He instructed the French ambassador to the Venetian republic, the Count of Avaux, to persuade the Venetians that the Habsburgs had no intention of honouring the Treaty of Cherasco, especially if it did not suit their needs.³ But Venice was content to rely upon the peace established in Italy by the Cherasco agreements and, in politely vague terms, begged off. When Avaux informed Richelieu of the Venetian response, the Cardinal-Minister called a meeting of the royal council and obtained its support of his decision to garrison the fortresses of the Three Leagues with approximately 3,000 French, Swiss, and Grisons soldiers.⁴

The decision had been made, and Richelieu needed someone to command the force. Joab-Gilbert du Landé, France's ambassador to the Grisons, commanded the Grisons force during this period, but Richelieu desired an individual more experienced than Landé.⁵ The man he sought had to be trusted by both the Grisons and the Venetians; he had to have military experience and integrity. Rohan

combined these assets favourably, and late in November of 1631 Richelieu instructed his representatives in Savoy to offer him the Grisons command.⁶ Rohan accepted the offer immediately, then went before the doge, Francesco Erizzo, to request a leave-of-absence. As the doge was polite but vague in his answer, Rohan decided not to await a decision, and he left Venice quietly at the end of November.

The duke arrived in Chur on 4 December⁷ and was received warmly by the Grisons, who admired the military reputation of their co-religionist. On 7 December Rohan wrote a letter to the Venetian ambassador in Switzerland, explaining his sudden departure from the republic and suggesting he still could be of service:

Finding myself in this country once more, by order of the King my master, I wish to advise your lordship of it, so that if in this event, he decides that my service can be useful to the Very Serene Republic, he will employ me confidentially as his most devoted and faithful servant. I [will] not fail on my part to continue by correspondence with your Lordship and I beg that he will do the same on his part.⁸

The Venetian senate was miffed with Rohan but could do little to reverse the fait accompli. In the face of complaints from the Spanish regarding Rohan's presence in the Grisons, the Venetians disclaimed any knowledge of the duke's departure from the republic.

On 11 December a special diet held at Chur elected Rohan Commander-in-Chief of the Grisons forces,⁹ and he began making preparations immediately. In his communications he urged Richelieu to interest the Republic of Venice and Switzerland in a Valteline project, and he asked for 6,000 French and 4,000 Swiss soldiers, in addition to

the three regiments of Grisons which already were at his disposal. This, he stated, would give him a total of 18,000 troops, enough to carry out his plan.¹⁰

Richelieu's policy at this time was unclear. He continued to subsidize Gustavus Adolphus and the German Protestants.

My thought is to prevent the Catholic religion in Germany from ruining itself, to guarantee the Catholic Electors from [being] wrecked, [and] to restrain the Archduke Leopold from executing the plans which he might have for an enterprise in the Grisons, my allies. . . . As to the war in Italy. . . . I desire nothing more than to see the Republic of Venice happily allied with my brother the Duke of Savoy.¹¹

The Cardinal wished to avoid any action which the Spanish might construe as aggressive, for he felt that neither he himself nor France was prepared for open war. As a result, he did not approve the Valteline project and simply asked Rohan to fortify the Steig fort immediately south of the Luziensteig pass and the Fort de France, located at Pont du Rhin, both at the northern entrance to the Grisons. In addition, Richelieu had another task for Rohan. He was to attempt to pacify the Swiss cantons, whose quarrels threatened to erupt into civil war, which inevitably would bring the French and Habsburgs into conflict.¹² Rohan was reluctant to do this without being sent the necessary funds. "If no money comes to me from France. . . . all the eloquence of Demosthenes and Cicero would be lost," he wrote;¹³ but he did succeed in August of 1632 and ended the threat of civil war.¹⁴

When he had finished arbitrating the disputes in Switzerland, Rohan expected approval of his plan. Soon,

however, he received a note not from Richelieu but from Gustavus Adolphus, which asked him to act to close the Valteline to the passage of Spanish troops.¹⁵ Rohan enthusiastically sent word of the Swedish request to the French court and proposed a joint French-Grisons expedition into the Valteline. But in these circumstances Richelieu desired to leave the passage open. While he had profited greatly from the successes of Gustavus Adolphus, the rapid movement of the Swedish army alarmed him to the point where he sought a means of curbing its progress. Gustavus made his request to Rohan for similar reasons, for he well knew the precarious foundation upon which his military power in Germany rested. Richelieu refused to allow overall Protestant strength to increase by allowing Rohan to close the Valteline to the Habsburgs and to restore the authority of the Grisons in the valley. Disappointed, Rohan was obliged to turn down Gustavus' request.

Towards the end of 1632 Rohan again requested that he be allowed to execute his design for the Valteline. But in the French court Rohan was accused of favouring the Protestants over the Catholics in Switzerland, of using the Grisons for his own purposes rather than those of France, and of undertaking secret correspondence with Gustavus Adolphus, with the German princes, and with the rebellious Gaston d'Orléans and the Duke of Montmorency.¹⁶ Richelieu's distrust of his former adversary again rose to the surface and, in November of 1632, when Marshal Toiras' army on the Milanese-Montferrat frontier was causing Feria no end of

worry,¹⁷ he ordered Rohan to disband all but one of his regiments and return to Venice at once.¹⁸

Rohan did not leave the Grisons until 11 January 1633. He arrived in Venice on the 26th, expecting to receive new orders from France from La Thullerie, the French ambassador to Venice. But the diplomat had no dispatches for him. Without waiting, Rohan left Venice almost at once and returned to Switzerland, informing Richelieu that his health obliged him to use the mineral waters of Baden, near Zürich.¹⁹ His return to Switzerland did not please Richelieu or Louis XIII. On 10 February, in a letter to the four Evangelical cantons, Louis put an end to Rohan's embassy in Switzerland.²⁰ Rohan was chided about his expenses, with which he maintained his Grisons regiments and travelled in Switzerland. Above all, he was reproached for having disobeyed orders by returning.

However, Rohan would not leave the area, and on 28 April, while journeying to Baden, he wrote Richelieu from Zürich, saying, "all of my hopes are in you, which make me beg you most humbly . . . to continue to be my protector."²¹

Early in May, the French learned that Feria was forming a large army in the Milanese and was preparing to march it through the Valteline into Germany.²² On 12 May Rohan received a letter from the King instructing him to prevent the passage of the Spanish from the Valteline through the Grisons and to try to prevent an alliance between the Catholic cantons and Spain.²³ On 2 June he sent

a missive to Louis regarding the Grisons situation, examining all possible routes the Spanish might use²⁴ and informing the King that co-operation from the Catholic cantons was hopeless because of their attachment to the Spanish monarch.

I believe that passage of the Valteline can be prevented, for in camping in the Lower Engadine without breaking the Treaty of [Monçon], [we] can prevent them from passing into the Tyrol, for as soon as they enter the Valteline (and by consequence break the said treaty), the county of Bormio can be seized easily [by us], which will stop them at once and enable [our] communication with the state of Venice.²⁵

Supposing that this would serve as a pretext for open hostilities, Rohan urged the King to take the Valteline and even the Milanese, which he believed could be accomplished in three months.²⁶

Rohan's plans were received with general approval. On 23 June 1633, Superintendent of Finance Bouthillier authorized him to levy 3,000 men, and on 2 July Rohan was sent a new commission as lieutenant-general to command the Grisons army. He also was sent two regiments of expert French troops, and he asked permission to levy an additional 2,000 Swiss. At the end of July he returned to Chur from Zürich, and there wrote to Fontainebleau asking for 200,000 livres. Without it, he warned, the Grisons already was lost to France, for the Spanish army in the Milanese was ready to march. Richelieu approved the money and the levy of 2,000 Swiss and empowered Rohan to take into his command the troops of Landé in the Grisons.²⁷ At the same time, Richelieu altered his original plans and ordered Rohan to take no offensive action with regard to the Spanish army; he still

wished to avoid any incident which might lead to open war.²⁸ Rohan was to watch the Spanish army carefully. If it used the Valteine for purposes of transport only, he was to let it pass into the Tyrol; if it became obvious that the Spanish were planning to establish garrisons in the valley, he was to seize Bormio and Chiavenna and trap the army, then force it to return to the Milanese.²⁹

On 22 August Feria's army, composed of 12,000 foot, 2,000 horse and 40 cannon,³⁰ left the Milanese. Warned of this departure, Rohan, on 19 August, sent a messenger to the Swedish Marshal Horn and to Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, telling them that he judged that Feria's army would march west through the Tyrol to Constance, then north to relieve the siege of Brisach.³¹ On 30 August Rohan sent Landé with a regiment into the Upper Engadine, to take Chiavenna and Riva if necessary, while he prepared to move quickly on Bormio. But the Spanish army moved through the Valteline rapidly and crossed into the Tyrol on 15 September.³² The Spanish then moved west through the Tyrol, joined forces with the imperial army of General Aldringer, and marched west toward Constance.

When the first contingents of Feria's army crossed the Stelvio and turned west, Rohan sent word to Marshal Horn, who, at the urging of the duke, laid siege to Constance on 8 September. Rohan inspected the Valteline as soon as the last of the Spanish had left it and found no traces of the passage. No sooner had he written a report to Richelieu on his inspection than he was ordered north

into Switzerland to placate the angry Swiss, who were on the verge of civil war due to Horn's siege of Constance. The Catholic cantons blamed the siege on Rohan and the Protestant cantons and accused them of collaborating with Horn. The French court also blamed Rohan for having guided the Swedes into the situation; in spite of the service he had rendered in forcing Feria to avoid the Grisons, "he received reproaches from all sides."³³ Rohan was instructed to request the Swedes to lift the siege in order to avoid a war in Switzerland.³⁴

Marshal Horn lifted the siege of Constance on 23 September, then joined Bernard of Saxe-Weimar to prevent the Habsburgs from entering Alsace, removing the danger from the Swiss. Rohan was convinced that his successful efforts to have Horn lift the siege of Constance would assure the Catholics of his desire for their satisfaction. For the remainder of the year he wrote memoir after memoir to the Court urging a campaign in the Valteline since the Grisons were becoming restless and were demanding the restitution of the Valteline to them. But Richelieu and Louis XIII were concerned with a new campaign in Lorraine and had sent a large army against Duke Charles. The army occupied Nancy, the capital of Lorraine, on 24 September, and Richelieu was following subsequent developments too closely to devote time to Rohan's earnest requests.

Then in October Rohan was told that Louis XIII was not going to delay the Valteline campaign any longer,³⁵ but events in Lorraine following the success at Nancy again

changed the King's mind. Richelieu apparently felt that the Lorraine campaign was more important and that it was better to press its success than to launch a new and somewhat dangerous effort in the southern Alps. Frustrated and disappointed, Rohan said afterwards that "he had been called to the Valteline six times and six times recalled."³⁶

At the beginning of 1634 a new Habsburg army began to gather in the Milanese, commanded by the Cardinal-Infant, Don Ferdinand, brother of Philip IV of Spain. The worried Swedes made efforts to have France, through Rohan, close the Valteline to the Spanish and appropriately Rohan was instructed to sound out the Venetians in this regard. The Venetian government did not issue an outright negative reply, but it did not agree to join any alliance.³⁷ The Grisons were threatening to ally themselves with the Spanish because of French indecision, and a perplexed Richelieu summoned the Duke of Rohan to Paris to discuss the situation with him.

Rohan left the Grisons in May and arrived at Fontainebleau at the beginning of June.³⁸ He was received warmly by both Richelieu and the King, and talks commenced at once. At the same time as Rohan's arrival at the Court, the Cardinal-Infant left the Milanese with a large army, travelled through the Valteline and across the Stelvio into the Tyrol, and then moved into Germany. The departure of his army worried not only the Swedes but Richelieu as well. The First Minister saw that the size of this army might compel France to join the war, and towards the end of the summer he began taking precautions and negotiating alliances.

When the Spanish army of the Cardinal-Infant joined the imperial army in Germany, it raised the size of the Habsburg force to between 33,000 and 35,000, whereas the combined forces of Marshal Horn and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar totalled approximately 22,000.³⁹ The Habsburg advantage was proved when the two forces met at Nördlingen on 6 September 1634. Marshal Horn was taken prisoner; Bernard had his horse shot out from under him; and the Habsburgs captured three hundred colours, including Bernard's own flag. The defeat dramatically signalled the need for overt French entry into the war, if the Habsburgs were to be checked.⁴⁰

Richelieu could regret not having acted sooner. Had French forces been able to enter the war openly in either 1631 or 1632, they could have taken advantage of the initial Swedish victories to establish a definite French preponderance in Germany. With the defeat of French-subsidized forces at Nördlingen, the remaining armies lost their focal point. There was no time to lose. Richelieu immediately entered negotiations with the United Provinces, the Duke of Savoy, and the Duke of Parma.⁴¹

On 17 October 1634 Rohan wrote to the Venetian resident that he was about to leave Paris for the Grisons,⁴² but within a week he was ordered by the King to take command of a large French army then assembling in Lorraine. He left for his new command at the beginning of November.⁴³ Richelieu had decided to carry out Rohan's plan for the Valteline, but as yet he did not inform Rohan. The duke's instructions were to winter in Lorraine and Alsace, watching carefully the

movements of Duke Charles of Lorraine, who, since the French occupation of Nancy a year previously, had abdicated his ducal throne in favour of his brother and had joined the imperial army.

Richelieu had decided to place five armies in the field: one with the Dutch against the Spanish Netherlands, commanded by Châtillon and Brézé; the second on the Rhine, under La Valette; the third in Lorraine, headed by La Force; the fourth in Italy, commanded by Créqui; and the fifth in the Valteline, under Rohan.

By December, 1634, Rohan was in Lorraine with an army of 12,000 foot and 1,200 horse.⁴⁴ During the winter there were two encounters, one that resulted in the retreat of a small imperial force, and one in which a small portion of Rohan's army forced Duke Charles to retreat from Alsace across the Rhine. In the spring of 1635 Rohan was ordered to take a portion of his forces and journey to the Valte-line.⁴⁵ His army there would include the Grisons forces of Landé. Rohan was free to act according to his own judgement; the only condition imposed upon him was that when he passed through Switzerland, he was to avoid offending any of the cantons if at all possible.⁴⁶ The entire march was to be kept secret so that the Spanish could not take preventative action.

To cross Switzerland without offending any canton was not an easy task.

To do it without permission would arouse all of the cantons. To ask permission would be to publicize the

plan, to go in file would lose the strength. To pass as a body would be something without example. . . .⁴⁷

In addition, the Duke of Lorraine still held some of the so-called forest towns along the Rhine near Switzerland, any of which could prevent the passage of Rohan's troops.

Rohan personally travelled to Basel at the end of March, 1635, and requested its leaders to grant him permission to cross their territory with some troops. While he was in Basel another French army under La Force invested Rheinfelden, one of the forest towns, so as to distract Duke Charles of Lorraine while Rohan's army passed. Then Rohan sent secret messages to Bern canton and the Grisons. That to Bern asked permission to cross its territory without Rohan's requesting the convocation of a special diet to award him formal approval, because of the urgency of his mission. Bern's general respect for France and its particular respect for Rohan resulted in its granting Rohan permission to cross and to gather supplies in the canton. The message to the Grisons carried a letter to Landé which instructed him to seize Bormio, Chiavenna and Riva without delay. Landé executed the orders quickly: he sent a contingent of soldiers over the Bernina to take Bormio, while he himself crossed the Splügen and entered Chiavenna, which capitulated without offering any resistance. He then moved on Riva and surprised its garrison, which consisted of only twenty men at this time.⁴⁸ Bormio fell without a struggle, actually welcoming the Grisons.⁴⁹ Rohan, who felt that Landé must accomplish his task before news of his own

arrival spread, was relieved of considerable worry when he learned at Aarau in Bern canton of the success of his second-in-command.

From Aarau Rohan set out across the Catholic cantons. He avoided the areas of most powerful Spanish influence and crossed into Zürich canton without the knowledge of the Spanish. From Zürich he travelled east to St. Gall (St. Gallen),⁵⁰ then to the Rhine and south along the valley over the Luziensteig pass and on to Chur, where he arrived on 12 April. Eight days later the French army was in the Valteline. Rohan's journey had been accomplished in complete secrecy, so successfully that the Spanish ambassador in Switzerland learned of it only when Rohan had entered the Grisons.⁵¹

Although he had arrived to find himself master of the Valteline, Rohan soon discovered that he would have to employ his troops diligently if he were to retain it. He had to defend both the Bormio and Lake Como ends of the valley; he had to defend the northern entrance at Maienfeld (the Fort de France) and the Steig fort; he had to guard the Upper and Lower Engadine and the Poschiavo. Combined with the forces of Landé, Rohan's army totalled 8,000 foot and 400 horse; the force was composed of ten French regiments, two Swiss and Grisons.⁵² Of this force, the defence of Bormio and Fort de France required 3,000, Chiavenna 2,000, leaving 3,000 for Rohan to use to guard the center of the Valteline, the Engadine and Poschiavo. In France, Richelieu received word of

Rohan's arrival in the Valteline and quickly sent the funds requested by the duke.

Rohan's task was two-fold, one military, the other political. He was to hold the Valteline against the Habsburgs, but he was not to deliver it to the control of the Grisons, who had been requesting its return since international involvement had begun openly in 1620, despite the fact that he held the valley with their help. From the French point of view, there were valid reasons for this position. The Swedes, with whom Richelieu had concluded a pact in April of 1635, had warned the Cardinal-Minister that their forces could not withstand another Habsburg army reinforced from the Milanese through the Valteline. French control of the Valteline would increase the chances for French success against Spanish forces in the Spanish Netherlands, because reinforcements would be forced to follow a much more circuitous route through the western Alps to reach the Rhine. Finally, in spite of the fact that the Grisons were traditional French allies, they had a reputation for being unreliable; and Richelieu could take no chances in 1635.

Perhaps Richelieu had waited too long to enter the war, for in 1635 he did so at a disadvantage. Many of his best generals were dead (Schomberg, Montmorency, d'Effiat), as was Gustavus Adolphus, his most able ally. Against the French stood a powerful, victorious Habsburg army. When France declared war on Spain on 19 May 1635, Richelieu possessed one advantage: Rohan held the Valteline.

When news of the occupation of the Valteline reached Ferdinand II, he ordered one of his most competent generals, the Baron of Fernamond, to organize his forces, enter the Valteline, rid it of the French and join forces with a Spanish army forming in the Milanese under General Serbelloni.⁵³ Aware of this move, Rohan levied three additional Swiss regiments, totalling 3,000 men, as well as three Grisons regiments,⁵⁴ without waiting for orders from France. He then placed a Camp Marshal, Canisy, in charge of the fortress at Chiavenna, sent Landé to reinforce the garrison at Bormio, and dispatched the Marquis of Montauzier with 1,200 men to Livigno in the Val Pedenos (a valley running approximately parallel to the Val Poschiavo, from Bormio to the town of Livigno, which is halfway between Bormio and the Lower Engadine).⁵⁵ Rohan took his own force to Trahona, in the Valteline about ten miles east of Lake Como, ready to go to the aid of either Landé or Canisy.

Fernamond took the offensive. He entered Santa Maria, in the Münsterthal (Val Müstair), early in June of 1635 and erected a fortress there, moved south and constructed another at Bains, and then attacked Bormio on 13 June. Landé, believing that the area could not be held, ordered a retreat, and the French fell back, first to Tirano, then through the Poschiavo into the Upper Engadine.⁵⁶ In Trahona Rohan received word of Landé's retreat and learned that Fernamond was proceeding down the Valteline after him. Judging that the imperials were en route to a junction with the Spanish forces of Serbelloni, which was

correct, Rohan moved out of the Valteline itself to Chiavenna, whence he could re-enter the Valteline or move to the Engadine with equal facility. But when Fernamond arrived at Tirano and discovered that the Spanish were not yet in the Valteline, he turned up the Poschiavo, crossed the Forcolo di Livigno pass, and pushed Montauzier from the town of Livigno into the Lower Engadine.⁵⁷ Fernamond then returned to Bormio, leaving a strong garrison at Livigno.

The situation for Rohan was critical. Not one of his troops remained in the Valteline itself, and nothing could prevent Serbelloni from marching his army to a junction with that of Fernamond. Rohan had to act before the two Habsburg armies joined, and he decided to take the offensive against Fernamond's force in Livigno.⁵⁸

From the town of Livigno there are three exits. The first is east through the Val Pedenos to Bormio; the second is south through the Val Livigno over the Forcola di Livigno pass into the Val Poschiavo (the route taken by the Austrian force when it drove Montauzier from Livigno); and the third is west through the Valle di Federia over the Casana pass into the Lower Engadine (the route taken by Montauzier). Rohan decided to attack the Austrian force by crossing the Casana from the Lower Engadine. Taking Canisy with him and leaving von Salis, a Grisons commander, in charge of the Chiavenna garrison, Rohan moved into the Engadine, joining Landé and Montauzier. From the town of S-chanf in the Lower Engadine, Rohan led a force of 3,000 French and 1,500 Grisons infantry, as well as 200 cavalry, over the dangerous Casana

pass during the night of 27-28 June 1635,⁵⁹ and through the Valle di Federia to Livigno. At dawn on the 28th, Rohan's force deployed itself so as to block the southern and western exits from Livigno to the imperials. From their positions Rohan's troops had no trouble routing the imperials and sending them fleeing east toward Bormio. The battle was over quickly, and its impact on Rohan's army was decisive to the entire campaign. A small force had routed a much larger one, had boosted morale and had re-won the restless Grisons to the side of the French.

Following the battle both Monatuzier and Canisy advocated immediate pursuit of the Austrians, while Landé judged that a chase would be dangerous. He pointed out that although spirits were high, the army was tired, and that the imperial army had been routed, not obliterated.⁶⁰ Rohan sided with Landé and marched his army south over the Forcola di Livigno pass into the Val Poschiavo, and south to Tirano in the Valteline, so as to prevent a possible joining of Spanish and Austrian forces.

Rohan's army reached Tirano on 29 June. Immediately the duke sent Montauzier and Canisy east to Mazzo,⁶¹ to guard the bridge over the Adda, which the Austrians would need if they decided to renew the offensive. When the two arrived at Mazzo, they found the bridge already in the hands of the imperials. On 30 June both Rohan and Fernand personally arrived at Mazzo, and the day was spent in continuous, indecisive skirmishes. Again Rohan was concerned; he did not know the location of Serbelloni's

army, and it was possible that the force could be advancing east through the Valteline. Once more it was necessary to act with haste, and once more Rohan decided to attack Fernamond. On the night of 2 July he grouped his army, and early the next morning he attacked with one flank the entrenched Austrian positions. Then another wave of his troops swept down from the mountainside, obliterated Fernamond's right flank and charged through the centre of the imperial force. The remaining Austrians then broke rank and fled northeast toward Bormio; only 600 of an original force of 6000 reported back to their units.⁶² Rohan's force lost about twenty men, by his own count, while death and desertion had destroyed an Austrian army.

Immediately after this victory Rohan received word that Serbelloni's army had arrived at Morbegno, in the Valteline close to Trahona. Without resting his troops Rohan turned westward to confront the Spanish. But Serbelloni had received news of the Austrian defeat, and during the night of 5 July he retreated into the Milanese.⁶³ Rohan arrived at Morbegno and found the Spaniards gone. Now there were only two other positions held by Habsburg troops in the area of the Grisons, Bains and Santa Maria. Determined to make his Mazzo campaign complete, Rohan again turned towards Bormio, and towards the end of July he attacked and drove the imperials from their fortresses. This time his casualties were heavier; he lost 350 men, including Montauzier and Canisy.⁶⁴ But Rohan remained undisputed master of the Valteline. The Livigno and Mazzo

campaigns were so successful as to be impressive; Rohan had routed a powerful imperial force three times and had frightened away a superior Spanish army. The victories had taken their toll, however; Rohan's army was weary from continual marches and battles, and at the end of July of 1635 he moved it from Bormio to Tirano, where it rested.

The Spanish soon attempted a new tactic. Remembering their negotiations with Rohan during the last Huguenot war in France, they instructed one of his former agents, Clausel, to attempt to win Rohan to the Spanish cause. On 14 September 1635 Rohan received a letter from Clausel asking the duke for an interview. Immediately suspicious, for he knew of Clausel's recent intrigues with Gaston d'Orléans and Marie de Médicis, Rohan arranged a meeting at Sondrio for the end of the month.⁶⁵

When the meeting took place, Rohan received Clausel's proposals with astonishment. He had the agent arrested at once and conducted him to the Fort de France, then notified Richelieu. On 17 October Richelieu drew up a "Project of interrogation" for Clausel, and a "Project of a judgement against Clausel".⁶⁶ He then sent a Master of Requests, Lasnier, to the Grisons to carry out the judgement. It is interesting to note that Richelieu pronounced Clausel's death sentence a full twenty days before procedures actually commenced against him. Clausel was executed for treason in the Fort de France on 10 November 1635.⁶⁷

In the meantime the Austrians had reinforced their posts at Bains and Santa Maria, preparing for another

onslaught in the Valteline. On 24 October Rohan forced his way into the Val Fraele,⁶⁸ northwest of Bormio, and sent Landé into the Lower Engadine to guard the exit from the Casana pass at S-chanf. Rohan had little difficulty routing the Austrians from Bains and Santa Maria, and most of them fled southwest to Livigno, then west to the Lower Engadine. Landé had not yet taken up his position in the valley, however, and most of the imperial force escaped through the Lower Engadine into the Tyrol.⁶⁹

On 1 November, the day after Rohan's last battle against the Austrians, his army returned to Tirano. Upon his arrival Rohan received discomfoting news regarding French efforts in the Milanese. Marshal Créqui had laid siege to the Milanese fortress of Valenza (on the Po river approximately twenty miles downstream from Casale) on 10 September and thereby had drawn off the Spanish army intended for use against Rohan. But he had been forced by the indecision of the Dukes of Savoy and Parma to lift the siege on 28 October.⁷⁰ Serbelloni, freed of his commitment in the Milanese, had turned once more toward the Valteline; and when Rohan reached Tirano, the Spanish army was entrenching itself just east of Morbegno.

Without losing a moment, Rohan saw to the security of Bormio, took his best regiments and struck out for Morbegno. He arrived in front of the Spanish positions on 10 November, hesitated briefly, then attacked the Spanish, securing the mountain-side to the south and the river bank to the north. Rohan's troops were checked by

the Spanish, but not before they had forced Serbelloni to retreat to his rear entrenchments. Rohan regrouped his forces and attacked again. The three-hour battle ended when the Spanish fell back in full retreat on Lake Como, then, chased by Rohan's troops, retired south from the lake into the Milanese. Judging that they would not be back, Rohan took his army back to Tirano. He learned that of a total of 4,400, Serbelloni had lost 800 men and was wounded himself.⁷¹ Word of the victory spread quickly, and the Austrians, who had considered mounting another campaign against Rohan, postponed their plans indefinitely.⁷²

The Duke of Rohan had executed a series of four brilliant campaigns, each one against forces numerically superior to his own. His victories were a credit to his own intelligence and to the courage of his troops. He had chosen his tactics wisely and never had allowed himself to be indecisive. His earlier military experience as a rebel in the mountainous terrain of southern France, in conjunction with the skill and knowledge of his Grisons allies, had enabled him to out-manoeuvre the best soldiers placed against him; his boldness of attack inspired fear in his opponents, courage in his own regiments, and respect in both. He reviewed the four campaigns of 1635 and saw Livigno as the most difficult, Mazzo as giving him the advantage, the Val Fraele as the best-planned and best-executed and Morbegno as "the most glorious".⁷³ He received congratulations for his successful operations from many individuals, including Richelieu.

It satisfies me to demonstrate to you the inexpressible contentment which the King has for the last victory which you have achieved with his arms at Morbegno, following the others with which it has pleased God to bless them, and that which I feel myself. . . .⁷⁴

No sooner had Rohan completed his campaigns than the Grisons asked to be restored to their sovereignty in the Valteline, with no conditions imposed upon them. But Rohan had been instructed to withhold restitution, not only because of the dangers involved in placing a Catholic territory under Protestant rule but because of the strategic value of the Valteline during this period.

Richelieu had empowered Rohan to negotiate a treaty between the Grisons and the Valtelins, and two conditions were made to him: first, that no religion other than the Catholic could be practiced in the Valteline; and second, that the administration of Justice would be accorded to the Valtelins.⁷⁵ Initially the Grisons objected, but as Rohan could not alter his stand, they conceded these two conditions, and the Articles of Chiavenna were formulated on 7 February 1636.⁷⁶ They largely were a modification of the Treaty of Monçon (1626), which was favourable to the Valtelins and which gave the Grisons only conditional sovereignty. The Grisons, on the other hand, had wanted a treaty similar to that of Madrid (1621), which restored the Valteline to them unconditionally. Both the Valteline and the Grisons came under the protection of the French crown with the Articles of Chiavenna;⁷⁷ and with the exception of the two conditions imposed by Richelieu through Rohan, the Grisons-Valtelins relationship reverted to the

situation prior to 1617. Only partially satisfied, the Grisons nevertheless ratified the treaty at Thusis in April of 1636. The articles then were sent to Fountainebleau for French ratification.

Awaiting Richelieu's approval of the Articles of Chiavenna, Rohan mounted a small expedition along the southern shores of Lake Como in April of 1636. The expedition was primarily to reconnoitre the approaches to the Milanese so that Rohan could undertake a larger campaign there later. All the while, Rohan had been sending letters to France asking for money, which he owed to his troops, and which had not been sent.

I declare to your Majesty . . . that his army, which up to the present has been the terror of the Milanese and the hope of his allies in Italy, can be said [to be] defeated, the Valteline abandoned and the Grisons revolted, if on 20 May the front line is not replaced and 200,000 livres are not sent. . . . For lack of this I beg him most humbly to accord me my leave-of-absence, so that I will not see the miserable wreck of such good troops which never have seen the enemy except to defeat him.

Rohan wrote similar pleading letters to Richelieu, to Superintendent of Finance Bouthillier, and to Père Joseph. He received no replies. As the arrears owed the Grisons regiments increased, so did their discontent.

Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, had invited Rohan to enter into combat against the Milanese at the end of May. On 29 May 1636 Rohan left the Valteline with 5,000 men for Lake Lecco, the southeastern branch of Lake Como, and within a short period he was master of the area. Yet in spite of his offer to Rohan, Victor Amadeus had no desire to see the French established in the Milanese, and he began working

against French ambitions in northern Italy by stalling Rohan and entering into secret negotiations with the Spanish.⁷⁹

When Rohan arrived at the town of Lecco, he secured his communications, but he was without artillery and ammunition. He wrote another dispatch to Richelieu pleading for reinforcements, money and supplies. In the meantime some of his soldiers mutinied; Rohan suppressed the insurrection and punished its instigators.

The Duke of Savoy then approached the Milanese frontier from the west, and Rohan wrote to him suggesting that he journey with his troops to Lecco and join him. Victor Amadeus was unreceptive to the idea and asked Rohan to join him. On 6 July, in a letter to Hémerý, the French ambassador to Savoy, Rohan wrote:

. . . I find it very strange that an army of 25,000 men with artillery, in which nothing is missing, makes a difficulty of crossing ten or twelve leagues of plain and having no river to cross, to favour joining me, wishes that I, with five or six thousand men without cannon, cross lakes and unfordable rivers and inaccessible mountains, [and travel] at least ten days in order to come to join [it].⁸⁰

Rohan waited another month for word from Victor Amadeus or Richelieu, fighting disease, rebellion, and hunger all the while. Then in August he turned north and marched his army to Sondrio, where he learned that the Duke of Savoy had retreated into Piedmont without combatting the Spaniards.

During this profitless campaign, the French position in the Grisons deteriorated dramatically. In the absence of Rohan--and of money from France--the pro-Spanish element had begun to direct affairs.⁸¹ To add to

the French misfortune, Rohan fell dangerously ill in September, so ill that he was believed beyond hope. Unable to care for his soldiers, he helplessly watched them starve and begin to pillage the Valteline. In Chur the discontented Grisons could not ignore the unhappy state of French affairs everywhere. Victor Amadeus had swung to the Spanish side; the Duke of Parma was listening to Spanish proposals as well. In Germany France's allies were abandoned. Northern France had been opened to the Habsburgs, for the Cardinal-Infant had forced the surrender of all Picardy, and Burgundy had been invaded from the Franche-Comté. There was talk that Paris would fall.

Who still thought of the Valteline, when France was invaded, when each day was marked by a surrender. . . when there was talk of fortifying Saint-Denis? Before anything else, it was necessary to chase the enemy from Picardy and from Burgundy, to retake Corbie, to throw back the Spanish in Artois, to save Saint-Jean de Losne and force Gallas to retreat.⁸²

In the Grisons, one of Rohan's colonels, Georg Jenatsch, a Grisons preacher who had participated in the initial struggles before 1620, typified the attitude of so many Grisons who were dissatisfied with the French, and began to think of ridding his country of them. Jenatsch had no trouble finding reasons to drive out the French: promises to have the Grisons restored in the Valteline had been made, then ignored or forgotten, many times since 1620; the most recent treaty mediated by the French had given the Grisons nominal sovereignty in the valley without effective power. More directly, the French had not paid the Grisons regiments for all of the campaign of 1635,

and it was obvious that Richelieu had French, not Grisons, interests at heart. Jenatsch suggested that the Grisons enter negotiations with the Austrians and the Spanish.⁸³

Rohan still was bed-ridden when he heard of these developments, but he recognized immediately that it was necessary to surrender sovereignty of the Valteline to the Grisons and to pay the soldiers. He sent an envoy to Marin Molin, a Venetian official in the Val Camonica, to tell him of the developments and request assistance; he sent the same advice to Méliand, the French ambassador to Switzerland, "so that the two States which have some interest that the Grisons be maintained in a state of repose can appeal to the King of France to take some action in this area."⁸⁴ Rohan requested Lasnier, now French ambassador to the Grisons, to go to Chur and placate the rebels. When Lasnier arrived, he discovered that strategic areas already were held by Grisons troops, so as to oppose the entry of any French reinforcements. He acted badly; like a pompous diplomat he threatened them with the wrath of the King.⁸⁵ Rohan, understanding the situation more clearly, saw to the provision of his troops, gave command of his army to the Baron of Lecques, then had himself carried by litter to Chur, where he arrived on 11 October 1636.

Unknown to the Grisons, Rohan had received word from France on the Articles of Chiavenna in June. But he had not received ratification of the treaty; he had been sent proposed modifications.⁸⁶ Richelieu had delegated

Bullion, Superintendent of Finance with Bouthillier, and Père Joseph to examine the articles. The two reached the conclusion that the articles were not of sufficient strength to guarantee the exercise of Catholicism in the Valteline. Richelieu, under some pressure from the papacy regarding the safety of the Valtelins, was eager to announce the conclusion of a treaty settling the problems of the Grisons and Valtelins. Moreover, he had received word that the Pope would not involve himself in a treaty "made by a heretic in favour of other heretics".⁸⁷ Initially, Richelieu considered repudiating the treaty altogether; then, thinking of the complex negotiations it had involved and the difficulty Rohan had encountered in having it ratified by the Grisons, he decided merely to modify it. In June Bullion handed the modifications to Prioleau, Rohan's secretary, who carried them back to the Duke. When Rohan read the proposed modifications, he knew at once the Grisons would not accept them. As a result he had delayed presenting them for as long as possible.

Shortly after his arrival in Chur, Rohan was present at a diet convoked to discuss the Articles of Chiavenna. He was of the opinion that he should ratify the articles in the name of Louis XIII without presenting the modifications, because he knew that they would never be accepted and that they would terminate French influence in the Grisons. Lasnier, however, produced orders from the King, instructing that the modifications be presented to the Grisons without delay. Rohan had no choice but to

obey Lasnier's instructions, because his rank as ambassador superseded Rohan's as military commander.⁸⁸ Contemptuous of Lasnier, Rohan presented the French demands.

. . . after [the Grisons] made a treaty to their dishonour and disadvantage, his Most-Christian Majesty, in order to gratify [them], instead of ratifying it promptly, as had been promised, had kept them waiting for five months, at the end of which arrived a modification which destroyed completely the nature of the treaty . . .⁸⁹

Immediately the pro-Spanish element saw its victory within grasp, and it upbraided the French for their bad faith and broken promises. On 17 October Rohan wrote to Louis XIII again, saying that the Grisons would not accept the modifications, for already they were renouncing the Articles of Chiavenna themselves.⁹⁰ On the same day, he wrote to Richelieu:

For me, Master, I am well, as much as is possible; . . . but it is unbearable for me to see perish that which I have conserved until now. In the name of God, take care that a person who breathes only for your service does not see the reputation of the arms of the King wither in a place where until the present he has maintained them with glory, for I would love much more to be dead of my illness than to see this.⁹¹

Again he pleaded for money to pay his troops and a simple ratification of the Articles of Chiavenna, but he received no answer.

On 22 October 1636 the Grisons met a Ilantz, a pro-Spanish city in the Upper League, and there decided to send three special ambassadors (among them Jenatsch) to Innsbruck to negotiate formally with the Habsburgs. Their publicly proclaimed purpose was to negotiate with the Archduchess Claudia, widow of Archduke Leopold (who died in 1632), for the annulment of the unfavourable Treaty of

Innsbruck (8 August 1629).⁹² Annulment of this treaty then would open the way for Grisons participation in the general peace talks then being conducted at Cologne.⁹³ The ambassadors' actual purpose was to negotiate a new agreement with the Habsburgs for restoration of the Valteline to the Grisons and to rid the territory of the French.

At Innsbruck the ambassadors were received warmly, and the Archduchess Claudia prepared the negotiations. She was assisted by official delegates of Ferdinand II and Philip IV. Rohan was informed of the secret negotiations by Colonel von Salis, and he quickly wrote to Richelieu, begging the Cardinal-Minister to send him what was demanded by the Grisons. The urgency of the dispatch and the message it carried appeared to impress the Court, for on 20 November Rohan received 200,000 livres, far short of the million requested, as well as Louis' agreement to ratification of the articles as they were prepared in February 1637.⁹⁴ But they arrived too late, for already no one would speak of the treaty to Rohan. The colonels and the captains, who were masters of the communes which made up the Grisons, had not received their full pay. "These people," wrote Rohan, "have lost respect and obviously are changed."⁹⁵ Still he managed to reconcile several of the Grisons colonels and captains by giving them some money and pensions. Yet his major obstacle to winning over the Grisons was Lasnier, who could not understand the frustration of the thwarted mountain people, and who intensified their dislike of France by his condescending attitude

and air of hauteur.⁹⁶

On 17 January 1637 the Grisons ambassadors at Innsbruck signed a treaty with the Habsburgs which marked the effective termination of French preponderance in the Grisons. The Spanish promised to pay all Grisons troops retroactively to 1 November 1636, and both Austria and Spain guaranteed to re-establish the Grisons unconditionally in the Valteline. The Habsburgs promised to help the Grisons drive the French from their territory on the condition that the Grisons renounce all of their alliances with France.⁹⁷ Rohan had written a dispatch to Richelieu on 27 December 1636 advising him of the imminent signing of the treaty, but by the time the delegates returned from Innsbruck, he still had heard nothing from Richelieu.⁹⁸ Disgusted, irritated, and quarreling with Lasnier, Rohan again wrote to France and demanded a leave-of-absence so that he could return to Venice. He was granted this leave, on the condition that he assume responsibility for everything that happened in his absence.⁹⁹

Rohan requested the convocation of a diet for 10 March, at which he told the Grisons

that he was not there to make new promises, by which he saw them already annoyed enough, but to ask them for a delay of six weeks [in their plans], so that the King during this interval could provide for all which was necessary to give them the sum total of what had been promised them. . . .¹⁰⁰

At Innsbruck the Grisons had planned a general uprising for 1 May. At the 10 March assembly they promised Rohan that nothing would happen until 1 May. Rohan then

wrote to Louis XIII begging for money and sent Prioleau, his secretary, to Paris to secure it.¹⁰¹ The Spanish noticed Prioleau's departure, and judging that he likely would receive money from Louis XIII, they notified the Austrians that they were advancing the date of the uprising to 18 March. In turn the Austrians informed the Grisons of this decision and told them to comply. The Austrians logically pointed out that the French might satisfy the Grisons' demands, but that, by means of the Treaty of Innsbruck, the Habsburgs had satisfied their demands. The Grisons had no choice but to comply, and they did not hesitate.¹⁰²

On 18 March 1637 Rohan was returning to Chur from the Fort de France when he heard of the uprising from one of his valets. Immediately he returned to Pont du Rhin and threw himself into the Fort de France, which was garrisoned by 800 Swiss and 200 French. The Swiss, however, refused to obey Rohan's orders, so that his effective fighting force was cut to 200. From the north there approached an imperial army of 6,000, led by General Gallas; from the Milanese Serbelloni again was preparing to march.

Rohan was denied communication with the main group of his forces, commanded by Lecques, in the Valteline, and had no means of subduing the Grisons. He did manage to send a courier to Méliand in Switzerland, who then informed Richelieu. On 28 March a concerned Richelieu wrote to Bullion:

The accident which has happened in the Valteline is so great that I do not know if it can be remedied. If it cannot, the consequences will be very uncertain; God

only knows whether after [this] the Swiss will revolt against us for lack of payment; God only knows whether after that Italy will remain solid . . . The misfortune has happened for lack of money; for one écu that had to be given at the proper time it now takes ten. . . . It has been a long time that I have been preaching to the Gentlemen of the Finances, I now ask them to believe it, otherwise there will be little security for which to hope in [our] affairs. . . . M. de Bullion will recall that nothing was given for fortifications for the years 1635 and 1636, and that funds given in 1635 were neither paid nor assured. I believe in truth that it could not have happened more inconveniently.¹⁰³

The next day, he sent a letter to the King:

The bad news of the Grisons has been confirmed by a courier. The perfidious Grisons have allied themselves with the Imperials and the Spanish, and the last letter of M. de Melian [Méliand] states that M. de Rohan is besieged inside the Fort de France. If money had been furnished for the accord which was necessary at the time, the men of M. de Rohan believe that this would not have happened.¹⁰⁴

On 30 March Richelieu sent Prioleau to the Grisons with 200,000 francs¹⁰⁵ and powers for Rohan to negotiate a treaty.¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile, in the Grisons, Rohan had been offered the services of the cantons of Glarus and Zürich as mediators, but they refused to lend him any military assistance. His hopes ruined, he asked permission to go to Chur and speak to the Grisons leaders. There he made a long speech and proposed five conditions which would constitute a treaty.¹⁰⁷ Under these conditions Rohan agreed to restore the Valteline to the Grisons and retire his troops from the valley and the Grisons, provided they could be allowed to leave in safety. This treaty was accepted by the Grisons on 26 March.

While in Chur awaiting execution of the treaty,

Rohan was overjoyed to see Prioleau return with the powers he needed to make the treaty binding on France. The powers, dated 30 March and signed personally by Louis XIII, carried with them some suggestions regarding the direction of an agreement, but Rohan already had signed his treaty, and considering both his honour and the safety of his troops, he refused to modify it.

Then, on 7 April, Richelieu dispatched the Count of Guébriant to the Grisons as Camp Marshal, with new orders for Rohan instructing him, with the aid of Guébriant, to attempt to hold the Valteline.¹⁰⁸ The First Minister also sent a Councillor of State, d'Estampes, with a similar order a few days later. Guébriant covered the distance from Paris to Pont du Rhin in only six days, but the Grisons stopped him there and would not allow him to go on to Chur. The Count was allowed to send Richelieu's orders on to Rohan, however; and on 18 April he received a reply from the duke:

It is completely impossible to make these people [the Grisons] change their decision, or to delay for one hour the departure of the King's troops from the Valteline, the first of which leave tomorrow, so that I see your coming here not only futile, but harmful because, if you are allowed to pass (which I do not believe will happen), you will make them so angry that I do not think that either you or I will be safe among them, which makes me beg you urgently not to risk coming, but go to Zürich and await news from me. . . .¹⁰⁹

Guébriant remained at Pont du Rhin, however, where he soon was joined by d'Estampes, who had received the same warning from Rohan but had decided to risk the journey. D'Estampes then asked the Grisons for permission to go on to Chur and,

to his surprise, was allowed to proceed with Guébriant.

In Chur, Rohan described the situation to the two Frenchmen, and together they attempted to re-win the Grisons, but in vain. Rohan then delegated Guébriant to lead the French army out of the Grisons; and the three agreed that the situation could not be salvaged.

On 28 March Rohan had sent orders to Lecques in the Valteline instructing him to evacuate the French army. Surprised, Lecques told Rohan's messenger that he could not believe that his commander had signed the treaty of 26 March freely, because it differed so much from established French policy in the Grisons; and he refused to obey Rohan's command. On 8 April Rohan replied that he had signed the treaty in perfect freedom, and again he ordered Lecques to evacuate the Valteline. Once more Lecques protested and demanded written orders from the King to this effect. On 16 April Rohan sent Lecques another letter, including in it a copy of Louis' instructions, which read, in part:

If there are no other means of remedying this affair or of alleviating it, the said Rohan shall negotiate, so that he can remove the troops of the King through Switzerland.¹¹⁰

The next day Guébriant's dispatch reached Rohan. The duke hesitated to send it along to Lecques, because of the danger which already existed; this decision was confirmed several days later when Rohan had conferred with Guébriant and d'Etampes.¹¹¹ When Lecques arrived in Chur and learned of the orders sent by the King on 7 April, he was upset and accused Rohan of delaying the letter deliberately, which was true.¹¹² He proposed to Rohan that the French

fall upon the small garrison at Chur and reverse the situation. But Rohan refused this suggestion and insisted upon the strict execution of the treaty of 26 March. He pointed out that a large Spanish army was now in the Valteline and that an imperial army was approaching Maienfeld. There would be no chance of success. The French retreat proceeded in good order, and the last French soldier left the Grisons on 5 May 1637. On the same day the Swiss handed the Fort de France to the Grisons, and Rohan was escorted by Jenatsch and many other Grisons to the frontier.

At the border the Grisons thanked Rohan for the service he had rendered them.

Although they re-entered the Valteline by means of the alliance which they came to make with the House of Austria, they could not deny that they were obligated for their victory to the arms of the King of France and to the valour of the said Duke of Rohan, whose memory would remain eternally in their country where, if as many statues were erected to him as there were rocks on their mountains, they could not show him enough recognition for what they owed him.¹¹³

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

¹Clarke, p. 183.

²See the original French version of this treaty, Appendix II, p. 191.

³Rohan, Valteline, p. 616.

⁴Ibid., p. 617. The council met on 2 September 1631, about three weeks before the Pinerolo incident. See also Rott, IV, Part I, 563.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., pp. 571-72.

⁷Rohan, Valteline, p. 618.

⁸Rohan to the Venetian ambassador in Switzerland, 7 December 1631, reprinted in Auguste Laugel, Henri de Rohan, son rôle politique et militaire sous Louis XIII, 1579-1638 (Paris, 1889), p. 431. See also p. 300.

⁹Rohan, Valteline, p. 618.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 619.

¹¹Richelieu to Toiras, 24 January 1632, reprinted in Laugel, pp. 300-301. This letter is not in Avenel, Lettres.

¹²Rohan, Valteline, p. 620.

¹³Laugel, p. 301.

¹⁴See M.F., XIX (1636), 538-42, for Rohan's speech to the Swiss. See also Le Vassor, VII, 150-156.

¹⁵See Rohan, Valteline, p. 621; Clarke, pp. 189-90; Laugel, p. 303; and Rott, IV, Part I, 620-21.

¹⁶Rohan, Valteline, p. 621; and Laugel, pp. 305-306.

¹⁷Rohan, Valteline, p. 623.

¹⁸Laugel, p. 306. See also Rott, IV, Part I, 653-58.

¹⁹Rohan, Valteline, p. 623.

²⁰Laugel, p. 306.

²¹Rohan to Richelieu, 28 April 1633, reprinted in Laugel, p. 306.

²²Rott, IV, Part II, 7-9.

²³Laugel, p. 307.

²⁴There were four, one through western Switzerland over the Gottard to Franche-Comté, another through the Valteline to the Tyrol, then northwest to the Lake of Constance, another through western Switzerland to Constance, and the last through the Grisons (via Chur) to Lindau.

²⁵Rohan to Louis XIII, 2 June 1633, reprinted in Laugel, p. 309.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Rohan, Valteline, pp. 624-25.

²⁹Ibid., p. 625.

³⁰Rohan, Valteline, p. 627; Rott, IV, Part II, 42. Laugel places the number at 8,000 foot and 1,200 horse (p. 310).

³¹Rott, IV, Part II, 37-38.

³²Rohan, Valteline, p. 627.

³³Laugel, p. 311.

³⁴Richelieu, Mémoires (Petitot ed., vol. 80), LIV. XXIV, 479-80.

³⁵Rohan, Valteline, p. 628.

³⁶Clarke, p. 194.

³⁷Rohan, Valteline, p. 630.

³⁸M.F., XX (1637), 220.

³⁹Laugel, p. 316. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War, p. 359, states that the Cardinal-Infant had 20,000 troops and that Ferdinand, King of Hungary (with whom Don Ferdinand joined his forces), had 15,000, for a total of 35,000.

⁴⁰See Avenel, Lettres, IV, 597-98, 603. See also Le Vassor, VIII, 236-66, for a detailed account of the battle written by Marshal Horn.

⁴¹With whom he signed alliances on 8 February 1635

(the United Provinces), and 11 July 1635 (Savoy and Parma). See also Le Vassor, VIII, 179-80, 368-76.

⁴²Laugel, p. 316.

⁴³Note for the King, 2 November 1634, in Avenel, Lettres, IV, 636. See also M.F., XX, 604-606.

⁴⁴Laugel, p. 317.

⁴⁵The order came through in March of 1635. Rohan was told to take seven regiments and four cornets of cavalry, about 6,000 men. See Rohan, Valteline, p. 632. For an account of his first winter campaign in Alsace, see M.F., XX, 604-606.

⁴⁶Rohan, Valteline, p. 633. See also Laugel, p. 319.

⁴⁷Laugel, p. 319.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 321.

⁴⁹Rohan, Valteline, p. 634.

⁵⁰St. Gall(en) is located approximately eighteen miles southwest of the point where the Rhine joins Lake of Constance.

⁵¹Laugel, p. 321.

⁵²Rohan, Valteline, p. 636. See also Avenel, Lettres, V, 3, for Richelieu's summary (15 May 1635) of the strength of all French forces, which totalled about 150,000. He estimated the Grisons army at 12,500.

⁵³Rohan, Valteline, p. 637. Fernamond also can be rendered as Fernamont; Serbelloni can be spelled Cerbélon.

⁵⁴Ibid. See also Laugel, p. 323.

⁵⁵See Map 4, "Valteline Campaigns of 1635", facing p. 90.

⁵⁶Rohan, Valteline, p. 638.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 639.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 640.

⁵⁹Laugel, p. 325.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 326.

⁶¹Mazzo is seven miles northeast of Tirano in the Valteline.

⁶²Rohan, Valteline, p. 644. See also Laugel, p. 327.

⁶³Rohan, Valteline, p. 644.

⁶⁴Note to the King, 4 August 1635, in Avenel, Lettres, V, 139.

⁶⁵Laugel, p. 329, cites a letter from Rohan to Richelieu dated 31 September 1635. September, however, has only thirty days. Rohan makes no mention of the Clausel incident in his memoirs, and Richelieu, although he mentions the episode, cites no letter.

⁶⁶Both are reprinted in Avenel, Lettres, V, 319-21 and 321-22, respectively.

⁶⁷Laugel, p. 330.

⁶⁸The valley in which is found the source of the Adda. See Map 1, "Grisons: Topography", facing P. 1.

⁶⁹Rohan, Valteline, p. 646.

⁷⁰Ibid. Valenza's French rendering is Valence. See also Jacques Humbert, Le maréchal de Crequy, gendre de Lesdiguières (1573-1638) (Paris, 1962), and Le Vassor, VIII, Part II, 21-24, for detailed accounts of this siege.

⁷¹Rohan, Valteline, p. 648.

⁷²Laugel, p. 331.

⁷³Rohan, Valteline, p. 648.

⁷⁴Avenel, Lettres, V, 956.

⁷⁵Laugel, p. 335.

⁷⁶Rott, V, 145. No available source lists these articles. Rohan, Valteline, p. 656, states that a treaty was signed, saying no more. M.F., XX (1637), says nothing about them. Laugel, p. 336, mentions only the conditions set down by Richelieu. The First Minister notes only that a treaty was signed, Richelieu, Mémoires (Petitot ed., vol. 82), Liv. XXVIII, 425. Clarke discusses the treaty and mentions his source, which is "Traitté faict à Chiavennes entre Mrs des troys liguees et les Valtellins et comtois leurs sujets, ratifié à Tosane [Thusis], en avril 1636 et par le roy le 28 octobre", Bibliothèque nationale, Fonds français 5190, fol. 182 vo.-186. See Clarke, p. 204.

⁷⁷Horatio F. Brown, "The Valtelline", ch. II of The Thirty Years' War. Vol. IV of The Cambridge Modern History, ed. Sir A. W. Ward, Sir G.W. Prothero and Sir Stanley Leathes (Cambridge, 1934), p. 62.

⁷⁸Rohan to Louis XIII, 27 April 1636, reprinted in Laugel, pp. 336-37.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 337.

⁸⁰Rohan to d'Hémery, 6 July 1636, reprinted in Laugel, p. 338.

⁸¹Rohan, Valteline, p. 657.

⁸²Laugel, p. 339.

⁸³Rohan, Valteline, pp. 658-59.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Laugel, p. 340.

⁸⁶Rott, V. 152-53.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 153.

⁸⁸Rohan, Valteline, pp. 660-61.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 661.

⁹⁰Laugel, p. 341.

⁹¹Rohan to Richelieu, 17 October 1636, reprinted in Laugel, p. 341 n.

⁹²See Rott, V, 16, 158 ff. See also Richelieu, Mémoires (Petitot ed., vol. 82), Liv. XXVIII, 423-24.

⁹³These talks, which lasted from 1636 to 1639, achieved nothing of note.

⁹⁴Rohan, Valteline, p. 664. See also Rott, V, 180-84; and Laugel, p. 341.

⁹⁵Laugel, p. 342.

⁹⁶Rott, V, 171.

⁹⁷Rohan, Valteline, p. 665.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 667.

¹⁰¹Rott, V, 189.

¹⁰²Rohan, Valteline, pp. 667-68.

¹⁰³Letter to Bullion, 28 March 1637, in Avenel, Lettres, V, 762-63. See also Laugel, p. 344; and Orest Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII: A Study of the Secretaries of State and the Superintendents of Finance in the Ministry of Richelieu, 1635-1642 (Oxford, 1963), pp. 129-30.

¹⁰⁴Letter to the King, 29 March 1637, in Avenel, Lettres, V, 763-64.

¹⁰⁵Laugel, p. 344.

¹⁰⁶Rohan reprints these powers in Rohan, Valteline, p. 671. See also the supplement to his Histoire particulière de ce qui s'est passé aux Grisons en la Valtelline, pendant le gouvernement de Duc de Rohan. En Quatre livres es années 1631, 1632, 1633, 1634, 1635, 1636 & 1637, entitled "Relation veritable & particuliere de ce qui s'est passé en la Valteline. De sort que le sieur Duc de Rohan a traicté avec les Grisons et de ce qui s'est ensuivy en execution dudict traicté", Bibliothèque nationale, Collection Dupuy 540, fol. 141, for reprints of each letter from Rohan to Lecques during this period.

¹⁰⁷Rohan's speech and his five conditions are reprinted in M.F., XX (1639), 293-303. See also Le Vassor, IX, 175-91.

¹⁰⁸Vicomte de Noailles, Episodes de la guerre de trente ans: Le Maréchal de Guébriant, 1602 à 1643 (Paris, 1913), p. 49.

¹⁰⁹Rohan to Guébriant, 18 April 1637, reprinted in Noailles, pp. 49-50.

¹¹⁰Reprinted in Laugel, p. 346.

¹¹¹Noailles, p. 53. Although no dates are given specifically, it appears that under the circumstances this was the course of events.

¹¹²Richelieu, Mémoires (Petitot ed., vol. 82), Liv. XXVIII, 433, states that Rohan concealed the letter until it was too late. Rohan, however, felt that the letter was too late even when it arrived.

¹¹³Rohan, Valteline, p. 674.

CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE

Rohan's departure from the Grisons on 5 May 1637 ended almost twenty years of active French involvement in the Grisons and the Valteline. During this period the French and the Habsburgs had made repeated diplomatic gestures to avoid an open and irrevocable armed confrontation over an interest important to both of them. When these attempts eventually failed, the French closed the Valteline to the Habsburgs; then, because of deteriorating conditions closer to France, they were forced to relinquish it to their enemies almost without a struggle.

Knowing that he would be held responsible for the loss of the Valteline, Rohan gave command of his army to Guébriant and went to Geneva from the Grisons. He soon was ordered by Richelieu to rejoin Guébriant and lead his army into Franche-Comté. Warned by his wife that he would be arrested if he did,¹ Rohan remained in Geneva for the rest of 1637, in spite of constant attempts by the French government to have him extradited.² On 13 January 1638 the duke left Geneva secretly and travelled to the canton of Zürich, where he was met by Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. Taken into Bernard's army as a gentleman volunteer, Rohan was wounded in a battle with imperial troops at Rheinfelden on 28 February. He was taken to Königsfeld in the canton of Bern to recover, and there he received permission from Louis XIII to retire honourably to Venice. Almost re-

covered, Rohan suffered a relapse and died on 13 April 1638 at the age of fifty-nine years. He had accepted Richelieu's blame for the loss of the Valteline, but he died with the knowledge that he was not at fault.

Adhering to the tradition of ministerial infallibility, Richelieu had refused to accept any responsibility for the French failure in the Grisons. Reflecting later upon the final episode of French involvement in the southern Alps, the Cardinal-Minister viewed it somewhat differently than did Rohan.³ He admitted that the duke had been sent powers from Louis XIII to negotiate a treaty with the Grisons, but he interpreted the powers thus:

The King, when he was notified of this revolt [of 18 March], had called upon the duke, on 30 March, to employ all of his courage and reputation so as to take care of this unhappy affair promptly; that, if there no longer were means of remedying or appeasing it, at least negotiate, so that he could remove the troops of the King through Switzerland.⁴

Richelieu apparently felt that something could have been done other than negotiating a treaty, whereas Rohan did not. The fact remains that Rohan was in the Grisons and that he understood the moods and frustrations of its people, while Richelieu, although no stranger to military campaigns, was concerned with matters of broader importance and did not have time to assess the Grisons problem in isolation. While not without initial praise for Rohan, the First Minister overshadowed such praise with condemnation.

It is certain that [Rohan] until this time had carried the King's affairs gloriously to a high point in the Valteline; but his last action not only ruined

in an instant all that he had done so well during the preceding years, but brought more dishonour to the arms of His Majesty than the entire past had brought them glory. This disgrace was such that it could not be repaired, and whatever excuse he could give for his faults, the most favourable name he could receive from his friends was that of a coward.

To offer the excuse that having been notified of the treason which was brewing . . . he had done nothing about it because he had been extremely ill, is [to offer] no excuse at all, because a man who commands must place his work above his health.⁵

Richelieu neglected to mention that the decision to evacuate the Valteline and Grisons was not that of Rohan alone, but also that of Guébriant and d'Etampes, who both had examined the situation and had concurred with Rohan. In addition, Guébriant later had the courage to defend Rohan's judgement in front of Richelieu.⁶

Rohan was not guilty of the charges directed against him by Richelieu. The responsibility for the failure of the Valteline campaign lies more with circumstances than with any individuals, and the major circumstance was financial. And it was upon his Superintendents of Finance, Bullion and Bouthillier, that Richelieu turned his wrath when he learned of the Grisons revolt. The Cardinal-Minister held the attitude that they were supposed to find funds when called upon, but often he himself was responsible for raiding budgets and transferring money to other purposes. He admitted this by implication when towards the middle of May of 1635 he wrote to Bullion:

This memoir is to make M. de Bullion know that it is absolutely necessary to replace promptly the funds which were destined for the fortifications and munitions of the Valteline and which were employed for the mustering of troops which had arrived there.

A letter to both the superintendents a year later showed that

Richelieu never doubted that they could find money if pressed:

There are some affairs in which we lost one hundred per cent through delaying or deferring. A long time ago I pressed Messieurs the Superintendents to be so kind as to give an afternoon to clearing up the claims from all foreigners who . . . are in the pay of the King. . . .⁸

When the destruction of the French cause in the Grisons became known to him in March of 1637, Richelieu wrote a scathing letter to his two ministers, which amply demonstrated both his frustration at the situation and his lack of control over finances.⁹

It also should be remembered that in 1635 and 1636 Richelieu organized five armies totalling, by his estimate, over 134,000 men.¹⁰ This figure did not include forces such as those of Sweden and the Netherlands, which were subsidized by the French. Even if Richelieu's figure is exaggerated, the financial support of this force placed a tremendous burden on a treasury far from full. During 1635 and 1636 Rohan's army was the only French force achieving a high degree of success; consequently the Superintendents of Finance may have been inclined to regard Rohan's constant pleas for money as overemphasized and, in the presence of much more urgent needs closer to home, to ignore them.¹¹

In addition to lack of payment, the Grisons were angered with the French over another item, Richelieu's refusal to ratify the Articles of Chiavenna, which climaxed seventeen years of broken promises. At first glance, it seems uncharacteristic that Richelieu would risk losing so strategic an area over a point of religion. He had not

hesitated to ally France with the Danes, the Swedes and the Dutch during his ministry; and the Grisons themselves had been French allies since 1512. The logic behind Richelieu's insistence upon modification of the religious aspects of the Articles of Chiavenna becomes clear when it is realized that he was under considerable pressure from Pope Urban VIII to ensure the security of the Catholic Valtelins.¹² Having lost the dukes of Parma and Savoy as allies, Richelieu had no desire to lose his influence with the pope, and consequently in Italy, as well. He thus instructed Père Joseph and Bullion to modify the articles.

When he heard of the disturbing developments in the Grisons in 1637, Richelieu finally sent both money and a simple ratification of the Articles of Chiavenna in a last attempt to salvage the situation. Probably he regarded the Grisons as inevitably lost, however, for he sent only one-fifth of the amount of money demanded.¹³ As a preventative measure he also dispatched 200,000 francs to the Swiss and ordered two new armies prepared to march to the Alps if necessary.¹⁴ But neither Louis XIII nor Richelieu pursued the matter once it was lost,¹⁵ and their attention again shifted to the conflict in Germany.

On 5 July 1637 the Grisons and the Spanish signed the Treaty of Asti, which gave the Habsburgs perpetual rights of transit through the Valteline and gave the Grisons sovereignty over the Valtelins, except on the point of religion. Then on 3 September 1639 a "perpetual peace" was signed between the Habsburgs and the Grisons which re-

solved the matter of religion by giving the Grisons Protestants the right to live and worship in the Valteline.¹⁶

In the perspective of the battle of Nördlingen, the French abandonment of the Valteline in 1637 could have had disastrous consequences. That this was not the case is explained by the internal situation of Spain during this time. The deciding factor there was the animosity between Olivares and the powerful northeastern Spanish province of Catalonia, whose hatred of the Count-Duke had increased steadily since he assumed control of Spanish affairs in 1621. Comparably to what Richelieu was doing in France, Olivares had attempted to reduce the power and privileges of the non-Castilian nobility while attempting to increase revenue, but unlike Richelieu he had succeeded in generating only antagonism, especially in Catalonia and Portugal. After France had declared war on Spain in 1635, Olivares' problems with these provinces increased, for he was unable to rely upon them for either men or money.¹⁷

Early in 1640, Olivares desperately billeted an army in Catalonia, hoping to force its subservience. Instead of capitulating to him, however, the angry Catalans rebelled and declared their allegiance to France.¹⁸ In December of 1640, six months after the Catalan revolt, the Portugese also rebelled, with French support. Then on 26 January 1641 a combined Catalan-French force defeated a Spanish army near Barcelona. The defeat marked the end of Spanish hopes for success in Europe, for Olivares realized that he had neither the men nor the money to prosecute a full-scale

war in the north and deal with a rebellion in Spain. The point was made clear on 18 May 1643 when the French defeated the Spanish at Rocroy in northeastern France. The battle was the turning point of the Thirty Years' War and marked the beginning of French ascendancy to European hegemony.

In consequence, although after May of 1637 the passages of the Grisons were available to the Spanish, Olivares was unable to send a significant number of men through them. In this context, the results of over twenty years of Spanish efforts to gain rights of passage came to naught. In the same context, it becomes apparent that Rohan's occupation of the Valteline between 1635 and 1637 was of utmost importance to the French cause in the larger conflict in Germany. In spite of serious setbacks along France's eastern frontier between 1635 and 1637, Rohan's Valteline efforts freed Richelieu from worry about another Habsburg invasion from the south. It was effective in that it drew approximately 12,000 Austrian and Spanish troops away from the northern conflict during the time when they decisively could have aided the Habsburg cause. And it was effective in that Rohan used a smaller number of men in the Valteline (8,000) than did the Habsburgs.

Richelieu was correct in placing the blame for the deterioration and loss of French influence in the Grisons more on his Superintendents of Finance than on Rohan. But in effect he blamed them for lacking the ability to perform financial miracles. His later analysis was careful but vindictive, and the Cardinal-Minister overlooked the

one individual who really was to blame for the fiasco of the Grisons in 1637: himself.

Many general works dealing with this period have suggested that Richelieu suddenly exploded on the scene and ably directed the inevitable establishment of French hegemony in Europe. A study of the struggle for the Valteline shows clearly the distortions and exaggerations of this view and demonstrates that these generalized assumptions are superficial at best. Far from skilfully controlling and directing a brilliant and clearly defined policy, Richelieu, by his diplomatic efforts, progressed fumblingly into highly complex situations wherein he had few preconceptions and for which he simply evolved policy pragmatically on the basis of day-to-day events. Moreover, rather than enjoying carefully prepared successes, Richelieu's policy with regard to the Grisons and the Valteline sometimes failed, and such successes as were achieved appear to have been as often the result of good fortune as of effective planning.

FOOTNOTES FOR CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE

¹Laugel, pp. 349-50. The warning was based on fact. On the same day that he issued his official orders to Rohan, Richelieu also issued secret orders for the duke's arrest.

²See Rott, V, 223-27; Laugel, pp. 349-50; and Clarke, pp. 210-11. Rohan claimed reasons of health for staying in Geneva. Richelieu felt that Rohan was not telling the truth. See Noailles, p. 54.

³See Richelieu, Mémoires (Petitot ed., vol. 82), Liv. XXVIII, 422-56. Le Vassor, VIII, Part II, 5-6, states: "It seems that Rohan had become suspected by Richelieu since the Clausel affair. At least Richelieu's historian insinuates as much. . . . I have read Rohan's manifesto [of the Grisons uprising of March of 1637], and I found nothing for which he can be charged with listening to the false proposals [of Clausel]. . . ." See also Le Vassor, IX, 175-91.

⁴Richelieu, Mémoires (Petitot ed., vol. 82), Liv. XXVIII, 432-33.

⁵Ibid., pp. 448-49.

⁶Laugel, p. 348.

⁷Letter to Bullion, [after 15 May 1635], in Avenel, Lettres, V, 10-11.

⁸Letter to Bullion and Bouthillier, 5 April 1636, in Avenel, Lettres, v, 440. See also Ranum, pp. 148-49.

⁹See above, pp. 121-22, for this letter.

¹⁰Avenel, Lettres, V, 3. See also above, p.128, n. 52.

¹¹The Peace of Prague, 30 May 1635, and the year of Corbie, 1636, were two factors which forced all thoughts of Rohan and the Valteline from Richelieu's mind. The Peace of Prague, whose two principal signatories were Emperor Ferdinand II and Elector John George of Saxony, resulted in the withdrawal of the latter, the most powerful of the German Protestant princes, from the war. This seriously depleted anti-Habsburg forces in Germany.

¹²Rott, V, 152-54.

¹³He sent 200,000 francs for the Grisons. See Avenel, Lettres, V, 764.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵On 4 May 1637 Louis sent a letter to Guébriant which acknowledged the king's acceptance of the loss of the Grisons and Valteline. It also carried his decision to send part of the Valteline army into Savoy (under Lecques) and part into Franche-Comté (under Rohan and Guébriant). Rohan and Lecques received similar letters. See Noailles, pp. 52-53.

¹⁶Rott, V, 345-52.

¹⁷J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (London, 1963), pp. 334-35. See also his The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain, 1598-1640 (Cambridge, 1963).

¹⁸Ibid., p. 339 See also Avenel, Lettres, VII, 276; and Charles Vassal-Reig, Richelieu et la Catalogne (Paris, 1935).

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APPENDIX I

Because the strategic importance of the Grisons and the Valteline was due to the many passes and valleys they contained, it is essential that the physical geography of the area be understood. This is the purpose of the following description.

The Grisons is the largest of the Swiss cantons. Its terrain is composed of mountains, including such peaks as Piz Bernina (13,283 feet), the Gran Zebrù (12,611 feet) and Monte Disgrazia (12,067 feet); the latter is the highest mountain in the Valteline watershed.

The Grisons contains the sources of three large rivers: the Rhine, the Inn and the Adda. The Rhine actually is considered to have three sources, all of which are located in the Grisons. The Hinter Rhein, literally the "farther" or "bottom" Rhine, is the southermost of the three, and is considered the true source of the river because it flows from the Rheinwaldhorn glacier; the Mittel Rhein or Medel Rhein is the smallest source, and is

*All elevations used in the following description are taken from The Times World Atlas (London, 1963). For convenience, metres have been converted to feet. All distances are taken from "Tourist Map of Switzerland" (Bern, n.d.), a publication of the Swiss Bank Corporation, and verified with the Landeskarte der Schweiz 1:50 000 scale maps, published by the Eidgenössische Landestopographie, Bern. For convenience, all kilometres have been converted to miles. 1 metre equals 3.2808 feet; one kilometre equals 0.62137 miles. For a clearer interpretation of this description, see Map 1: "Grisons: Topography", facing p. 1.

further north and somewhat west; and the Vorder Rhein, the "closer" or "front" Rhine, is the largest source in terms of volume and is the northernmost of the three. The Mittel Rhein joins the Vorder Rhein at Disentis/Mustér, about twenty miles from the source of the latter; the Hinter Rhein flows into the Vorder Rhein twenty miles further downstream. The river then continues in a northeasterly direction for another six miles to Chur, the present-day capital of the Grisons, where it turns in a northern direction and flows to Lake Constance (in German, Bodensee), fifty-eight miles distant. Emptying out of the western end of the lake, the Rhine flows in a west-southwest direction sixty-two miles further to the city of Basel, where it turns north again and flows to the Netherlands and the North Sea, some 700 miles distant.

The Inn river rises near the center of the Grisons, southeastward from the sources of the Rhine. It flows northeast through the Engadine valley to Innsbruck in the Austrian Tyrol, where it turns generally eastward and flows to the Danube, approximately 200 miles away. The Adda river rises in the Val Fraele, northeastward of the upper reaches of the Inn, then runs southwest and west through the Valteline to Lake Como, from which it exits in a southern direction to join the Po river sixty-five miles away.

The Valteline is the long valley of the Adda river that runs directly eastward from Lake Como for almost forty miles, then turns northeastward for another thirty-five miles, and culminates in the Stelvio pass (9,045 feet), the

second-highest pass in Europe. Lake Como (625 feet) is located along the southern extreme of the Alps, and its lower branches protrude beyond the limits of the mountain system into terrain which rolls gently southward for thirty-two miles to the city of Milan. The overall length of Lake Como, from its southern to its northern extreme, is forty-three miles; at its widest point it is three miles across. With a maximum depth of 1,345 feet, it is the deepest lake in Europe. Lake Como is composed of three branches, each about sixteen miles in length, which project northward to the mouth of the Adda river, southwestward to the town of Como, and southeastward to the town of Lecco. This last branch, out of which flows the Adda toward the Po, also is called Lake Lecco. At the tip of the promontory which extends northward and serves to divide the two southern branches of Lake Como, is the town of Bellagio. This town was one of the points of departure for Spanish troops on their journey across the lake and north to the mouth of the Valteline, and the beginning of their transit of the Alps.

North of Lake Como lies Lake Mezzola, cut off from the larger lake by the silted delta of the Adda. It is fed by the Mera river, which then flows into Lake Como. Eight and one-half miles north of Lake Mezzola along the Mera is the town of Chiavenna (1,040 feet), located strategically at the southern openings of two major Alpine routes. Almost directly north of the town runs the Val di San Giacomo. Twenty-four miles in length, the valley opens in the north on the Rheinwald valley, through which flows the Hinter

Rhein on its way to the Vorder Rhein twenty-six miles distant. The San Giacomo valley is relatively narrow with an uneven floor. Nineteen miles north of Chiavenna it reaches its summit in the Splügen pass (6,932 feet), from which it drops quickly to the town of Splügen on the Hinter Rhein.

The strategic value of the San Giacomo lay in its connections with other valleys, such as the Rheinwald. About eight miles upstream from Splügen in the Rheinwald, the valley is joined by the Val Mesolcina. Running south from the Rheinwald, the Val Mesolcina curves ever more westward as it proceeds in its predominant direction. Two miles from its opening on the Rheinwald, the valley reaches its summit in the San Bernadino pass (6,768 feet), on the southern slope of which the valley is joined by the Moësa river. When the Mesolcina opens at its southern extremity, thirty-six miles from the San Bernadino pass, it is running directly west. There it joins the Val Blenio Riviera, which runs from the Göttard pass, thirty-six miles northwest of the junction. Through the Blenio Riviera flows the Ticino river, which is joined by the Moësa where the two valleys intersect. The Ticino runs eighteen miles further southwest to Lake Maggiore. From the town of Bellinzona, nine miles up the Ticino from Lake Maggiore, it is possible to traverse a low, unnamed valley for twenty miles directly south to Lake Lugano. From there it is a relatively easy journey to Como, nineteen miles southeast, and hence to Milan, thirty-two miles south.

East-northeast from Chiavenna, ascending the Mera river, runs the Val Bregaglia, twenty miles in length, which culminates in the relatively low Maloja pass (5,955 feet). Approximately seventeen miles from Chiavenna, at Casaccia, a trail leaves the valley and proceeds in a westerly direction for about two miles. It then turns north and rises quickly to the Septimer pass (7,546 feet). The trail continues through an extremely narrow and uneven valley north from the Septimer for seven miles, to open on a larger valley, the Oberhalbstein, whence the road runs north to the upper branches of the Rhine. Not in general use today, the Septimer pass was very important as a bypass to the longer route through St. Moritz and the Julier pass (see below).

On the northeastern side of the Maloja pass lies the Maloja Plateau (5,938 feet), which contains the sources of the Inn river and the beginning of the route through the Engadine valley to the Austrian Tyrol.

Because the San Giacomo valley (Splügen pass), the Val Mesolcina (San Bernardino pass), the Val Blenio Riviera (Göttard pass), and the Val Bregaglia (Maloja pass) all led into Protestant territory, their strategic value to the Habsburgs was nullified, and to traverse any of them was dangerous.

Of all the valleys in the Grisons and surrounding areas, the Valteline is the widest and most gently sloping; consequently it is the most easily-travelled. Over a total distance of seventy-five miles it rises only 3,500 feet, an

average slope of less than one per-cent. Other valleys in the area, the Val Bregaglia from Chiavenna to the Maloja pass, for example, rise over 4,500 feet in less than twenty miles, an average slope of five per cent. This factor is extremely important when one considers the equipment which had to be transported with an army.

The Valteline runs directly east from Lake Como for forty miles. Throughout this distance it meets no other valleys containing passes to other routes, but it does intersect some small valleys running north from its floor. These valleys could be used to shield an army for purposes of either attack or defense. The first such valley encountered east of Lake Como is the Val di Masino, which is approximately ten miles from the Lake. The Masino runs north from the Valteline for eleven miles and is flanked on the west by Monte Spluga (9,263 feet) and on the east by Monte Disgrazia (12,067 feet). Fifteen miles east in the Valteline is the Val Malenco, which runs for nine miles along the eastern flank of Monte Disgrazia. The town of Sondrio, this historic capital of the Valteline, lies at the junction of this valley and the Valteline.

At the village of Tresenda the Valteline turns northward and proceeds in an increasingly northern direction to its end at the Stelvio pass, thirty-five miles away. At Tresenda the Valteline is joined by another valley, unnamed, entering from the southeast. Eighteen miles long, the valley rises rapidly to the Aprica pass (3,856 feet), then drops gently eastward to the town of Edolo, where it meets

two other valleys, the Val Camonica and the Val di Sole.

The Val Camonica runs south-southwest from Edolo for twenty-five miles and opens on Lake Iseo. The terrain surrounding the lake is gentle; Milan is only twenty miles southwest.

The Val di Sole runs generally northeastward from Edolo for approximately forty miles, traversing the Tonale pass (6,177 feet) halfway along its distance, and opens on the Adige river south of Bolzano.

Both the Val Camonica and the Val di Sole would have been of substantial strategic importance to the Spanish as alternate routes to and from the Valteline, where it not for the fact that all of the Val Camonica and most of the Val di Sole were in the possession of the Republic of Venice. Venetian hostility to the Spanish rendered both valleys dangerous to Habsburg travel.

Six miles northeast of its turning point at Tresenda, the Valteline is joined by one of the most important valleys in the area, the Val di Poschiavo. Like those valleys opening on Chiavenna (San Giacomo and Bregaglia), the strategic importance of the Poschiavo lay in its subsequent connection with other valleys. Opening just south of Tirano (1,410 feet), the valley rises to its summit in the Bernina pass (7,621 feet). The vertical climb from Tirano to the Bernina is over 6,000 feet in twenty-four miles; in contrast, beyond the the pass there is a drop of only 1,500 feet in twelve miles to the Swiss town of Samedan in the Engadine valley.

The Engadine valley, which contains the upper

reaches of the Inn river, runs in a southwest-northeast direction through the Grisons, and customarily is divided into two parts, the Upper Engadine and the Lower Engadine. The Upper Engadine opens from the Maloja Plateau, which contains the sources of the Inn. Where the river flows into the Upper Engadine, immediately northeast of St. Moritz, the valley is very narrow but uncommonly level; twenty-six miles from the Maloja Plateau it opens to the wider Lower Engadine, which runs north, then northeast, for thirty-three miles. The Lower Engadine then opens on an even broader valley which runs to Innsbruck in the Tyrol.

Four miles southwest of Sameden, lying at the junction of the Maloja Plateau and the Upper Engadine, is the town of St. Moritz (5,833 feet). Directly west of the town lies the Oberhalbstein valley, which reaches its summit within five miles at the Julier pass (7,493 feet). From its westward direction the valley then turns and runs northward for the remaining twenty-five miles of its length along the Julia river. Where it turns north, the Oberhalbstein is joined by the narrower valley of the Septimer pass (see above). At the town of Tiefencastel, the Julia river joins the Albula river and the Oberhalbstein meets three other valleys: one runs directly north for eighteen miles to Chur, on the Rhine; another, joining from the east, carries the upper waters of the Albula river and leads to passes that rejoin the Engadine; the third carries the Albula river west for nine miles to the Hinter Rhein in the Schwams (Schons) valley, just north of Thusis.

The source of the Albula river is in a small valley approximately parallel to the Oberhalbstein, eight miles to its east. This valley rises in the south to the Albula pass (6,585 feet), after which it drops steadily into the Upper Engadine, four miles downstream from Samedan. Where it flows out of its source valley, the Albula is joined by the Landwasser river, which begins in the valley of the Flüela-Wisshorn (10,131 feet), thirty-six miles northeast of its junction with the Albula. The western massif of the Flüela-Wisshorn is traversed by the Flüela pass (7,818 feet), which permits travel from the city of Davos to the Lower Engadine at a point twenty-four miles down the Inn from Samedan.

In themselves the Albula and Flüela passes were of no great importance to the Spanish, but the existence of another valley which opened in the south at Davos made them very important to the Habsburgs, especially the Austrians. This valley, the Val di Partens, is known better as the Prättigau. Twenty-five miles long, the Prättigau curves north-northeastward from Davos for six miles to the town of Klosters, where it is joined by the Landquart river. From Klosters the Prättigau swings northwest, then west, emerging on the Rhine river at the town of Landquart, which is nine miles north of Chur. Four miles further down the Rhine lies Maienfeld, the northernmost town of the Grisons. In the seventeenth century this was the site of the Pont du Rhin and the Fort de France, an important bridge and fortress respectively. Access to this area, and to the Grisons, was controlled by the Luziensteig (Steig) pass, which traverses

a small but impassable curve of the Rhine. The location of the Luziensteig made it and the Pont du Rhin very important to both the Grisons and the Tyrol. If the Habsburgs captured the area, all of the Grisons was open to them.

Thus, starting from the Valteline, it was possible for Spanish soldiers to travel through the key valley, the Poschiavo, across the Bernina pass to Samedan, where they were presented with two choices. In the first instance, they could turn northeastward from Samedan and travel through the Engadine valley and on to Innsbruck. In the second instance they could turn southwestward from Samedan and then north through the Oberhalbstein to Tiefencastel, where the three valleys which joined there offered them as many choices. While the Oberhalbstein route held more danger for Habsburg troops, its wide choice of valleys was an advantage, for it was difficult for opponents to defend three valleys simultaneously.

Twenty-four miles northeast of Tirano in the Valteline lies the town of Bormio (3,993 feet). Bormio lies at the junction of two important routes, one leading southeast, the other northeast. The first, the Valfurva, contains the Frodolfo river, which flows into the Adda just south of Bormio. The Valfurva is about thirty-five miles long; it winds generally south-southeast from the Valteline, crosses over the high Gavia pass (8,599 feet), and opens in the south on the Val di Sole at a point thirteen miles northeast of Edolo (see above).

The Val di Sole opens on the Adige river approxi-

mately six miles north of the city of Trent. Forty miles upstream of Trent lies the city of Bolzano, from which it is possible to journey up the Isarco river through the Val Isarco. The Isarco flows from the north-northeast over a distance of fifty-five miles. It rises on the southern slope of the Brenner pass (4,495 feet), on the northern side of which is the Wipp valley. The Wipp Tal is about twenty miles long, and runs north-northwest to Innsbruck.

The second route from Bormio runs directly north-east, climbing over 5,000 feet in less than twelve miles. The route traverses the high mountains that ring Bormio on three sides to form the northeastern terminal of the Valteline, and leads to the Stelvio pass (9,045 feet). On its northeastern side, the pass drops away almost as abruptly, opening on the small town of Sondrio ten miles from its summit. Sondrio is on the Adige river, ten miles from its source and approximately sixty miles upstream from Bolzano. Followed upstream to its source, the Adige leads to the Resia pass (4,954 feet). On its northern slope, the Resia pass gives rise to a small river, about ten miles in length, which flows northwest into the Inn in the Lower Engadine.

Since most of the Adige river basin north of Trent was, historically, in the hands of the Habsburgs, the routes which led through Bolzano to either the Brenner or the Resia passes were potentially as advantageous as the route over the Stelvio pass to Sondrio and the Adige. But their utility to the Habsburgs was negated by the fact that the major portion of the Val di Sole lay in the hands of the Venetians.

Just below the Stelvio pass on its western side is found the valley of the Umbrail pass (8,205 feet). The Umbrail, extremely close to the Stelvio, leads directly north for a distance of ten miles to the town of Santa Maria. Santa Maria is in the Val Müstair (Münsterthal), which runs northwest and northeast from Santa Maria; and it is possible to travel northwest along the Münsterthal, over the Fuorn pass (7,050 feet), to Zernez, where the Upper and Lower Engadine valleys meet. It also is possible to travel northeast in the Münsterthal to the village of Glorenza, on the Adige river approximately three miles upstream from Spondiga.

The great height of the Stelvio pass, however, rendered it useless for at least seven months of the year due to heavy snow. While all other passes suffered heavy snowfalls during the winter, their height made them less susceptible to the lingering effects of snow; and they were either clear or less blocked for a longer annual period.

Thus, in terms of geography, the Valteline was of vital strategic importance to the Habsburgs. Not only did it in itself constitute a direct route from Milan and Lake Como in the west to the Stelvio pass, the Adige river and the Holy Roman Empire in the east, but it afforded physical access to the many other valleys and passes in the Grisons which, for this reason, became as important as the Valteline. Political factors placed a limit on the number of routes available to the Habsburgs at any given time; these factors served only to increase the importance of the Valteline. In effect, it was the direct route through the Valteline, then

over the Stelvio pass into the Tyrol, which was used most often by the Spanish and Austrians. Still, almost all of the valleys in the area were employed during the struggle for purposes of supply, defense and attack.

APPENDIX II

A. Traicté de Madrit ou Declaration du Roy d'Espagne faicte à Monsieur de Bassompierre pour la restitution de la Valteline.

Ayant esté envoyé sur la fin du mois de Fevrier de la presente annee [1621] de la part du Roy Tres-Chrestien, le sieur de Bassompierre Chevalier de nos Ordres, Conseiller en nostre Conseil d'Estat, & Colonel General des Suisses, son ambassadeur extraordinaire en Espagne pour traicter avec le Roy Catholique du restablissement de la Valteline, à cause des interests qui obligoient sadite Majesté Tres-Chrestienne de conserver & maintenir les Grisons en leur pays, il trouva sadite Majesté Catholique malade, de sorte qu'il ne peut executer sa commission de vive voix, mais ayant donné sa lettre de créance, & mis par escrit les principaux points de sa commission, la mort de sadite Majesté non preveue fut cause qu'elle avoit de restituer ladite Valteline selon le desir & demande dudit Roy Tres-Chrestien, d'autant plus qu'en mesme temps sa Sainteté en fit instance fort expresse par un Bref particulier: mais ayant sadite Majesté Catholique, d'heureuse memoire, en mourant laissé aux clauses adjoustées à son testament le Chapitre suivant.

D'autant que le vingt-septiesme de Mars de la present
annee j'ay receu une lettre de la main de sa Sainteté Gregoire
XV, par laquelle il m'exhortoit & enchargeoit qu'en sa con-
sideration & pout l'amour du luy, ayant esgard au bien public,
j'advisasse de pacifier l'affaire de la Valteline, & oster

toutes occasions de scandales qui en pourroient arriver,
j'ordonne au Serenissime Prince mon tres-cher & tres-ayme
fils, de recevoir en cecy le conseil paternal de sa Sainteté
en la forme susdite, puis que ma principale intention n'a esté
que pour le bien public & seureté des Catholiques de ceste
valle, dont sa Sainteté prend le soin comme Pere Universel.
Et je veux que ce mien escrit & ordonnance soit tenue pour
clause speciale de mon testament, comme si elle y avoit
esté compris en vertue de l'article contenu en mon dit testa-
ment, par laquelle je commande. Que tous les papiers qui
paroistront signez de mon nom, soient tenus pour partie
d'iceluy. Faict en mon nom Palais Royal de Madrit le 30 Mars
1621.

La Majesté du Roy D. Philip quatriesme incontinent apres estre venu à la Couronne voulut accomplir ce que le Roy son Seigneur & pere luy ordonnoit, & que sa Sainteté desiroit pour la tranquillité commune, & ce que le Roy Tres-Chrestien luy demandoit conformément à ce que sa parole Royale estoit obligé envers les Seigneurs des trois Ligues, & deputa avec ample pouvoir ses Commissaires les sieur Hierosme Caymo Regent de son supreme Conseil d'Italie, & Juan de Cerica Chevalier de l'Ordre de S. Jacques, Commandeur de Saint Vivera, Conseiller de sadite Majesté Catholique & son Secretaire d'Estat, Pour traicter sur ce sujet avec lesdits Seigneurs de Bassompierre, & Comte de la Rochepot Conseiller du Conseil d'Estat de sadite Majesté Tres-Chrestienne, & son ambassadeur ordinaire en ceste Cour, lesquels on convenu au nom desdits Majestez des articles suivants, en vertu de la

Lettre de creance qu'a apportee ledit sieur de Bassompierre dudit Roy Tres-Chrestien, en datte du 30 Janvier de la presente annee, & du pouvoir que lesdits sieurs Commissaires ont de sadite Majesté Catholique, dont les teneurs sont inserees à la fin du present Traicté.

1. Premièrement, Que toutes choses seront remises en leur premier estat, tant d'un coste que d'autre, retirant chacun les forces garnisons que l'on avoit mises de nouveau, & consequement que sa Majesté Catholique retire les troupes qu'elle a aux confines de l'Estat de Milan joignant la Valteline, & Val de Chiavenne, en façon qu'il n'y ait autres troupes que celles qui avoient accoustumé d'y estre avant cesdits mouvements derniers, & que d'autre part Messieurs les Grisons en feront de mesme en la Valteline, Comtez de Chiavenne & Bormio.

2. Sera fait pardon general par Messieurs des Ligues de tout ce qui a esté fait en ces derniers mouvements, sans que lesdits sujets de la Valteline, Comtez de Chiavenne & Bormio puissent jamais estre recherchez, ny inquietez en leurs personnes, ny en leurs biens pour tout ce qui a esté fait en ceste occasion, & à ceste fin lesdits Seigneurs Grisons mettront tout ce qui s'est passé en perpetuel oubly.

3. Il est arresté & accordé, que pour ce qui concerne la Religion en la Valteline, Comtez de Chiavenne & Bormio, on osterà toutes nouveutez prejudicables à la Religion Catholique, lesquelles pourroient avoir esté introduittes dez le commencement de l'annee 1617 jusques à present.

4. Il est accordé que les Ligues Grises feront le

serment & promesses requizes, conformément à ce qui est accoustumé en semblables occasions, pour l'entretienement de ce qui est accordé cy-dessus, & donneront lesdits serments & promesses en forme authentique aux trois personnages declarez au chapitre suivant. Et le Roy Tres-Chrestien promettra de faire entretenir la mesme chose, comme seront pareillement les treize Cantons & Valasians, ou la plus grand part d'iceux.

5. Que le Roy Catholique donnera incontinent advis au Seigneur Archiduc Albert son oncle, afin qu'il envoie le President du Parlement du Comté de Bourgogne, ou autres personnages du mesme Comté à Lucerne pour se trouver le plustost que faire se pourra, mais au plus tard, & pour tous delais au dernier de May prochainement venant, auquel lieu ledit personnages se joindra avec le Nonce de sa Sainteté, & l'ambassadeur que sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne aura agreable commettre pour accomplir & mettre les choses presentement concertees en effect & execution; entendant & declaront en outre que les anciens Traictez & pactions faictes avec la Maison d'Autriche, & en particulier pour la Comté de Tirol, seront entretenus & gardez.

6. Que le personnage qu'enverra le Seigneur Archiduc Albert du Comté de Bourgogne portera avec soy une lettre anticipée de son Altesse pour le Duc de Feria, luy donnant advis que l'affaire est entierement achevée, & qu'il execute incontinent l'ordre qu'il aura eu de sa Majesté Catholique de restablir le tout, & le laisser au premier estat où il estoit auparavant; laquelle lettre il enverra aussi-tost au Duc de Feria, apres l'accomplissement des choses mentionnees au

quatriesme chapitre cy-dessus: Et à ceste fin sera envoyé par sa Majesté Catholique audit Duc de Feria, ordre tres-expres pour executer promptement ledit restablissement, & remettre le tout en son premier estat, aussi-tost qu'il en aura eu advis de sadite Altesse.

7. Que ceste capitulation sera ratifiée par le Roy Tres-Chrestien, & que la ratification en sera delivrée à Paris au Marquis de Mirabel Conseller de la guerre de sa Majesté Catholique, & son amabssadeur ordinaire resident en la Cour de France, & ce incontinent apres que ledit sieur de Bassompierre y sera arrivé.

8. Il est arresté qu'il sera fait deux coppies de ceste capitulation, l'une langue Françoisse, l'autre en langue Castillane, toutes deux signees desdits sieurs de Bassompierre, Comte de la Rochepot, Regent Caymo, Secretaire Cerica, pour estre mises és mains de chacune desdites parties, à scavoir la Françoisse audit Secretaire Juan de Cerica, & la Castillane audit sieur de Bassompierre. Faict à Madrit, le 25 jour d'Avril l'an 1621. signee Bassompierre, d'Angennes, Regent Caymo, Juan de Cerica.

M.F., X (Paris, 1625), 123-29.

B. Premier projet dressé à Rome, pour l'accommodement des differents qui sont entre les Grisons, en Fevrier, 1624.

I. Que l'establissement de la Religion Catholique en la Valteline, Comtez de Bormio & Chiavenne s'effectuera conformément aux articles qui en ont esté dressez par ordre de sa Sainteté, & qui seront mis au pied de ceste capitulation,

souscripts par le commandement de sa Sainteté, & Monsieur le Cardinal Barbarin son nepveu.

II. Que les Grisons jureront & promettront les observations des mesmes articles de la Religion, s'obligeant en toute meilleure forme aux deux Roys; & ceux-cy l'un à l'autre; & les mesmes deux Roys pour ladicte observation promettront l'assistance de leurs bons offices, & encores de leurs armes toutes-fois & quantes qu'ils en seront requis de sa Sainteté, ou des Papes qui seront pour lors.

III. Qu'en tous les lieux de la Valteline des Comtez de Bormio & de Chiavenne, esquels les Grisons avoient accoustumé d'envoyer des Gouverneurs devant les derniers mouvements de l'an 1620 ils puissent doresnavant en envoyer encores qui soient esleus de leurs communes, pourveu qu'ils soient Catholiques, & non autrement.

IV. Qu'en toutes les instances & cas d'appellation selon les loix, statuts, & coustumes des Grisons, les causes esquelles lesdits Gouverneurs Catholiques esdits Pays auront donné sentence soient reveues par des Juges Catholiques esleus comme dessus.

V. Que lesdits Gouverneurs administeront la Justice droictment & sans aucune passion, haine, & vengeance.

VI. Que lesdits Gouverneurs procederont à ladicte administration de Justice tant civile que criminelle avec l'assistance des Lieutenants esleus des lieux où ils exerceront leur Gouvernement.

VII. Que quant au Comté de Bormio & ses dependances, l'on n'entend point par la present Capitulation faire aucun prejudice aux privileges dont ceux de Bormio jouyssoient

devant lesdits mouvements de l'an 1620 mais au contraire que tous lesdits privileges demeurent en leur premier vigueur: la present Capitulation s'entendant pour les peuples dudit Comté de Bormio, plustost augmentant que restreignant leursdits privileges.

VIII. Que tous les forts bastis en ladicte Valteline & Comtez de Bormio & Chiavenne, depuis l'annee 1620, se démoliront, avec promesse des Grisons aux deux Couronnes, & de celles-cy reciproquement l'une à l'autre, qu'ils ne se referont, & ne se permettra qu'ils soient refaicts sous quelque pretexte & couleur que ce soit.

IX. Que le passage par la Valteline & Comté de Bormio demeurera libre à sa Majesté Catholique pour faire passer & retourner les mesmes gens de guerre, qu'elle aura besoin d'envoyer delà les monts, avec les circonspections qu'on a accoustumé d'avoir és passages de la gendarmerie touchant le departement des chemins, & comportements desdits gens de guerre.

X. Que les Valtelins & ceux de Bormio, & tous les autres habitans des susdits Vallées & de leurs dependances, auront pardon general de tout ce qui s'est passé jusqu'au jour de la datte des presences à cause des mouvements qui commencerent l'an 1620. . . .

XI. Que les Grisons prometttront & jureront en s'obligeans aux deux Roys en toute meilluere forme, & ceux-cy l'un à l'autre l'observation de tous les presents articles, & de tout ce qui en tout autre cas controversé ou litigeux sera déclaré par les deux Roys estre entendu en la presente Capitulation; jurant encore lesdits Grisons l'observation des

articles cy-dessus concernans la Religion Catholique.

XII. Qu'en cas de contravention à tous les presents articles de Religion, ou en aucune partie d'iceux, & en ce qui touche la present Capitulation, les Grisons se declareront avec expresse renonciation dez à present comme dez lors, exclus & privez de toute raison, jurisdiction & superiorité, ez Comtez de la Valteline & Comté de Bormio, en sorte que lesdits pays & habitans demeurent pour tousjours libres & sans que jamais plus ils doivent recognoistre en aucune façon lesdits Grisons.

XIII. Que pour tant mieux asseurer ceste promesse, les Grisons prieront les deux Roys de prendre en leur protection la deffense des Valtelins, & ceux de Bormio contre eux-mesmes, pour faire qu'ils observant la presente Capitulation, & les articles concernons la Religion joints icy bas.

XIV. Qu'il sera au plain & absolu arbitrage du Pape de declarer les cas de contravention aux presens articles Politiques accordez entre les deux Couronnes; & que lesdits Grisons prometttront & s'obligeront aux deux Roys, & ceux-cy reciproquent l'un à l'autre d'en demeurer à ce que sa Sainteté declarera touchant ladite contravention.

XV. Que lesdits Grisons contrevenants à la susdite capitulation & establissement, ou en quelque partie des articles cy-dessus transcripts concernant la Religion, ou par offense que quelques personnes particuliers feussent au public de la Valteline & du Comté de Bormio, ou par offense particuliere entre privez Grisons & Valtelins, & ceux dudit Comté de Bormio.

XVI. Que le Pape declarant que les Grisons auront contravenue, en ce cas, si tost que telle declaration de sa Saincteté par le moyen de son Nonce prez les Suisses & Grisons Catholiques sera fait aux Ambassadeurs que les deux Roys tiennent respectivement esdits pays, leursdites Majestés seront obligées dans le temps de quatre mois que leur aura esté faicte la declaration du Pape, de faire desister les Grisons de toute contravention, autrement que ce terme expiré, il sera permis à sa Majesté Catholique, & à ses Ministres de moyenner sans ou avec les armes, comme sa Majesté jugera plus à propos, que les Valtelins & ceux du Comté de Bormio demeurent libres conformément à l'Article unziesme cy-dessus escrit, & qu'en tel cas sa Majesté tres-Chrestienne ne donnera aucune assistance secrette ou public aux Grisons.

XVII. Que si l'offense des Grisons estoit telle contre les Valtelins, & ceux de Bormio, qu'ils prissent publiquement les armes contr'eux, encores que ceste prise d'armes eut pour fondement une cause particuliere, alors & en ce cas, sans qu'il soit besoin d'une denonciation au Pape, ny d'une declaration de cestuy-cy, il sera permis à sa Majesté Catholique, & à ses Ministres, de moyenner sans autre delay, sans, ou avec, les armes, comme mieux luy semblera, que les Valtelins & ceux du Comté de Bormio demeurent libres conformément à l'Article unziesme cy-dessus escrit, & qu'en tel cas sa Majesté tres-Chrestienne ne donnera aucune assistance secrette ou public aux Grisons.

XVIII. Que les deux Couronnes s'obligeront de demeurer à la declaration du Pape, naissant quelque doute

sur ces trois articles, sçavoir 14. 15. & 16. qui concernant la seureté du present establissement, en cas que lesdits Roys ne fussent d'accord en la determination desdites doutes.

XIX. Que lesdits deux Roys & leurs Ambassadeurs ordinaires pres sa Sainteté conformément à leur pouvoir, la teneur duquel sera enregistre au pied de la presente Capitulation, en prometttront l'observation, & des articles cy-dessus escrits, & que dans le terme de deux mois, de la datte du present establissement, les articles en seront ratifiees.

XX. Qu' aussi-tost que la ratification en sera faite, & que les patentes en seront envoyes à sa Sainteté, la presente Capitulation s'effectuera, afin qu'esdits pays de la Valteline & Comtez de Bormio & Chiavenne, les forts soient demolis.

XXI. Que jusques à ce que lesdits forts soient demolis en ladite Vallee & Comtez de Bormio & de Chiavenne, le depest s'entend estre continuée entre les mains du Pape, & que pour le commandement de ces lieux-là, il demeure un Catholique tel que sa Sainteté voudra, en quoy les deux Roys donneront leur consentment, & à ce tel là, la Superintendance pour l'accomplissement & execution du present establissement.

XXII. Que chacun des Ambassadeurs des deux Couronnes soubscrira une coppie de la present Capitulation, l'un retenant pres de Soy celle qui aura esté soubscrite de l'autre.

Project des Articles touchant de le faict de la Religion, que le Pape Urbain 8 entend estre observez dans la Valteline, & aux Comtez de Chiavenne & Bormio.
Au mois de Fevrier, 1624.

Articles du moyen par lequel les choses touchant la Religion Catholique-Romaine, les Peuples de la Valteline & des Comtez de Chiavenne & de Bormio devront estre gouvernez par ordre & commandement de sa Sainteté le Pape Urbain 8. Si tous les poincts politiques pour l'accommodement des differents qui sont entre les Grisons & les Peuples de la Valteline & des Comtez de Chiavenne & de Bormio sont accordez entre les deux Roys par l'entremise de leurs Ambassadeurs ordinaires residens en la Cour de Rome: . . . Sa Beatitude prescrit & commande l'observation des Articles cy-dessus escrits.

1. Que les Gouverneurs qui seront envoyez és Gouvernemens de la Valteline, & des Comtez de Chiavenne & de Bormio, devront estre de la Religion Catholique-Romaine, & non autre.
2. Que toutes les instances & cas d'appellation, selon les Loix, Status, & Coustumes du pays, les causes esquelles lesdits Gouverneurs Catholiques esdites pays aurons donné sentence, seront cogneuës & reveues par des Juges Catholiques.
3. Qu'en cas qu'il survint quelque doute, si lesdits Gouverneurs & Juges seront vrayment Catholiques, ou pretendus tels, l'on doive demeurer à la Declaration que le Pape en sera devant qu'ils prennent possession de leur charge.
4. Que dans la Valteline, Comtez de Chiavenna & de Bormio, comme aussi és lieux de Bruz & Puschiavo, l'on ne puisse exercer en aucun temps ny maniere, soit publiquement, soit privéement, aucun acte ou usage, ny faire profession d'aucune autre Religion que de la seule Catholique-Romaine.
5. Que les Grisons seront obligez de recevoir & maintenir

avec tout favorable assistance en tous leurs pays de deçà les monts l'exercice de la seule Religion Catholique-Romaine, & de tout acte & usage d'icelle privativement à tout autre exercice, acte & usage d'autre Religion.

6. Que les mesmes Grisons seront obligez de recevoir & maintenir avec toute favorable assistance en tous les autres pays le libre exercice de la Religion Catholique-Romaine, & de tout acte & usage particuliere d'icelle, & de chasser de leursdits pays tous apostats de l'Eglise Romaine, en sorte qu'ils ne puissent avoir domicile esdits pays.

7. Que nul de secte heretique, telle qu'elle puis estre, ne puis avoir domicile asseuré en aucun terre ou lieu de la Valteline, des Comtez de Chiavenne & de Bormio, de Bruz, & de Puschiavo, ny en aucun autre lieu deçà les monts sous quelque pretexte que ce puisse estre.

8. Qu'en tous les susdits pays, domaines & lieux, tous les Loix & Decrets qui offensent en quelque façon le Pape & son autorité, & celle de l'Ordinaire, & qui sont contre la liberté Ecclesiastique, seront revoquées & annulles, & par special les Sentences faits par les Droictures de Tosane contre les Valtelins devant leur souslevation.

9. Que les heritiques, de quelque secte que ce soit, qui ont des biens stables, cens, rentes, & qui possèdent en aucune maniere immeubles, meubles, & autres biens en la Valteline, Comtez de Chiavenne & de Bormio, s'ils ne veulent vivre suivant l'usage de ladite Religion Catholique-Romaine, & que devant que de s'y habiter faire profession de la Foy Catholique, seront obligez de vendre, permuter, ou en quelque outre

façon aliener lesdits biens à personnes Catholiques, dans le terme de six ans de la datte des presents articles: & cependant voulans bailler à ferme lesdits biens, seront tenus de ce faire à des Catholiques.

10. Qu'il sera permis aux heretiques qui possederont des biens, comme a esté dit cy-dessus, durant le temps desdites six ans de pouvoir aller & demeurez lieux où ils possederont lesdits biens deux mois de l'annee, à sçavoir un mois à la fois, en divers temps du jour de leur arrivee esdits pays, & non deux mois de suite; durant lesquels temps ils pourront faire valoir leursdits biens, cultiver leurs terres, & en recueillir les fruicts, les transporter, & librement jouyr de leurs revenus.

11. Que lesdits heretiques ez cas exprimez cy-dessus de cultiver leurs terres, & en recueillir les fruicts, ne pourrrent mener avec eux leurs femmes & familles. Et quant aux Gentils-hommes, il sera permis de mener deux serviteurs au plus: & arrivez qu'ils seront au lieu où ils possedent du bien, seront obligez de se presenter au Podestat ou au Lieutenant dudit lieu, lesquels ne pourront leur donner licence de demeurer plus longtemps que celui qui leur est accordé cy-dessus, ny leur permettre d'y venir armez; lesquels susdits heretiques pendant qu'ils y demeureront, ne pourront faire exercise d'aucune autre Religion, que de la Religion Catholique-Romaine en public ou privé, ny dogmatiser, disputer, ou en quelque autre façon, discourir des choses contraires à ladite Religion Catholique-Romaine; & faisons autrement, seront severement chastiez par la Justice de l'Ordinaire ou autre Juge Ecclesiastique.

12. Que les enfans des heretiques de quelque sorte que ce soit, tant masles que semelles, qui demeureront & sont encores en la Valteline, Comtez de Chiavenne & de Bormio, seront retenus esdits pays pour les nourrir & eslever à la Catholique ez Seminaires, Monasteres, & lieux pieux, ou en quelque autre façon, ausqels les peres seront tenus de donner les aliments: & en cas de refus, y seront contraints par les voyes d'une sommaire Justice, & sans appel; & ne pourront lesdits pères les priver de leur heredité.

13. Que l'entree libre en la Valteline, Comtez de Chiavenne & de Bormio sera permis à tous Ecclesiastiques, tant seculiers que regulieres: comme aussi d'y demeurer, y bastir des Eglises, d'y instituter des Paroisses, Colleges & Universitez, & finalement leur sera permis d'exercer sans aucun obstacle tout ce qui sera necessaire & expedient en ces pays-là manutention de la Religion Catholique-Romaine.

14. Qu'il sera permis à l'Ordinaire & aux Visiteurs & autres Ministres de l'Eglise Romaine de visiter lesdits pays, & y exercer en toutes affaires, mais principalement en ce qui touche la Religion Catholique-Romaine leur office & Jurisdiction selon la disposition des loix Ecclesiastiques & l'usage de l'Eglise Romaine.

15. Que la Ligue Grise, celles de la Cadée, & des dix Droictures, & la Seigneurie de Mayensfeld, tant au nom public que par les personnes particulieres seront obligees en vertu de la present Capitulation de rendre dans six mois de la datte d'icelles, aux Eglises & personnes Ecclesiastiques, tous & chacun les biens qui sont en quelque lieu que ce soit,

qui ont esté occupez & usurpez depuis quarante ans en ça; Et à ceste restitution seront obligez non seulement les usurpateurs, mais leurs heritiers successeurs, & ayans cause, avec condamnation des fruicts escheus & mal perçeus à ceux qui les ont occupez: comme aussi de ceux qui ont esté alienez par contracts autant devant que depuis les susdits quarante ans.

16. Que le susdit & tous autres de presens articles ne sera poinct restrictif & limitaf, mais extensif & ampliatif, à tout ce que aura desjà esté esclaircy, estably, & accordé par Monsieur l'Evesque de Compagne à present Nonce Apostolique ez Conferences & Pitachs faicts n'a gueres en la ville de Coyre pour le benefice de la Religion Catholique-Romaine, des Eglises, & personnes Ecclesiastiques.

17. Que pour plus grande seureté de ladite Religion Catholique-Romaine & des Catholiques, devant la demolition des forts, & tout autre acte de l'execution de la Capitualtion politique, devront estre publiez par Edict tous les present articles de Religion, compris sous les nombres 1.2.3.4.5.6. 7.8.9.10.11.12.13. & 14.

18. Que les Grisons prometttront aux deux Roys, & ceux-cy l'un à l'autre, de demeurer à la decision du Pape sur les doutes qui pourront naistre sur les present Articles de Religion, & contravention à la teneur d'iceux.

19. Que les deux Roys pareillement prometttront & s'obligeront d'assister tousjours pour l'entiere observation des presens Articles de leurs bons offices, & de leurs armes encore, tout & quantes fois qu'ils en seront requis par sa

Saincteté, ou des Papes qui seront pour lors.

20. Que la disposition du Chapitre unzième qui regarde le pardon de ceux de la Valteline, & de ceux de Bormio, & des Chapitres 11.12. & 13. touchant la seureté de l'observation des poincts politiques & temporels qui seront accordez entre les deux Roys, s'entendra de mot à mot repetee & inserees és presents Articles pour l'observation d'iceux en faveur de la Religion Catholique-Romaine, non seulement en la Valteline & Comté de Bormio, mais à Chiavenne encores, comme si Chiavenne au regard de la Religion estoit compris ausdits Articles.

21. Que pour plus grande seureté de l'accomplissement & observation desdits Articles de Religion, chacun des deux Roys sera promptement faire tous offices, afin que les Suisses promettent & s'obligent pour les Grisons, à l'observation de toutes & chacunes les choses comprises aux susdits Articles; mais que ce present Article s'entendra mis à part & purement, & non par forme de condition, afin que les articles qui seront establis, comme il a esté dit cy-dessus entre lesdits deux Couronnes, touchant les poincts politiques & temporels, & les susdits Articles touchant la Religion demeurent en leur vigueur, encore que ladite promesse des Suisses n'ensuivist.

Reprinted in M.F., X (Paris, 1625), 154-69.

C. Les Articles traictez & accordez entre l'Excellent Seigneur Marquis de Coeuvres Ambassadeur de sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne aux Suisses & Grisons, & General de l'armee de l'Union de sadite Majesté Tres-Chrestienne, de la Serenissime

Republique de Venise, & de son Altesse de Savoye, Avec les
souscrits Deputez de la Valteline.

1. Les Valtelins seront maintenus sous la protection de sa Majesté Très-Chrestienne, selon l'alliance qu'elle a avec les Seigneurs Grisons, & celle qu'elle a avec lesdits Seigneurs Princes ses Colleguez, pourveu que les Valtelins s'en rendent dignes, par la renonciation à toutes les protections, alliances, & traictez recherchez & conclus depuis les cinq derniers anneés avec autres Princes.

2. Que nul des forts ne sera mis en la puissance des Grisons, & au respect du Terzero de Tirano, ils ne seront point logez aux terres de dessus, ny en celles dessous, & n'entront point és maisons des familles principales, sçavoir en celles de Torelli, Lamberthengi, & Bresta; & sera mis un si bon ordre parmy eux, & une si Bonne discipline, que nul ne sera mal traicté ny de parole, ny de faict.

3. Que l'administration & gouvernement de la Valteline demeurera en l'estat qu'il se trouvera à present, & pour le temps qu'il sera jugé raisonnable par sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne, & lesdits Princes ses Colleguez.

4. Que les differents entre les Grisons & Valtelins seront accordez le plustost que faire se pourra, avec toute satisfaction & seureté pour les Valtelins.

5. Seureté, telle qu'elle demandera par les particulieres familles de la Valteline.

6. Les Deputez Valtelins ayans proposé estre raisonnable, que si les affaires & different entre les Grisons & Valtelins ne se peuvent terminer au contentement de tous les

particuliers, & qu'ils s'en trouvast aucuns qui seroient contraincts d'aller habiter ailleurs auparavant qu'ils soient necessitez de partir, on leur donnera une entiere satisfaction du payement de toutes leurs facultez: Que sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne, & les Princes ses Colleguez, seront obligez de practiquer toutes sortes de moyens possibles pour l'accomplissement de cest article.

7. Et suivant cest accord, (lequel servira pour le Terzero de Tirano & Teglio, & pour ceux de Sondrio & Morbegno, & tous autres qui voudront suivre l'exemples des Tiraniens) les Deputez souscrits promettent & s'obligent de mettre les armes bas, & recevoir dans Tirano & par tout l'armee de sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne, & des Princes ses Colleguez, comme amis & Protecteurs, & d'ouvrir les portes de tout ce qui est, & se trouvera en leur puissance.

8. Ces articles ont esté conclus & arrestez de part & d'autre, sçavoir de la part & au nom de sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne, & les Princes ses Colleguez, par Monsieur le Marquis de Coeuvres, General de leur armee, avec promesse de les faire approuver: Et de l'autre part, par les Deputez soussignez, tous du Conseil, & habitans de la Valteline, qui promettent de fournir la ratification des presents articles par ledit Conseil, & par tous les habitans du Terzero de Tirano.

Fait à Madona de Tirano le 6 Decembre 1624. Signé,
D'Estrées.

M.F., X (Paris, 1625), 825-28.

D. Traicté Pour la Paix de la Valteline, fait à Monçon en Espagne le 5 Mars 1626 entre les deux Roys.

Le retour de Monsieur le Legat [Barberini] en Italie, sans rien conclure au sujet des propositions qui se firent en France, a donné occasion à plusieurs discours qui se firent sur ce sujet en different endroits. Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de France residant en Espagne reçeut l'ordre de penetrer si la difficulté que fit ledit sieur Legat sur la Souveraineté des Grisons, en laquelle seule consistoit le peu de fruict de sa negotiation, estoit née par mouvement & intelligence du Roy d'Espagne; Et ainsi parlant à M. le Comte Duc de S. Lucar, il luy representa en outre combien directement ce point là touchoit à la reputation du Roy Tres-Chrestien; a quoy ledit sieur Comte Duc luy donna aux mesmes manieres à entendre avec paroles semblablement generales, bien qu'expresses, Que directement ny indirectment il ne s'estoit traicté ny proposé de la part de sa Majesté Catholique aucune chose avec ledit sieur Legat, & qu'on n'avoit employé son moyen pour qu'aucune parole entrast de la part d'Espagne en quelque point que se peust estre de sa negociation en France, & auusi peu aux particulieres propositions d'Icelle: Que ce dont il estoit certain, que chose du monde qui fust veritablement & reellement contraire à la reputation du Roy Tres-Chrestienne, sa Majesté en aucun temps que ce fust ne le pouvoit desirer, ny avoir pour agreable; & que dans les choses concurrentes la Valteline, le propre et seul but du Roy son Maistre estoit la seureté de la Religion Catholique-Romaine, principal fin de sa Majesté Catholique en toutes ses actions. A quoy repondit sieur

Ambassadeur de France, agreant & ayant en estime de la part de sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne ceste response sur ce point, touchant le desir de sa Majesté Catholique à ne point prejudicer à la reputation du Roy son Maistre, en chose où sa Majesté Catholique peust cognoistre qu'elle peust estre interessée. Et en ceste bonne disposition ils proposerent ensemble le desir de l'accommodement des alterations presents en Italie; surquoy conferans de part & d'autre; ils sont demeurez d'accord des Articles suivans: etablissant premierement & de conformité pour point indubitable & arrêté, & du S. Siege Apostolique, afin que la premiere cause & mouvement de ce Traicté soit le nom de sa Sainteté.

I. Que leurs Majestez desirans de reduire leur amitié en bonne correspondance, si elle estoit tant soit peu alterée par les incidents arrivez entre Messieurs les Grisons & les Valtelins, à entiere & reciproque satisfaction, de conformité unanime ont resolu, resoluent, capitulent, & promettent de remettre les affaires desdits sieurs Grisons, Valtelins, Comtez de Bormio & de Chiavenne, en l'estat où elles estoient quand les premieres troubles ont commencé parmy eux, ce qu'on presuppose avoir esté au commencement de l'annee 1617 sans alterer ny innover chose du monde de l'estat où elles se trouvoient pour lors: Annullans pour cet effect tous traictez faictes depuis ladite annee avec les Grisons, par qui ce puisse estre.

II. Qu'en la Valteline, Comtez de Bormio & de Chiavenne, il n'y puisse à perpetuité avoir autre Religion que la Catholique, Apostolique, Romaine, avec tres expresse

exclusion de quelque exercice ou usage d'autre secte, ou Religion que ce soit. Et que l'establissement & observation perpetuelle de cet Article soit dans un memorial perpetuel, du zèle et de la pieté de ces deux Couronnes, lesquelles y demeurent conjointment obligees.

III. Que les Valtelins, ceux des Comtez de Bormio & de Chiavenne, puissent eslire par eslection entr'eux, leurs Juges, Gouverneurs, & autres Magistrats tous Catholiques Grisons, ou Valtelins sans qu'à telle eslection Messieurs les Grisons se puissent opposer, ny que leur approbation soit necessaire; encores toutesfois que pour leur confirmation on ne met point en doute qu'ils la leur devoient donner: Et en cas de ne la donner, & huict jours passent apres la presentation, Lesdits sieurs Grisons perdront la premiere fois pour trois ans le droict qu'ils ont que les Valtelins la leur demandent; & que les huict jours estans passez, le pouvoir & exercice de leur Magistrature ne soit point suspendu ny interrompu; ains au contraire que la personne esleue exerce la charge, comme si elle avoit obtenu ladite confirmation: & au cas qu'en une autre eslection ils fissent encores le mesme refus, ils perdrent ledit droict à perpetuité.

IV. Que les Juges, Gouverneurs, & autres Magistrats, pourront juger diffinitivement, sans que pour raison quelconque lesdits Grisons puissent annuler leurs Sentences & resolutions, ny destourner leur execution: Et aussi ordonner, disposer, & executer tout ce qui concerne leur Pouvoir, Office, & Magistrature, & le bien de la Religion Catholique, Apostolique & Romaine.

V. Et que rien de ce qui concerne les presens Articles, soit en la substance, soit en la forme, ne se puisse alterer par lesdits sieurs Grisons, soit par actes particuliers ou generaux: A l'observation dequoy, dès à present comme dès lors, les deux Roys se declarent engagez à l'execution de ce qui se promet, soit en cas qu'il se soit peu prévoir, ou non.

VI. Que nul Roy, Prince, ou Potentat puisse, sans offencer les deux Roys, attenter, retarder, empescher, ny faire differer chose quelconque, de ce qu'en faveur desdits sieurs Grisons, Valtelins, & Comtez susdites, a esté resolu, arresté, & capitulé ce jour d'huy cinquiesme jour de Mars 1626. entre les deux Couronnes: & qu'elles soient obligées de maintenir par toutes sorts de voyes deuës et raisonnables, ce qui a esté déclaré & arresté, & d'en conserver l'execution perpetuelle, sans y apporter aucune alteration.

VII. Que Messieurs les Grisons prometttront & jureront solennellement, & en plaine Assemblée, en la meilleure forme & plus autentique & celebre qui soit entr'eux, l'observation perpetuelle & inviolable des presens Articles & Capitulations. Et les deux Roys respectivement l'un à l'autre, comme chacun d'eux à part soy, prometttront, & jureront le mesme, & s'assisteront mutuellement de leurs offices, & de toutes voyes deuës, raisonnables, & permises, pour l'entiere & exacte observation des choses qui sont exprimées en ce present Traicté.

VIII. Que les deux Couronnes procureront & donneront asseurance d'un oubly perpetuel de ce qui s'est passé dans

tous les mouvements precedents, sans qu'aucuns de ceux qui y ont eu part recevoient aucune molestie pour ce sujet, ny en leurs personnes, ny en leurs familles, ny en leurs biens, soit qu'ils soient de la Valteline, des Comtez de Bormio, de Chiavenne, ou d'autres lieux.

IX. Que les Valtelins, & ceux des Comtez cy-dessus, comme jouyssans par ce Traicté d'un nouveau droict d'eslire, & avoir leurs Juges, Gouverneurs & Magistrats, payeront annuellement une somme de deniers aux Grisons, correspondante à l'utilité publique & particuliere, que le general & particulier desdits Grisons recevoit de leur administration & Magistrature esdites Valteline & Comtez: laquelle somme sera arbitrée par gens à ce deputez entr'eux de part & d'autre. Et pour rendre les Grisons plus promptes & interessez en l'observance de ce Traicté, s'il arrivoit que leur obstination fust telle, qu'au lieu de l'executer, ils entre prissent par resolution & advis public, & meussent les armes semblament publique, pour y desroger, Les deux Roys les declareront & les declarent dès à present, comme dès lors, exclus & privez à perpetuité de la somme de deniers mentionnée au present Article; Au payment de laquelle, lesdits Valtelins, & ceux desdits Comtez sont obligé: Comme aussi les Grisons, de confirmé les Juges, Gouverneurs & Magistrats qui seront esleus desdites Valteline & comtez. Et si cela ne suffit à arrester le cours de leur contravention, les deux Roys arbitreront ensemble une plus grande peine, & s'engagent à leur faire suivre.

X. Que le Pape faisant cognoistre par ses Nonces aux deux Roys qu'il y a contravention notable de la part des Grisons, en chose qui concerne la Religion, & le declarant ainsi, sa Sainteté apres ceste cognoissance donnée aux deux Roys; telle Declaration sera notifiée ausdits Grisons par le Nonce de sa Sainteté, resident dans le pays de Messieurs les Suisses Catholiques, afin qu'ils n'en pretendent cause d'ignorance; & qu'ils soient obligez de l'assister, se desister de leur contravention, & de rentree dans leur devoir, & s'ils ne le font dans quatre mois, à compter du jour de la datte de ladite Declaration notifiée, les deux Roys seront tenus de s'unir ensemble à prendre toutes voyes deuës, raisonnables & permises, pour s'opposer aux Grisons, & protoger les Valtelins. Et le Roy de France en particulier croit devoir à son zele & à sa pieté, d'employer lors sa puissance & autorité pour les reduire en leur devoir, tant s'en faut qu'il leur donne aucune assistance, ny public, ny secret, dont ils se puissent prevaloir.

XI. Que s'il arrivoit que les Grisons employassent leurs armes publiques contre les Valtelins & Comtez de Bormio & Chiavenne, pour quelque cause que ce fust, soit publique ou particuliere, les deux couronnes en seront adverties. Et les Ambassadeurs des deux Roys residens sur les lieux travailleront promptement & sans dilation à les faire desister: & en cas qu'ils ne le puissent obtenir, les deux Roys s'obligent d'employer conjointement leur autorité, moyens & pouvoir, leur faire sentir la peine qu'il semblera aux deux Roys estre deuë à ce desordre, conformément aux Capitu-

lations cy-dessus, desquelles la premiere est, De les tenir pour exclus du droict de confirmer l'eslection dudit Juges, Gouverneurs & Magistrats: Comme aussi, De perdre la somme annuelle que pour ceste raison lesdites Valtelins & Comtez leur devoient payer: Adjoutant à cela la plus grande peine qu'il plaira aux deux Roys declarer en conformité de leur Article 9 cy-dessus. Remarquant en outre que la Declaration des deux Roys, touchant ladite peine reservée à leur arbitre & jugement, se doit donner incontinent apres que le quatre mois, dont il est fait mention cy-dessus, seront passez, sans autre plus grande dilation.

XII. Qu'en quelque temps que se soit qu'il arrive que lesdits Valtelins & ceux des Comtez de Bormio & Chiavenne rompent en tout ou en partie, l'observation de ce present Traicté, touchant la Religion Catholique, ou Articles Politiques, lors que cela sera venu en evidence, les deux Roys les declaront descheus des privileges establis en leur faveur par leurs deux Majestez, lesquelles ont voulu s'employer à leur procurer ce bien & ce repos, avec tant de soin & de fatigue: et le Roy d'Espagne en particulier croit devoir à son zele & à sa pieté, d'employer sa puissance & autorité à les reduire en leur devoir; tant s'en faut qu'il leur rende aucune assistance, ny publique, ny secrette, pour les appuyer dans ladite contravention.

XIII. Que tout ce qui s'est cy-devant dit & capitulé, se doit entendre sous la presupposition qu'en premier lieu & devant toutes choses les forts de la Valteline, Comtez de Bormio & de Chiavenne, & le surplus de ce qu'en ces lieux-là

a esté occupé par les armes de la Ligue, & mesmes par celles de sa Majesté Catholique en ces presents alterations, sera entierement remis entre les mains de sa Sainteté.

XIV. Que les armes des deux Roys, ou de leurs Alliez, estans retirées desdits lieux, lesdits sieurs Grisons ne pourront tenir en leur frontiere qui regarde la Valteline & Comtez des garnisons extraordinaires, & plus fortes que celles qu'ils avoient auparavant ces alterations. La mesme & pareille Loy ayant à observer dans les frontiers de l'Estat de Milan, Demeurant en outre, & particulièrement arresté, que lesdits Grisons ne pourront mettre gens de guerre, milice, ny garnisons dans ladite Valteline ou Comtez de Bormio & Chiavenne, afin que la force & presence des armes que verroient les Valtelins ne violente pas l'usage libre de la Religion Catholique, ny de leur Justice en forme de Gouvernement establee par ce present Traicté.

[Articles XV, XVI, and XVII concern the settlement of the war between Savoy and Genoa, and are not included here.]

XVIII. Sa Majesté Catholique se contente dez ceste heure, que les presents choses capitulées estans arrestés, signées, & ratifiées des deux Roys, & chacune des choses particulièrement & à son regard; Que tous les forts qui sont en la Valteline, Comtez de Bormio & Chiavenne, sans exception aucune, lesquels y auront esté edifez depuis l'an 1620 soient razez & demolis par sa Sainteté, delivrant au Gouverneur de Milan ou à celuy qui aura son pouvoir & procuration, ce qui fut donné par inventaire à sa Sainteté d'artillerie & munition; & non seulement consent que dessus sa Majesté

Catholique, mais elle supplie instamment sa Sainteté, qu' incontinent elle le mette en execution, s'entendant en outre que lesdits Forts n'ayent à se refaire, par qui, ny sous pretexte que se soit.

XIX. Et d'autant qu'il s'est traictée plusieurs & diverses fois des formes & des moyens d'accommoder des affaires, sans que les Traictez qui se sont faits ayent peu avoir effect, leurs Majestez entendent & declarent, Que la present & seul Traicté est celuy qui doit avoir effect, & estre mis en execution; annullant tous les autres Traictez d'accommodement en ceste matiere, en la part où ils ne seront pas conformés totalement au present Traicté, La declaration duquel en chose douteuse concernant, se reserve & remet dès à present à sa Sainteté, Siege Apostolique, & sacre College; & en toutes autres choses, à l'amiable declaration & interpretation des deux Couronnes: lesquelles au surplus ont convenu de quatre mois de temps, à compter de cinquiesme Mars de l'annee present, pour les faire approuver à ceux qui y ont part, ou ont leurs interests communs en cet affaire.

XX. Ces presents Articles se concluent & signent unanimement & de conformité, par M. le Comte de la Rochepot, Conseiller d'Estat du Roy Tres-Chrestien, & son Ambassadeur en Espagne: & par M. le Comte de S. Lucar, du Conseil d'Estat de sa Majesté Catholique, son Sommelier du Corps, & grand Ecuyer; S'obligeant l'un à l'autre en vertu des pouvoirs qu'ils ont des Roys leurs Maistres, afin que le contenu en ce present Traicté demeure ferme & asseuré. Et en la mesme

maniere la ratification du present Traicté, accordé & signe de leurs Princes en la forme accoustumée, dans quatre mois apres la datte de presents, avec revelation & emulation de part & d'autre de quelque accident qui soit survenu, on puisse survenir, jusques à la ratification & publication du present Traicté. Fait à Monçon, le 5 jour de Mars 1626. Signé, D'Angennes, Y El Conde Duque de San Lucar.

Articles secrets touchant l'accommodation de la Paix de la Valteline, en Suite du Traicté cy dessus de Monçon.

Pour ne s'estre mis dans le Traicté du mesme datte de ce present Article, ce que ledit Article contient pour certains & bons respects, M. le Comte de la Rochepot, Conseiller d'Estat du Roy Tres-Chrestien, & son Ambassadeur en Espagne: & M. le Comte de S. Lucar, du Conseil d'Estat de sa Majesté Catholique, son Sommelier du Corps, & grand Ecuyer, ont convenu, que ledit Article (bien que secret) aura mesme force que s'il estoit compris dans le Traicté, & sera ratifiée de la mesme forme que ledit Traicté, & signe de la main de leurs Majestez.

[Paragraph omitted here]

D'autant que l'Article (inserée dans le Traicté) qui concerne la demolition des forts, ne porte pas une Declaration si expresse du temps & de la maniere dont il sera procedé en ceste demolition, comme il est l'intention des deux Roys, Leurs Majestez pour certains & bons respects se promettent l'un à autre de faire tous offices possibles, sans en espargner pas une, à ce qu'incontinent & sans aucun delay

ils se demolissent, encore qu'on aye toute confiance en la sainte intention de nostre S. Pere. Qu'apres la supplication qu'il luy en est faicte par le Traicté, il mette [sic] incontinent à effect ladite demolition: qu'apres la ratification dudit Traicté, les deux Roys luy en feront faire instance par leurs ambassadeurs residents aux pieds de sa Sainteté, de la bonté de laquelle il se promettent qu'il luy plaira leur en donner assurance. Faict à Monçon, le 5 jour de Mars 1626. Signé, D'Angennes, Y El Conde Duque de San Lucar.

[The same paragraph as the first in the secret articles appears here.]

Que si les Grisons, Valtelins, & ceux des Comtez de Bormio & Chiavenne ne s'accordent de la somme d'argent que lesdits Valtelins & Comtez devoient payer ausdits Grisons, à raison de ce qui leur est concedé du 5 Mars 1626. les deux Roys prendront un expedient en leurs differents, & les feront contenter de ce qui sera de raison, & dès à present, comme dès lors, leurs Majestez declarent & promettent, de ne consentir ny permettre que de part d'autre, la force s'employe sur ce sujet entre les parties, non plus qu'à l'advenir, pour quelques autres differents leurs Majestez promettent de terminer par leur autorité & negotiation, sans souffrir que lesdites parties, ny eux pour elles, viennent aux armes en quelque façon que ce puisse estre, soit sur le sujet de leur differents, soit en consequence d'iceluy; enquoy leurs Majestez demeurent unanimes & conformés. Fait à Monçon. . . .

M.F., XIII (Paris, 1627), Part II, 1-8.

E. [Treaty of Cherasco, 19 June 1631]

Premierement, que le susdit Traicté de Querasque [Cherasco] sera entierement observé selon sa forme & teneur excepté ce qui sera changé par le present pour le regard dudit Article secret; qui est, que ledit seigneur Galasso a promis de nouveau, qu'au premier advis donné du present accord l'Empereur donnera l'Investiture du Mantouan, du Montferrat, & de toutes les terres en dependantes, sans reserve ny condition, en la mesme forme qu'aux Ducs ses predecesseurs, excepté les terres assignees au Duc de Savoye & au Duc de Gustalle, qui leur ont ont este accordees pour les raisons contenues audit Traité de Quesasque, & par le Duc de Parme, Comissaire deputé par sa Majesté Imperiale.

2. Ledit seigneur Galasso promet faire venir ladite Investiture dans 25 jours du jour de le Traicté; ou du moins advis de Monsieur de Léon Ambassadeur aupres de l'Empereur, ou de Monsieur l'Evesque de Mantoue, qu'elle est expediee & consignée entre leurs mains.

3. Promet en outre ledit Galasso que des troupes de l'Empereur sortiront d'Italie, & de retirer ensemble les six mil hommess de pied, & les mille Chevaux que le Duc de Feria Gouverneur de Milan doit envoyer à la fin de Juillet prochain, excepte six cents hommes de pied & cent Chevaux, que chaque partie pourra tenir dans les places reservees par le present Traicté.

4. Pour plus d'assurance de la restitution des places, seront consignez de part & d'autre des ostages, sçavoir du costé de l'Empereur lesdits seigneurs Piccolomini,

Chieza, & Visleben; & de celuy du Roy, Messieurs de Tavanès, de Nerestan, & d'Ayguebonne, lesquels seront envoyez depuis le 20 Juillet jusques au 20 Aoust, qu'ils devront estre rendus entre les mains de sa Sainteté; qui est suppliee de les recevoir, & garder, avec promesse & obligation de ne les rendre, qu'apres l'execution du present Traicté.

5. Et en cas que l'une des parties n'eust ou ne voulust executer ledict Traicté, celui qui aura executé retirera les siens, & ceux encores de sa partie jusques à l'entiere execution dudit Traitté.

6. Sa Sainteté declare neantmoins qu'elle n'entend recevoir aucun ostage pour la restitution des Grisons, pour laquelle ledit Galasso promet se consigner soy-mesme pour Ostage entre les mains du Duc de Mantoue; & ledit sieur de Thouras [Toiras] de mesme pour Briqueras entre les mains du Duc de Savoye, au cas que lesdits Grisons & Briqueras, ne soient rendus au temps promis par ce Traicté; qui est depuis le sixiesme jusques au 20. Aoust.

7. Et au cas que l'un manque, il sera donné en Ostage à celui qui aura executé jusques à l'entiere execution de ce qu'ils ont promis.

8. Les demolitions de costé & d'autre commencerent à se faire le 6. Aoust jusques le 20. dudit mois, auquel temps les susdictes demolitions soient faites ou non, en l'une des deux manieres suivantes.

9. La premiere que lesdites places seront tout à coup abandonnées & rendues au mesme jour 20. d'Aoust, sçavoir par Messieurs de Thoiras & de Servient pour le Roy, Pignerol,

Briquerasm, Suze, Avigliane, avec tous les Forts & Chateaux en despendans; & par le sieur Galasso pour l'Empereur, au mesme jour que les susdites, Mantoue, Porto, & Canetto, avec leurs Forts & Chateaux & dépendans: Ensemble les Passages des Grisons, Valteline & Comté de Chiavenne. De Maniere qu'à mesme temps & à mesme jour 20. Aoust, jour de ladite restitution, seront retirez de part & d'autre les garnisons desdites places; Et lesdites places remises comme elles estoient auparavant la guerre, aux Ducs de Savoye, de Mantoue, & ausdits Grisons.

. . . Fait à Querasque le 19. de Juin 1631. M. Galasso.
Thoyras. Servient.

M.F., XVII (1633), 34-38.

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